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Abstract 
 
Leveraging the knowledge of an organization is an ongoing challenge that has given rise 
to the field of knowledge management.     Yet, despite spending enormous sums of 
organizational resources on Information Technology (IT) systems, executives recognize 
there is much more knowledge to harvest.   Prediction markets are emerging as one tool 
to help extract this tacit knowledge and make it operational.    Yet, prediction markets, 
like other markets, are subject to pathologies (e.g., bubbles and crashes) which 
compromise their accuracy and may discourage organizational use.    
 
The techniques of experimental economics were used to study the characteristics of 
prediction  markets.    Empirical data was gathered from an on-line asynchronous 
prediction market.    Participants allocated tickets based on private information and, 
depending on the market type, public information indicative of how prior participants had 
allocated their tickets.   The experimental design featured three levels of feedback  (no-
feedback, percentages of total allocated tickets and frequency of total allocated tickets) 
presented to the participants. 
 
The research supported the hypothesis that information assimilation in feedback markets 
is composed of two mechanisms - information collection and  aggregation.    These are 
defined as:  
• Collection - The compilation of dispersed information - individuals using their own 
private information make  judgments and act accordingly in the market. 
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• Aggregation - The market's judgment on the implications of this gathered information 
- an inductive process. This effect comes from participants integrating public 
information with their private information in their decision process. 
 
Information collection was studied in isolation in no feedback markets and the hypothesis 
that markets outperform the average of their participants was supported.    The hypothesis 
that with the addition of feedback, the process of aggregation would be present was also 
supported.    Aggregation was shown to create agreement in markets (as measured by 
entropy) and drive market results closer to correct values (the known probabilities).  
However, the research also supported the hypothesis that aggregation can lead to 
information mirages, creating a market bubble. 
 
The research showed that the presence and type of feedback can be used to modulate 
market performance.  Adding feedback, or more informative feedback, increased the 
market's precision at the expense of accuracy.    The research supported the hypotheses 
that these changes were due to the inductive aggregation process which creates agreement 
(increasing precision), but also occasionally generates information mirages (which 
reduces accuracy). 
 
The way individual participants use information to make allocations was characterized.    
In feedback markets the fit of participants' responses to various decision models 
demonstrated great variety.  The decision models ranged from little use of information 
(e.g., MaxiMin),  use of only private information (e.g., allocation in proportion to 
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probabilities), use of only public information (e.g., allocating in proportion to public 
distributions) and  integration of public and private information.    Analysis of all 
feedback market responses using multivariate regression also supported the hypothesis 
that public and private information were being integrated by some participants.   The 
subtle information integration results are in contrast to the distinct differences seen in 
markets with varying levels of feedback.    This illustrates that the differences in market 
performance with feedback are an emergent phenomenon (i.e., one that could not be 
predicted by analyzing the behavior of individuals in different market situations). 
 
The results of this study have increased our collective knowledge of market operation and 
have revealed methods that organizations can use in the construction and analysis of 
prediction markets.     In some situations markets without feedback  may be a preferred 
option.  The research supports the hypothesis that information aggregation in feedback 
markets can be simultaneously  responsible for beneficial information processing as well 
as harmful information mirage induced bubbles.    In fact, a market subject to mirage 
prone data resembles a Prisoner's Dilemma where individual rationality results in 
collective irrationality.  
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1 Motivations and Research Questions 
The motivations and research questions for the present study are explained in this section. 
 
 
1.1 Motivations 
“If only HP knew what HP knows, we would be three times more productive”  
Lew Platt, while CEO of Hewlett-Packard  
 
Leveraging the knowledge of an organization is an ongoing challenge that has given rise 
to the field of knowledge management.     Yet, despite spending enormous sums of 
organizational resources on Information Technology (IT) systems, executives recognize 
there is much more knowledge to harvest – as expressed by Lew Platt’s comment.   The 
role and issues associated prediction markets as a tool to reveal latent knowledge within 
the organization are discussed below. 
 
1.1.1 Organization Knowledge Management 
Knowledge Management (KM) is a field within the area of Information Sciences which 
deals with the organizational use of information and knowledge.    The field is of great 
practical value to organizational Information Technology (IT) groups – that is, the group 
that develops and deploys computer and technology systems for the organization’s 
employees.   KM is discussed in numerous books and academic journals - cf. (Liebowitz, 
1999), (Tiwana, 2002), (Davenport & Prusak, 1998), (Choo, 1998) and (Nissen, 2006). 
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1.1.2 Issues with Sharing Information 
Studies have shown that knowledge management (KM) projects can encounter a variety 
of problems and challenges (c.f. Gupta, Iyer, & Aronson, 2000; Lin & Kwok, 2006; 
Sharp, 2003).  Invariably, these problems are the result of unforeseen side effects 
manifested by the system being manipulated – namely the organization.   Fundamentally, 
a KM system requires that members of the organization share their knowledge.  This may 
simply mean making explicit knowledge accessible to others or transforming tacit 
knowledge into explicit knowledge for sharing.  There are a number of reasons an 
individual may not be willing to share their knowledge (Ciborra & Patriotta, 1998) 
(Gilmour, 2003; Schutte & Snyman, 2006): 
• Individuals may feel their proprietary knowledge is a competitive advantage versus 
their fellow employees – resulting in a prisoner’s dilemma (Jolly & Wakeland, 2008) 
• They may fear loss of power or control 
• They may fear ridicule or criticism 
• They may not feel sharing is fair, as described by experimental economics research 
(Sigmund, Fehr, & Nowak, 2002).   
• Organizational culture may not be conducive to knowledge sharing (Long & Fahey, 
2000). 
 
1.1.3 Wisdom of Crowds 
The term Wisdom of Crowds was popularized by the best-selling book of the same title 
by James Surowiecki (2005), a business columnist for the New Yorker magazine.    
Surowiecki’s book is important for at least two  reasons: 1) he does a credible job of 
collecting the most important ideas and research; and, 2) he presents the material in a 
very readable fashion, bringing the topic to a large group of business managers.     
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The thesis of the wisdom of crowds is that the diverse knowledge and expertise of a 
group can potentially be harnessed and applied to a range of problems.    Further, the 
argument offers that, by virtue of the aggregated diversity, these groups can potentially 
outperform groups of experts.   Several other books have been written on the general 
topic of crowd wisdom with similar discussions (Sunstein, 2006), (Benkler, 2006), 
(Tapscott & Williams, 2006), (Rheingold, 2002). 
 
Surowiecki’s main thesis is that there are four conditions that characterize wise crowds:  
• Diversity of opinion 
• Independence 
• Decentralization (people are able to specialize and draw on local knowledge)  
• An aggregation mechanism 
 
These concepts are discussed below. 
1.1.3.1 The Value of Diversity 
Scott Page is professor and researcher at the University of Michigan.   His book The 
Difference (Page, 2007) develops ideas around diversity in groups.   One of the main 
propositions he develops is what he calls “the crowds beats the average law.”   This 
asserts “Given a collection of diverse predictive models, the collective prediction is more 
accurate than the average individual predictions.”  That is the collective prediction error 
is less than the average individual error (Hong & Page, 2004).    Hong and Page develop 
this assertion via modeling and a mathematical derivation.   Their derivation uses the set 
of assumptions listed below: 
• Agents are intelligent (that is, they can find a marginally better solution) 
• The problem is difficult (that is, no agent can always find the optimal solution) 
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• Diversity of agents (if the predictions differ then prediction diversity must be 
positive) 
• The best agent is unique 
 
Given these conditions, Hong and Page assert that groups of diverse problem solvers can 
outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers.    So, the theorem asserts that both 
ability and diversity contribute to the wisdom of crowds. 
1.1.3.2 The Power of Greater Numbers – and Independence 
Nicolas de Condorcet, was a French philosopher and mathematician who developed what 
is today known as Condorcet's Jury theorem (Condorcet, 1785).    The theorem states that 
for a group making a binary decision by majority rule then if each member’s probability 
of making a correct choice is greater than ½ the probability that the group’s decision will 
be correct increases as the number of members of the group increases – approaching 1 as 
the group grows infinitely large. 
 
In Condorcet’s proof of the theorem, he assumed independence of the voters in order to 
eliminate dependent probabilities from the calculation.    Ladha (1992) has studied  
Condorcet’s theorem under the conditions of correlated votes.   Ladha summarizes his 
findings as: 
“for large groups, Condorcet’s results would hold under fairly general conditions.   
For small groups, the conditions are severe.   Finally, under reasonable 
assumptions, Pn, the probability that a majority selects the better alternative, 
would be inversely related to p, the average of the coefficients of correlation.”    
 
In summary, given the assumption that each member’s probability of being correct is 
greater than ½, then: 
• Greater numbers improves the result 
• Greater independence improves the result 
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1.1.3.3 Aggregation Mechanisms 
To extract the wisdom of the crowd a mechanism is needed to aggregate inputs.    Chief 
among these mechanisms are polls and markets.    Surowiecki opens his book by 
recounting the story of British scientist Francis Galton’s description of a weight judging 
contest at the 1906 West of England Fat Stock and Poultry exhibition.   For a small fee, 
fair participants could make a guess of the weight of an ox which was on display.   The 
best guesses received prizes.   Some 800 people entered the contest, a diverse mix of 
people attending the fair.    After the contest Galton collected the tickets and analyzed 
them.    He used the sample mean as a representation of the group’s collective guess.   
The sample mean turned out to be 1,197 pounds.   The correct weight of the ox was 1,198 
pounds.    This is an example of an incentivized poll. 
 
Another prime example of an aggregation mechanism is a double auction market.   
Surowiecki illustrates the wisdom of crowds at work in a market with the stock market 
reaction immediately following the Challenger Space shuttle explosion.     Within a few 
hours of the explosion, the stock price of Morton Thiokol, manufacturer of the solid 
rocket boosters which were the cause of the explosion, had dropped much lower than the 
stock of all the other space shuttle contractors (Maloney & Mulherin, 2003).    However, 
there was no comment from NASA or any other authority on the cause of the accident for 
several days.   The next day the NY Times noted “There are no clues to the cause of the 
accident.”    However, the stock market had already made a correct assessment. 
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1.1.4 Prediction Markets and Organizational Use 
Prediction markets (also called predictive markets, information markets, decision markets, 
idea futures, event derivatives and virtual markets) are a type of market which can be 
used to harness the wisdom of crowds.    A prediction market is a type of futures market 
designed to extract information about some type of future event.   Typically, an 
instrument (e.g., a futures contract) is created whose final value is tied to the future event.   
The current market prices can be interpreted as predictions of the probability of the event 
or the expected value of the parameter.   Example use of prediction markets by 
organizations include aids in demand forecasting (Hopman, 2007).   Prediction markets 
are the topic of several current books – (e.g. Abramowicz, 2007; Hahn & Tetlock, 2006).  
Also, of note, analyst firms such as Forrester Research which do research, analysis and 
consultation for IT organizations have begun writing about and recommending prediction 
markets as an business tool  (Young, 2008). 
 
Prediction markets offer a financial incentive for organizational members to participate.   
This directly addresses some of the barriers to sharing mentioned above.   Page also 
argues that incentives are important as they drive out less accurate predictions and more 
heavily weight accurate ones (as long as the predictors understand how accurate they 
might be).    
 
Anonymity is another critical characteristic of prediction markets.   This addresses some 
of the mentioned barriers to sharing as well as some of the group deliberation biases as 
described by Sunstein (2006). 
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Organizational prediction markets have been used for financial forecasts and schedules 
predictions.    However, this tool has organization hurdles to overcome (H. Berg) 
including: 
• Concern about self-fulfilling late forecasts (e.g., an employee makes a low 
prediction and proceeds to reduce his effort) 
• Potential for negative consequences (e.g., if a prediction market predicts a project 
will miss a schedule, employees may reduce their work effort) 
• Fit to the project process flow (e.g., data must be available when it can have an 
impact) 
• Negative impressions around prediction markets (e.g., insider trading, gambling is 
bad, not appropriate for work, betting on failure, etc.) 
 
1.1.5 Accuracy of Prediction markets 
Berg et al. (2008) review the accuracy of Iowa Electronic Market’s Political Market 
forecasts.    They analyzed the results of 49 markets covering 41 elections in 13 countries.    
They not only compared the markets to the actual results, but also to leading opinion 
polls.   Their results showed prediction markets exhibit excellent accuracy and no 
observed bias. 
 
1.1.6 Limitations of Prediction Markets 
However, prediction markets, like all markets, are subject to anomalies which can 
compromise their accuracy - market bubbles and crashes as prime examples.    
Surowiecki chose the title of his book as a word-play off the title of another very famous 
book about crowd behavior, Extraordinary Popular Delusions & the Madness of Crowds 
by Charles Mackay (1932).   Mackay’s book, originally published in 1841, has several 
chapters on economic bubbles in history including the Dutch tulip mania of the early 
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seventeenth century and the South Sea Company bubble of the early eighteenth century.     
Prediction markets may have difficulty gaining broad organizational use if they are 
understood to work only ‘some of the time’ (consider the thought experiment of an 
engineering software package which works correctly ‘most’ of the time).   
   
1.1.7 The Role of Feedback in Markets 
Markets integrate varying levels of positive and negative feedback.   If a market prices an 
asset below its intrinsic value then some market participants will buy that item causing 
the price to increase.   Buying will continue until the price has risen close to the intrinsic 
value.   This self correcting, negative feedback, loop is fundamental to the correct 
functioning of a market.    However, the buying process, creating the rising prices, may 
trigger other participants to also buy; this additional buying creates even more price 
increases and can cause further buying.    This represents positive feedback, which can 
continue for extended periods. 
 
1.1.8 Motivations of the Research 
The motivation of the present study is to better understand the underlying mechanisms 
and some of the design parameters of prediction markets in order to help organizations 
design more effective information tools.   In particular, the research seeks to better 
understand the role of feedback in these markets. 
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1.2 Research Questions 
The research questions focus on key aspects of prediction market use in organizational 
settings and are summarized below. 
 
1.2.1 What are the Mechanisms Involved in the Information 
Assimilation Process? 
What are the mechanisms by which markets assimilate information?   What is the role of  
feedback in these processes?    What types of failure mechanisms are possible and how 
should a prediction market organizer deal with them?    
 
1.2.2 How does the Presence and Type of Feedback impact Market 
Performance? 
As mentioned there are multiple aggregation methods.    The incentivized poll worked 
extremely well in the Ox weight contest.   A traditional market structure worked in the 
Challenger example.   How do the factors of feedback structure and incentives impact 
performance?    How should an organization choose? 
 
1.2.3 How do Individuals use Information in the Allocation Process? 
How are participants using private and public information in their decision processes and 
how does that impact the market performance?     Can these strategies be modeled? 
 
Table 1 summarizes the research questions and their relevance to the organizational 
prediction market designer. 
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Research Question Relevance 
What are the mechanisms involved in the 
information assimilation process? 
How does a market achieve its results and how 
can it be managed? 
What are the error mechanisms in markets?    
And how can they be managed? 
How does the presence and type of feedback 
impact market performance? 
What is the relationship between prediction 
market designs and performance?  Which 
structure should an organizational decision 
maker choose for their particular task? 
How do individuals use information?   
What are the models for individual behavior? 
Can the performance of the market be 
improved  by changing participants' behavior?  
Who should be invited to participate?    
Table 1. Summary of research questions. 
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2 Literature Review, Synthesis and Experimental 
Hypotheses 
In this section the relevant literature is reviewed and synthesized to bring out the detail 
relevant to this work.    
 
 
2.1 Market Background 
This section reviews the important concepts from the study of markets. 
 
2.1.1 Market Types 
Many market types are available (cf. Harris, 2003 for more details).    The exact 
dynamics will depend on the type of market as well as a host of other characteristics 
associated with that market - e.g., liquidity, presence of market makers, costs, etc.   The 
discussion here will focus on three common methods: double auction; parimutuel; and 
fixed winnings. 
2.1.1.1 Double Auction 
Double auction markets are the most common form of markets in the financial world.   
They are also quite common in prediction markets – with the Iowa Electronic market 
being one example.   Potential buyers and sellers submit bid and ask prices.    When an 
overlap occurs (that is, bids greater than asking prices) a transaction can occur.   The 
efficiency of a double auction market is dependent on the number of participants and the 
liquidity (frequency of buying and selling).    For large capitalization companies in a 
major stock market (e.g., NASDAQ), double auction markets work extremely well.    The 
spreads between, bid and ask prices are small, and many shares are traded so that the 
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prices are stable.   However, for smaller markets, which typify many organizational 
prediction markets, double auction markets may be problematic.    Double auction market 
processes have been studied extensively by traditional game theorists (cf. Gibbons, 1992) 
as well as complexity scientists (cf. Friedman & Rust, 1993). 
2.1.1.2 Parimutuel Markets 
Parimutuel betting systems have been developed as an alternative market structure for 
prediction markets.   The parimutuel system as a prediction market was initially explored 
by Plott et al. (Plott, Wit, & Yang, 2003).   Parimutuel systems are common in many 
gambling environments such as horse racing.   In this system all bets are placed into a 
pool.   The organizer removes a share (often called the take or vig) and the remainder is 
split amongst all winning tickets.    The organizer often shows a running summary of the 
collected bets; for example, in the case of a horse race, the odds are calculated and 
displayed as the bets are received. 
2.1.1.3 Fixed Winnings 
Another market type, called here fixed winnings, would constitute a lottery which 
provides a fixed payout for each correct answer (Shelley, 1989).    This type of market 
will be used in the present research. 
 
2.1.2 Information Assimilation Capability of Markets 
The concept of a market’s ability to aggregate information goes back to some of the 
fundamental concepts of classical economics.   Smith’s (1776) invisible hand and 
Hayek’s (1945) giant processing machine for decentralized information allude to the 
information processing capability of markets.   However, the ideas were more fully 
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developed with the Theory of Rational Expectations and the Efficient Market Hypothesis.    
Before reviewing these theories let’s examine what economists mean by aggregation.   
There are two tasks for the market: 
• Bring together diverse sets of information and methods of interpreting information 
• Make a judgment about what that information means 
 
Some economists use the combined terms of disseminate and aggregate to convey the 
multiple tasks.   However, in other cases, only aggregation is used.  One could argue that 
the word aggregate may not precisely convey both functions so this work uses the term 
assimilate.   
 
The theory of rational expectations states that agents, acting with complete access to the 
relevant information, forecast events in the future without bias.     Any errors then would 
be due to random events.    The theory is generally attributed to the American economist 
John Muth (1961).     Grossman (Grossman, 1981; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980) performed 
the theoretical analysis to show that under conditions of asymmetric information, the 
theory of rational expectations leads to effective aggregation of information by a market.    
The theory grew from a response to the theory of adaptive expectations.   The Theory of 
Adaptive Expectations argues that future values are based on past values.    However, the 
value cannot reach equilibrium under this assumption.   So, rational expectations theory 
was developed to be consistent with equilibrium conditions.   It is worth noting that the 
rational expectations hypothesis does not assume every decision of each individual is 
rational.   Rather it assumes that the sum of all decisions by all market participants has no 
systematic bias and uses all relevant information in the formation of the expectation. 
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The theory of rational expectations can then be used to build the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (Fama, 1965) .  The efficient market hypothesis asserts that markets are 
efficient in terms of the prices, that is, the price reflects all known relevant information.     
If the theory is strictly correct, then it would not be possible to outperform the market.   
Since all known information is integrated into prices, only unknowable new information 
can affect prices and thus prices should be described by a random walk (a hypothesis 
made by Bachelier (1900) in his dissertation sixty years prior). 
 
Plott and Sunder (1988) empirically showed that properly designed markets can indeed 
aggregate information.    In their experiments, they defined three possible states of nature 
(X, Y and Z).   If the correct state of nature (drawn randomly) was  Z, then half the 
traders were told ‘X is not correct’ and the other half were told ‘Y is not correct.’   Thus, 
the collective information of the group was sufficient to precisely define the true state.   
They created double auction experimental markets for this research and showed that 
some of these markets disseminated and aggregated the information by correctly 
forecasting the correct state.    
2.1.2.1 Theoretical Challenges to Classical Models 
Several theoretical challenges to the classical models of market efficiency have been 
proposed.    These are outlined below. 
2.1.2.1.1 Keynesian Beauty Contest 
Keynes (1936) questioned whether market participants were pricing based on 
fundamental values or beliefs about other market participants.    He used the analogy of a 
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beauty contest to illustrate the point.  In his fictional example he supposed a newspaper 
contest asked participants to predict the faces that would be judged the most beautiful to 
win a prize.   A simple strategy is to choose faces that the entrant considered beautiful.   
However, a more sophisticated strategy would be to consider public perception and to 
attempt to predict the public’s choice.   An even more sophisticated strategy would be to 
assume other participants were also using this strategy and therefore the task is to predict 
what other participants think the public’s perception will be.   This line of thinking can be 
carried out indefinitely.  
 
The Keynesian beauty contest represents another branch of game theory concerned with 
common knowledge (Binmore, 1991).    A simple game sometimes called the number 
guessing game (or k game) was developed to test the ideas of the beauty contest.   Each 
participant is asked to choose a number between 0 and 100.   A prize is awarded to the 
participant whose number is closest to 2/3 of the average.   The first order reasoning 
might be an expectation that the average between 0 and 100 will be about 50 and 2/3 of 
50 is 33.    However, if everyone were to pick 33, then the correct choice is 22.   However, 
if everyone were to choose 22, the correct choice would be 15.   The Nash equilibrium 
for this game is 0, and that’s what a rational player should choose under the assumptions 
of common knowledge.     Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) reviewed 24 published 
experiments on the k-game.    The lowest winning number in all the experiments was 15.   
There was some variation across class of participant, incentives and repetition but most 
participants only think a few levels deep. 
16 
2.1.2.1.2 The Efficient Market Paradox 
The efficient market paradox, or information paradox, was originally proposed by 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).    The paradox argues that if the markets reflect all 
information then there are no opportunities and no one will trade.   However, markets 
require trading to be efficient since trading is the process which aggregates the 
information.   So, if everyone believes the efficient market paradox, then it will not hold, 
as there will be no trading.    
 
Sornette (2003) makes an interesting observation about this paradox: 
 
 “the more active and efficient the market, the more intelligent and hard working 
the investors; as a consequence the more random is the sequence of price changes 
generated by such a market.    The most efficient of all is one in which price 
changes are completely random and unpredictable. …  Information leads to 
randomness, while lack of information leads to regularities.” 
 
One argument is that the paradox can be solved from a dynamic perspective (Birchler & 
Butler, 2007) as a small time advantage can be sufficient incentive to acquire and 
disseminate new information (trade).  
2.1.2.2 Practical Challenges to Classical Models: Bubbles/Mirages 
Bubbles represent a significant challenge to classical models of market efficiency.  The 
market work on bubbles and mirages will be reviewed. 
2.1.2.2.1 Classical Work on Bubbles, Crashes and Mirages 
Brunnermeir (2001) defines a bubble as a persistent deviation of an asset price from its 
fundamental value.    This definition creates a conundrum with identifying a bubble in 
process since for so many assets there is no way to strictly identify the intrinsic value.    
Given that, many bubbles are only identified after a sudden drop in price (called a crash).   
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The logic behind this being that there was no sudden change in the asset or information 
associated with that asset which could have accounted for the sudden change, therefore 
the prior value was in fact a bubble. 
 
Some argue that the existence of bubbles and crashes disprove the efficient market 
hypothesis.   However, the efficient market hypothesis only asserts that all available 
information held by traders is aggregated in prices.   There is no assertion by efficient 
market hypothesis that the information is fundamentally correct.    
 
Charles Mackay (1932)  spent three chapters discussing economic bubbles including the 
South Sea Company and Mississippi Company bubbles of the early eighteenth century 
and the Dutch tulip mania of the early seventeenth century.    Burton Malkiel’s A Random 
Walk Down Wall Street (2003) makes spirited references to Mackay’s descriptions.   As a 
more recent example, the dot-com stock rise and fall of the late 1990’s is described as a 
bubble (Shiller, 2000). 
2.1.2.2.2 Bubbles in Experimental Economics 
Bubbles have been repeatedly created in the markets of experimental economics (cf. 
Porter & Smith, 1995; V. L. Smith, Suchanek, & Williams, 1988).    In these experiments 
the conundrum over fundamental values can be explicitly addressed.   For example, some 
of the securities used in the trading experiments had precise values through their 
experimental lifetime.    Miller (2002) provides a synthesis of these experiments and 
observes that momentum and excess capital as two common contributing factors to  
bubbles.    For example, the movement of price towards its fundamental value provides 
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the momentum which can create an overshoot bubble.    He also observes that increased 
availability of trading capital (fiat money given to participants) leads to both the 
likelihood and size of bubbles. 
 
2.1.3 Prediction Markets 
Recent books (Abramowicz, 2007; Hahn & Tetlock, 2006) and an extensive literature 
review (Tziralis & Tatsiopoulos, 2007) are available on prediction markets.    Only a 
small sampling of this literature will be discussed here. 
 
Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007) reviewed 155 articles published between 1990 and 2006.    
These span a wide range of topics including theoretical work, market description, 
applications and legal or policy concerns.    They found the pace of publication to be 
increasing with very high growth in the last 5 years. 
 
The Iowa Electronic Market (IEM), begun in 1988, is the most recognized and earliest 
example of a prediction market (R. Forsyth, Nelson, Neumann, & Wright, 1992).   
Established by the business school at the University of Iowa, this is a futures market for 
political events – with greatest notoriety around US Presidential elections.    As 
mentioned the markets have been shown to be very accurate and consistently predict 
better than more traditional methods such as polling (J. Berg et al., 2008). 
 
Incentives are fundamental in economics.    Many organizational prediction markets offer 
a monetary incentive (Hopman, 2007).    Other organizational markets offer (Cowgill, 
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Wolfers, & Zitzewitz, 2008) prizes (such as company logo shirts or caps).    Both have 
been shown to be effective.   It is worth noting that employees participating in a company 
prediction market have indirect incentives.  For example, if the results of the market are 
used by the management and this helps the project to succeed then the company may 
improve its overall results.   This could benefit participants in various ways ranging from 
securing their own job to adding to their financial interests (e.g., in terms of bonuses, 
stock options, etc.). 
 
 
2.1.4 Experimental Prediction Markets 
Of prime interest in this area are the experimental prediction markets organized and 
reported by Charles Plott and colleagues at The California Institute of Technology 
(Caltech).   These works followed the framework of experimental economics in they 
attempt to control the information given to participants.    In these markets, participants, 
almost exclusively Caltech students, are given controlled information which is primarily 
balls drawn from an urn. 
 
A brief description of the urn markets will be given.   Participants are given private data 
and can observe how other participants are acting (public data).    The private data 
consists of a set of draws from an urn.   In what they describe as the Probabilistic 
Information Condition (PIC) the urn contains 15 balls.   The balls consist of 6 types 
representing the states of nature – here considered simply to be letters A through F.   
Prior to the prediction market (PM) the researcher randomly chooses one of the balls to 
be the correct state.   This selection is not revealed to the participants.  Suppose the 
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random selection chooses B to be the correct state.     The urn would then be populated 
with 5 B balls, and 2 balls of each of the other types.    Participants know the relative 
percentages but do not know which state is correct.   Each PM participant is then given 
the results of three draws from the urn, with replacement.   The result of these three 
draws, the draw set, is the private information of each participant.    The participants are 
given an allocation of fiat which can be used to purchase tickets across the six states.   
The cumulative purchased tickets are displayed and available to the participants – the 
public information.   After the PM closes, and the correct state is revealed, the pot is split 
evenly across the tickets purchased for the correct state.    Any unused fiat is returned to 
the researcher (so there is no incentive to hold fiat). 
 
Plott, Wit and Yang’s paper “Parimutuel betting markets as information aggregation 
devices: experimental results” remains the most important work on experimental 
parimutuel markets (2003).     Plott and team ran two types of experiments.   In the first, 
balls were drawn from an urn and results given to participants as described above (PIC).   
The second type of experiment was called ‘Not sets.’    Here, there were again six states 
of nature, but participants were given definitive information about what state was not 
correct.   Enough information was supplied such that the group, as a whole, could 
precisely determine the correct state if they were able to share all their data.    Participants 
were given an allocation of fiat money with which to purchase tickets.   Once purchased, 
tickets could not be refunded or exchanged1.   Once the market was complete, the 
winning pot was split evenly across all correct tickets.    The numbers of participants in 
                                                 
1
 This eliminates the possibility of a crash 
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the markets ranged from 10-15.    The markets were open for between 4 and 5 minutes.   
Participants were told that they could randomly close any time after 4 minutes.   Plott and 
team conclude that information aggregation can be detected in both types of markets.     
They also observed mirages (defined as the mode of the distribution being on an incorrect 
state), which occurred 9 times in the 38 markets they ran (23.4%).    The team observed 
that the majority of the tickets were allocated in a small time window just prior to the 
earliest time the markets could close.   They felt this behavior inhibited the aggregation of 
information.   Further, they observed bluffing and long shot bias in the markets, although 
they noted these effects were small. 
 
In a second set of experiments at Caltech, Axelrod et al. (Axelrod, Kulick, Plott, & Roust, 
2007) made two modifications to the market structure: 1) a cost for waiting was 
implemented by increasing the price of tickets with time; 2) opening a second market 
immediately after the first market had finished.    The team theorized that some of the 
observed effects such as the long shot bias were the result of disequilibrium which arises 
from the fact that tickets cannot be resold.   So, the second market was opened after final 
odds from the first market were published to the group, but before the correct state of 
nature was identified.    They found that both of these mechanisms improved the ability 
of the market to aggregate information as compared to the original mechanism.    
However, mirages continued to occur at similar rates2. 
 
                                                 
2
 In the non-repeated market mirages occurred in 29/90 markets (32%) in the repeated market mirages 
occurred in 8/42 markets (19%) 
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In another set of experiments at Caltech, Roust and Plott (2005) designed a two stage 
market.   First, participants were given private information as before.   They were then 
given an allocation of fiat to purchase tickets in a market without feedback (that is, it was 
an incentivized poll).    The results of the first phase were then published to the group 
without identification of the correct state.   Then, a second market, with feedback,  was 
conducted as described in the Axelrod experiment, with an increasing cost of tickets as 
the experiments proceeded.     Table 2 shows the results.    Overall, they observed 
approximately the same rate of mirages (27/90 or 30%).     It is interesting to notice that 
mirages were seen in the first round (incentivized poll).   However, in 70 of the 90 
markets they only had 10 participants.   This small number could lead to statistical 
anomalies in the ball draw 
 
First Stage Prediction Second Stage Prediction Count 
Correct Correct 63 
Incorrect Incorrect 183 
Correct Incorrect 1 
Incorrect Correct 4 
Table 2. Summary of results from Roust & Plott Experiments (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Of the 18 where both first and second stage were incorrect, 14 predicted the same state while 4 predicted 
different states 
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2.2 Individual Decision Processes 
Aspects of the subject's decision processes are examined in this section.   The focus will 
be on the processes involved in experimental prediction markets. 
 
2.2.1 Overview 
Decision frameworks and the overall steps in the allocation process are discussed.  Figure 
1 shows an overview of the steps in the decision process in the experimental prediction 
market used in this study.    The three stages include: gathering of data including the 
private draw and public information if available; assessment of the probability that any 
given state is the correct state; and, finally a decision of how to allocate tickets. 
 
 
Figure 1. Steps in the ticket allocation process 
 
 
There are a number of excellent sources of review of existing work in judgment and 
decision making.    Hastie and Dawes (2001) provides an excellent overview of key 
issues in judgment and decision making.  Resnick  (1987) also provides an excellent 
overview of decision theory.   Camerer (1995) provides an excellent overview and 
specifically highlights areas relevant to economics.  Baird (1989) gives an excellent 
Private Data:
Draw Set
Judgment -
Assessment of 
Probability of each 
state being correct
Decisions -
Allocate tickets 
across the 
states
A B C D E F
249 451 152 48 76 24
Public Data: 
Cumulative Allocation
Gather data
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overview of key decision analysis tools.     Camerer’s book Behavioral Game Theory 
(2003) gives an excellent review of research on descriptive behaviors in decisions under 
conflict. 
 
2.2.2 Judgment - Assessment of Probability 
After collecting their data, participants must make an assessment of the probability of 
each state being the correct state.     
2.2.2.1 Bayes’ Theorem 
Using only the private information, Bayes’ Theorem can be used to calculate the 
posterior probability that any state is the correct state given any combination of draws 
from the urn.    Bayes’ Theorem is shown below - 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
p(Hprior) = prior probability of the hypothesis 
p(D|H) = conditional probability of the data given the hypothesis 
p(D) = probability of the data = p(H)p(D|H) + p(-H)p(D|-H) 
p(Hpost|D) = posterior probability of the hypothesis given the data 
 
 
The probabilities for the Plott PIC market are calculated and shown in Table 3.    There 
are three possible types of draws: all three balls match (e.g., AAA, BBB, CCC, etc.); Two 
balls match (e.g., AAB, AAD, BBC, etc.); or none of the balls match (e.g., ABE, CDF, 
AEF, etc.).    These three types are shown as the rows in the table.   For the first row, all 
balls match, then the posterior probability that the ball type received is the correct state is 
)(
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=
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calculated to be 75.8% (that is, if the experiment of drawing balls from the urn were 
repeated a large number of times, 75.8% of the time that three matching balls was 
received, the type of ball received would be the type with 5 balls in the urn – the correct 
state).    Still, it is possible to draw three balls of the incorrect state (that is, with two balls 
in the urn).   This will happen 4.8% of the time.    Again, the urn contains 5 balls of the 
correct state of nature and 2 balls of each of the other states. 
 
  
 Most 
Frequent (e.g., 
A) 
2nd Most 
Frequent (e.g., 
B) 
2nd Most 
Frequent (e.g., 
C) 
Each Not 
Drawn (e.g., 
DEF) 
Three matching draws 
(e.g., AAA) 
75.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 
Two matching draws 
(e.g., AAB) 
49.0% 19.6% 7.8% 7.8% 
Three different draws 
(e.g., ABC) 
23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 9.5% 
Table 3. Bayesian posterior probabilities of private information 
 
 
To illustrate the calculation consider the situation where a participant receives a draw of 2 
A balls and 1 C ball.   What is the probability that A is the correct state? 
p(Hprior )= 1/6 (all equally probable) 
 
p(D|H) = probability A given A is the correct state (i.e., Urn is biased for A) 
            = (1/3)^2 * (2/15)^1 * (2/15)^0 * (2/15)^0 * (2/15)^0 * (2/15)^0 
 
p(Dindependent of hypothesis)=  
     (((1/6) * (1 / 3) ^ #A * (2 / 15) ^ (Total - #A)) +  
      ((1/6) * (1 / 3) ^ #B * (2 / 15) ^ (Total - #B)) + 
      ((1/6) * (1 / 3) ^ #C * (2 / 15) ^ (Total - #C)) +  
      ((1/6) * (1 / 3) ^ #D * (2 / 15) ^ (Total - #D)) +  
      ((1/6) * (1 / 3) ^ #E * (2 / 15) ^ (Total - #E)) +  
      ((1/6) * (1 / 3) ^ #F * (2 / 15) ^ (Total - #F))) 
 
Where, Total = Total number of balls drawn = 3 
and, #A=2, #C=1, All other = 0 
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p(Hprior )= 1/6 
p(A|H) =  .0148 
p(Dindependent of hypothesis)=  .0025 + .0004 +  .0010 + .0004 + .0004 = .0050 
 
p(A|D)=((1/6)*.0148)/.0050 = .4902 
 
2.2.2.2 Departures from Bayes' Theorem 
Several research studies have shown significant deviations from Bayes’ theory in practice.     
2.2.2.2.1 Base Rate Neglect 
The phenomenon of base rate neglect was first outlined in a famous experiment by 
Kahneman and Tversky  (1973)  and repeated by Maya Bar-Hillel (1980).   A story 
approach was used to describe the situation of an accident involving taxi cabs where 
participants overwhelmingly demonstrated a neglect for the base rate in the probability 
assessment responses. 
 
El-Gamal and Grether (1995) performed an extensive bingo cage experiment to test the 
usage of Bayesian rules.   Two bingo cages with different distributions of balls were 
randomly selected by the draw of a ball from a third cage.   The distribution of balls was 
varied in the initial cage and the usage of this prior probability was studied.    They found 
that the most prominent rule being used was Bayesian.   However, they did see 
significant numbers of subjects which used alternative rules.    The second most common 
rule they saw in the subjects they called representativeness.   Here participants based 
their choices on how the ball draw matched the cage composition, and thus essentially 
neglecting the ratio of balls in the first cage.     
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2.2.2.2.2 Conservatism 
Experiments by Phillips and Edwards (1966) saw that subjects behave conservatively (i.e., 
update posterior probabilities insufficiently on the basis of new information) under 
various experimental conditions.   They found: 
 
"... conservatism was unaffected by prior probabilities, remained constant as the 
amount of data increased, and decreased as the diagnostic value of each datum 
decreased." 
 
 
In the El-Gamal and Grether (1995) experiments mentioned in section 2.2.2.2.1 in the 
third most prominent rule observed, which they called conservatism, subjects over 
weighted the data based on the composition of the first cage. 
 
A large number of studies have shown a common bias being overestimation of the 
probability of low frequency events and underestimation of the probability of high 
frequency events (Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeney, 1981; Hastie & 
Dawes, 2001; Viscusi, 1985).     For example, Hastie and Dawes (2001) show a graph of 
the statistical estimate of deaths per year for various causes vs. the judgmental estimates 
by participants.   Very low frequency events are shown to be overestimated by several 
orders of magnitude.   At the other end of the scale, subjects were seen to underestimate 
common causes of death by several orders of magnitude. 
 
28 
Anchoring and adjustment is a potential mechanism for the conservative  behavior 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).    Subjects can anchor on any initial information and fail 
to adjust for the task. 
 
2.2.2.2.3 Pseudodiagnosticity 
Pseudodiagnosticity is a consequence of the failure to consider alternative hypotheses in a 
probabilistic inference task (Dougherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schaivo, 1979).   It is 
evaluating the diagnosticity of information on the basis of only one of the required 
conditional probabilities.    Eddy (1988) found 95% of practicing physicians grossly 
miscalculated the inferred incidence of cancer in his experiment.     Eddy used the 
following statement in his experiment: 
 
“The prevalence of breast cancer is 1% for women over age 40.   A widely used 
test, mammography, gives a positive result in 10% of women without breast 
cancer, and in 80% of women with breast cancer.   What is the probability that a 
woman in this age class who tests positive actually has breast cancer?” 
 
While the correct answer is 7.5% as calculated using Bayes’ theorem, 95 out of 100 
physicians responded “about 75%.”   Eddy attributed this to a failure to consider the 
alternative hypothesis. 
 
2.2.2.2.4 Other Factors 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) have studied the effect of data shown as frequency 
versus percentages in Bayesian probability tasks.    Their research shows more nearly 
Bayesian behavior with frequencies than with percentages or probabilities. 
 
29 
2.2.2.3 Integrating Multiple Data Sources 
Information integration theory was developed by Norman Anderson  (1981) and seeks to 
describe how information is integrated in the judgment and decision process.   The theory 
asserts individuals go through  a valuation phase followed by an integration phase.  The 
valuation focuses on the psychological judgment of value or probability as opposed to the 
corresponding observable measures.     Integration involves the method the decision 
maker uses to combine multiple inputs.    The theory argues that  individuals use simple 
algebraic rules in the integration processes.     
 
Anderson describes a relevant experiment with two urns.   Each has a specified 
proportion of red and white balls.    One of the two urns will be selected with a given 
probability.   Subjects were asked the probability that a white ball would be drawn given 
a mix of red and white balls in the two urns.     The probability model is: 
 
Prob(White) = Prob(Urn A)Prob(White|Urn A) + [1- Prob(Urn A)] Prob(White|Urn B) 
 
Anderson’s results showed basic agreement between the subjects and the predicted 
probability.    He suggested that this supported his cognitive algebra concepts where the 
subjects are able to effectively perform multiplication and addition. 
 
2.2.3 Decisions - Allocation of Resources 
Once the participant has assessed the probability that any state is the correct state they 
must make a decision on how to allocate their tickets.   In this section relevant theories 
are discussed. 
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2.2.3.1 Expected Utility Theory 
Classical theories of choice under risk focus on the Expected Utility Theory.   Bernoulli 
(1738) originally described the theory but it gained prominence when von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) were able to derive it from basic axioms.    Simply stated, the theory 
argues that choice between probabilistic options can be made by comparing the weighted 
sums of the individual utility values multiplied by their respective probabilities.    The 
theory supports choices where there are multiple selections down any branch of the 
decision tree, by summing up the products of utility and probability of all choices down a 
branch.   In many classical theories the concept of rational decisions was tied to the 
maximization of expected utility (i.e., choosing the option with the highest expected 
utility).    von Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms and expected utility theory have been 
extremely valuable in the development of decision theory and game theory by making it 
possible to formulate certain problems mathematically. 
 
2.2.3.2 Departures from Expected Utility Theory 
Several of the most relevant departures from expected utility theory will be discussed.   In 
addition, some of the theories which have been proposed to account for this behavior will 
be described. 
 
2.2.3.2.1 Dependence on Irrelevant Alternatives 
A number of paradoxes have been used to test and question the expected utility theory.  
One of the most well known is the Allais Paradox (1953) as illustrated below in Table 4.    
The studies showed that subjects may not  adhere to the independence axiom. 
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Experiment #1 
 Probability Payout 
Choice 1 100% 1M Francs 
Choice 2 89% 1M Francs 
1% 0 
10% 5M Francs 
 
Experiment #2 
 Probability Payout 
Choice 1 89% 0 
 11% 1M Francs 
Choice 2 90% 0 
10% 5M Francs 
Table 4. Illustration of choices from Allais paradox 
 
In Experiment 1 participants tend to choose Choice 1.   In Experiment 2 participants tend 
to select Choice 2.    The Allais Paradox challenges the expected utility theory by 
showing the participants do not strictly adhere to the underlying axioms.   By selecting 
choice 1 in experiment 1 and choice 2 in experiment 2 the independence axiom is 
violated (cf. Hastie & Dawes, 2001 for the derivation).       
 
2.2.3.2.2 Ambiguity Aversion 
In the Ellsberg paradox (1961) participants must choose between two gambles with the 
same expected value.   In one gamble there is a known distribution and with the other  
gamble there is an unknown distribution.   Participants overwhelmingly choose the 
gamble with the known distribution.    This displays an aversion to ambiguity (or 
uncertainty). 
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2.2.3.2.3 Preference Reversals 
The phenomenon of preference reversals is based in the work of Slovic and Lichtenstein  
(1968) with extensive review and discussion in the recent edited volume (Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 2006).    In a preference reversal two lotteries are constructed wherein many 
participants place a higher price on one lottery while preferring to participate in the other 
lottery.    For example, lottery 1, which is typically referred to as a P bet (P standing for 
probability - these bets have a higher probability of winning), might offer a 80% 
probability to win $2 and 20% probability to lose $1.     An example of lottery 2, which is 
typically referred to as a $ bet ($ bets having a higher winning dollar amount), might be 
20% chance to win $9 and 80% chance to lose $0.50.   When participants are asked 
which lottery they would like to participate in, they usually prefer P bet to $ bet lotteries.   
However, when asked how these lotteries should be priced, participants feel that $ bet 
lotteries should be priced higher than P bet lotteries.   In one study Slovic and 
Lichtenstein found that 73 percent of participants made the reversal.       Concerned about 
the implications of this phenomenon to economic theory Grether and Plott (1979) 
systematically tested a number of methodological consideration and concluded the results 
were robust.   In addition to challenging expected utility theory as a descriptive model, 
the preference reversal phenomenon illustrates an important framing issue. 
 
2.2.3.2.4 Satisficing 
In the theory of Satisficing developed by Simon (1976), the cost of maximizing is taken 
into consideration.    For example, an individual may choose a satisfactory, rather than 
optimal solution, if their search time is limited. 
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2.2.3.2.5 Prospect Theory 
Prospect Theory, by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), develops a framework around 
expected utility and models a number of departures from expected utility theory  with 
numerous empirical studies supporting it.    The descriptive theory describes how 
individuals evaluate potential loss and gains in risky decisions.   Hastie and Dawes (2001)  
describe three key components of the utility function assumed by the theory: 
 
1. "An individual views monetary consequences in terms of changes from a  
reference level - which is usually the individual's status quo." 
2. "The resulting value function is steeper for losses than for gains - implies loss 
aversion." 
3. "The curve is concave for gains and convex for losses, implying the decision 
maker will be risk averse when choosing between gains and risk seeking when 
choosing between loses." 
 
In addition, Prospect Theory (a) substitutes decision weights for probabilities, with 
decision weight being a non-linear function of probability, and (b) assumes a preliminary 
editing phase in which a reference point is set and outcomes may be combined or 
segregated. 
 
 
2.3 Interactions in Markets 
Markets by their very definition involve multiple agents.   This section reviews relevant 
interaction effects from the literature. 
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2.3.1 Rational Markets with Irrational Agents 
Given the observed irrational behavior by decision psychologists and behavioral 
economists, how do classical economists reconcile their views around rational 
expectations and efficient markets?    Camerer (1992) lists four hypotheses.    
 
First, the cancellation hypothesis would assert that individual errors are random and 
cancel each other.   However the cancellation hypothesis requires the judgments be 
randomly distributed around the rational judgment while the behavioral research shows 
systematic errors. 
 
Second, the smart few hypothesis asserts the market actions are dominated by a few 
active traders who are generally rational.    This theory requires some level of self insight 
into the error mechanisms by the participants. 
 
Third, the learning hypothesis asserts traders learn from their experiences or buy advice 
which averts the irrational behavior.    Counterarguments include evidence that learning 
from individual experience is difficult (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978) and imitation learning 
can be even more difficult. 
 
Finally, the evolutionary hypothesis argues that traders who make rationality errors are 
selected out – that is, they go bankrupt because of their errors.    Thus, only unbiased 
traders would remain.    The arguments against this theory are that economic evolution 
35 
could work very slowly.   Second, evolutionary processes may not have any inherent bias 
for or against rational decision processes.    
 
2.3.2 Feedback 
Feedback is the engine of market interactions.    In this section, various ideas discussed in 
the literature are reviewed. 
2.3.2.1 Information Cascades 
Information Cascades have been proposed as an explanation of herding behavior in 
markets (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992).    To understand 
this mechanism consider a simple example.   Individuals must choose between two doors, 
A and B, one correct and one not correct.   They each are given private probabilistic 
information on which is the correct choice.   This private information is not shared 
directly however their decisions are visible to the other participants.   Consider the 
situation where the private information has probability of 2/3 of being correct.   You are 
the third person to make a choice and your information indicates B has a higher 
probability of being the correct choice.   However, you see the first and second person 
choose A before you must make your selection.   Assuming everyone is using Bayes’ 
theorem one might reason as follows: the prior probabilities are 50/50 and the first person 
in line had no information other than their own private information so application of 
Bayes’ theorem would suggest they follow their private signal.  So, that would imply the 
first person had private signal which indicated door A was correct.    The second person 
would have also assumed that the first person’s private signal was door A.   If their 
private information was door B Bayes’ theorem would suggest that both doors have equal 
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probability.    Making a second assumption that in the case of equal posterior 
probabilities the second person makes their prediction based on their private signal 
indicates that by also choosing door A, their private signal was also door A.    Now it is 
your turn to choose.    If the two previous private signals were indeed door A, then 
application of Bayes’ theorem would suggest ignoring your private signal of door B and 
choosing door A.    At this point the information cascade has begun.     All the following 
individuals have the same data from the first two participants as well as all who preceded 
them who would have continued to choose door A.    Information cascades have been 
extensively studied and have a rich literature (cf. Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003 for a review). 
 
Experiments have validated (L. R. Anderson & Holt, 1997), in general, the predictions of 
information cascade theory.    There are several important caveats to these experiments 
however.   First, they represent a carefully controlled experiment where the known 
probabilities are available to all participants (in this case, balls are selected from urns 
with known frequencies).   So while the participants did not know the exact information 
of others, they did know the nature of that information.   This differs from the ‘real world’ 
in that market participants have no idea of the nature of others' information.   The second 
caveat is there are always a few participants who do not act in accordance with the theory 
(e.g., do not take the Bayesian rational option).   We know that some individuals make all 
manner of deviation from rationality in decision processes – and this result simply 
affirms. 
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The information cascade represents a classic example of a Bayesian game (Harsanyi, 
1967, 1968).    However, this perspective is rarely mentioned in the literature.   Eyster 
and Rabin (2009) discuss this aspect in their work, however they do not present any 
prescribed strategies. 
2.3.2.2 Reputational Herding 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) propose a model for herd behavior based on managers 
wishing to support their reputation as decision makers and mimicking the investments of 
other managers in order to minimize the risk of uniquely making a bad decision.    This 
theory relies on some visibility into the manager’s holdings (e.g., a fund manager who 
periodically publishes their investments to managers or shareholders).    Graham (1999) 
suggests this mechanism in herding behavior seen amongst investment newsletters. 
2.3.2.3 Crowd Behavior 
Plummer (2003) has suggested that crowd behavior is important in the actions of markets.   
Forsyth (1999) provides an excellent overview of crowd or collective behavior theories.   
He suggests a definition of collective (or crowd) behavior as the actions of a large group 
of people who are responding in a similar way to an event or situation (based on McPhail, 
1991).    Some theorists believe crowds have unique properties which differ from the 
dynamics present in smaller groups.   Forsyth discusses four key theories on crowd 
behavior: contagion theory; emergent norm theory; convergence theory; and, 
deindividualization theory 
 
Le Bon (1895) originally proposed contagion theory where emotions and behaviors were 
transmitted from one crowd member to others.   He proposed that this process could 
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transform the crowd from thoughtful and rational individuals to the extreme behaviors 
sometimes observed.     
 
Turner and Killian (1972) proposed emergent norm theory which argues that the 
collective behavior is caused by adherence to group norms created spontaneously by the 
crowd. 
 
Convergence theory asserts that the crowd’s collective behavior is present, either direct 
or latent, in the group beforehand. 
 
Deindividuation theory (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952; Zimbardo, 1969) asserts 
that crowd factors such as anonymity, arousal, etc. create a lowered threshold of normally 
restrained behavior. 
 
Forsyth notes the behavior need not involve groups that are physically together as 
psychologists list fads, fashions, rumors, mass hysteria and social movements as 
exhibiting crowd behavior.   Notably, markets would fall under this category. 
Many recent studies have concluded that dramatic changes in self-control and atypical 
behavior are actually rare.   Forsyth (1999) writes: 
 
“They concluded that the conditions that exist in mobs, such as membership in a 
large crowd, anonymity, and a decline in self-awareness, prompt group members 
to conform to situation-specific group norms, but that these norms are rarely 
inconsistent with general social norms (Postmes & Spears, 1998).” 
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2.3.2.4 Feedback in Delphi  
The Delphi method (Linstone & Turoff, 1975) is a forecasting tool which uses feedback.    
With the Delphi method a panel of experts is asked to provide comments which a 
facilitator anonymously combines and republishes to the panel.    The experts are asked to 
review the comments and forecasts from the other experts, update their thinking if 
appropriate, and resubmit their comments.   The process continues until the results are 
stable or a set number or rounds have occurred.    
 
Of particular interest is the impact of feedback.   Are the groups in effect converging to 
the correct answer, or just consensus?    An excellent meta-analysis is done by Rowe and 
Wright (1999).    They summarized the results across 16 papers.    There were 21 
experiments in these papers and they saw divergences (where the group moved away 
from the correct answer) in 3 cases.     
 
2.3.2.5 Positive and Negative Feedback in Markets 
A feedback loop is a series of connections within a system which affects itself (Sterman, 
2000).   The type of feedback, either positive or negative, is determined by the type of the 
effect.   In a system with a positive feedback loop, a perturbation at the input of the 
system will be increased as it travels around the loop.   In a system with negative 
feedback the perturbation will be decreased as it travels around the loop.    
 
In the perspective of the efficient market hypothesis the price provides negative feedback 
to the market.   As market participants assess their information, they develop an 
expectation of the price.  If the market price they observe is greater than this expectation 
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they will take actions which tend to decrease the market price (that is, they may sell the 
item if they own it).   By the same reasoning, if their expectation is lower than the current 
market price, they will take actions which tend to increase the market price (that is, they 
may buy the item).     By contrast, a system where an information mirage is underway is 
in a positive feedback cycle.   As more participants make the same choice it encourages 
subsequent participant to make the same choice. 
 
2.3.3 Systems Theories of markets 
A number of theories and analyses of markets have been developed within the systems 
science field.    These will be briefly described. 
2.3.3.1 System Dynamic Market Models 
System dynamics can be used to model markets.   Sterman (2000) discusses system 
dynamic models of commodity cycles.    These models encompass supply and demand 
factors and endogenously create price cycles.    One of the important lessons of system 
dynamics is that very simple structures can create complex dynamics.    For example, the 
numerous varieties of S type growth (e.g., exponential growth, limiting effects, 
oscillations, etc.) all come from a structure with two simple feedback loops. 
2.3.3.2 Catastrophe Theory 
Zeeman (1974) proposes an alternative model for bubbles and crashes associated with 
catastrophe theory.    Zeeman considers the market to be a gradient system and argues the 
dynamics of the interaction between fundamentalists and chartists (technical traders) 
gives rise to crashes that can be modeled with a cusp catastrophe.   These concepts are 
also discussed in depth by Rosser (1991). 
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2.3.3.3 Agent Based Models 
Various studies have created agent based market models.  Cohen et al. (1983) provided 
one of the earliest reports.   LeBaron (2000) provides a review of various work.   The 
most extensive effort was carried out by the Santa Fe institute (W. B. Arthur, Holland, 
LeBaron, Palmer, & Tayler, 1997). 
2.3.3.4 Markets as Complex Evolving System 
A theory of markets as complex evolving and adaptive systems has been proposed (cf. 
Beinhocker, 2006), which has been predominately studied at the Santa Fe Institute (P. W. 
Anderson, Arrow, & Pines, 1988; W. Brian Arthur, Durlauf, & Lane, 1997).    While not 
precisely defined, this perspective incorporates many of the traditional systems science 
concepts: 
• Nonlinear dynamics – As opposed to traditional economics, equilibrium is not 
assumed.   In fact, dynamics are inherently incorporated into the theories.   
Furthermore, linearity is not assumed.    
• Interactions and emergence – macro phenomenon emerge  from the interactions 
of agents within the system 
• Evolutionary – Multiple aspects (behaviors, strategies, actions) of agents evolve 
in response to the environment.  
 
Closely related is the developing field of Econophysics (c.f. Johnson, Jefferies, & Hui, 
2003; Mantegna & Stanley, 2000).    In the Econophysics framework, none of the typical 
assumptions made in classical Economics are used (e.g., normality of distributions, 
random walk behavior, rationality of agents, etc.).   Instead, Johnson et al. (2003) 
describe the basic tenants as: feedback; non-stationarity; many interacting agents; 
adaptation; evolution; single realization; and, open systems. 
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2.4 Decisions Frameworks in Economics 
Two key frameworks are relevant to the present study – behavioral economics and 
experimental economics. 
 
Behavioral economics (or the closely related field of behavioral finance) is the integration 
of economics with the building blocks from psychology and decision science. 
Assumptions around the aggregate rationality of economic agents are suspended and the 
impacts of behaviors observed in human decision processes on economic systems are 
studied.    The initial work in the field was strongly influenced by the development of 
Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversdky (1979) and Bounded Rationality by Simon 
(1976).   An excellent overview is given in Inefficient Markets: An introduction to 
Behavioral Finance by Shleifer (2000). 
 
Experimental economics relies on the application of standard experimental methods to 
study economic issues.    Thus, experimental economics also takes a decidedly 
descriptive view of human behavior.   Camerer (1995) provides an excellent review with 
illustration of the viewpoint of experimental economics. 
 
One important difference between behavioral and experimental economics is in their 
inquiring systems.    Behavioral economics primarily relies on analysis of the vast data 
sets available from actual economic systems in its analysis.   This Lockean form of 
inquiry  (Mitroff & Turoff, 1973)   is in contrast to the Kantean form used in 
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experimental economics which relies on experimental markets where variables of interest 
are precisely controlled for focused studies of cause-effect relationships. 
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3 Experimental Hypotheses and Methods 
The experimental hypotheses and methods are discussed. 
 
3.1 Synthesis and Experimental Hypotheses 
The literature is synthesized and a set of experimental hypotheses are developed to 
address the research questions set forth in section 1.2. 
 
3.1.1 Research Framework and Market Measurements 
The focus of the research and some of the key tools will be described. 
3.1.1.1 Research Framework 
The framework of experimental economics will be adopted for the present study.     All 
information to participants will be known by the researcher; and all participants' actions 
will be captured. 
 
An experimental prediction market similar to the Plott et al (2003) PIC market will be 
used.   Participants will be able to allocate a fixed number of tickets across these six 
states.    The cumulative allocation of tickets per state will be the market result. 
 
3.1.1.2 Entropy 
The entropy of the final distribution of allocated tickets can be used as a measure of the 
certainty, or the conviction, of the prediction.    The entropy is computed as shown in the 
equation below: 
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where p(x) is the probability associated with a particular state and is simply the tickets 
allocated to the state divided by the total number of allocated tickets.  The log nature of 
Entropy tends to compress differences.    The minimum value of entropy is 0 which 
occurs when all tickets are allocated on one state.   The maximum entropy is 2.585 which 
occurs when tickets are evenly distributed across the six possible states. 
3.1.1.3 Evaluating two Distributions - Wurtz Distance 
Several descriptive tests have also been used to describe differences in distributions (Plott 
et al., 2003).   The Wurtz number will be used in the present study (Wurtz, 1997) as 
defined by: 
	,   0.5 |	  |


 
 
where p and q are the probabilities of each state (that is, the observed ticket allocation 
divided by the total).    This metric was chosen because it is well behaved for allocations 
of 0 tickets. 
3.1.1.4 Aggregate Information Available (AIA) 
Plot et al. (2003) describe a measure they termed Aggregate Information Available (AIA).   
AIA is simply the Bayesian posterior probability if all draws which have been distributed 
are known.   In the market used for the present research, the AIA is a distribution of 
probabilities across the six states. 
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Of particular interest is the Wurtz distance between a given cumulative allocation in a 
market and the AIA distribution.   This gives a measure of how close the allocation is to  
perfect assimilation of information. 
3.1.1.5 Statistical Significance of a Result 
The cumulative allocation of tickets reflects the market's results.   A two stage statistical 
test for significance of the results will be employed for the present study.   In the first 
phase the accumulated results will be compared to a uniform distribution to determine if 
there is any information in the distribution.   In the second phase the two states with the 
largest distributions will be compared for significance of the mode.   This method is 
analogous to the use of ANOVA to test for significance on a group of means and then 
post-hoc tests to determine which means are statistically different.      The method is 
illustrated in Table 5.    In this example, the cumulative allocation across states is 
10,20,100,40,80,50.    With a total of 300 tickets allocated, this allocation is compared to 
a uniform allocation of 50 tickets per state.    With standard categorical data analysis the 
resulting p-value obtained from the Chi-square distribution is less than 0.05, so the 
allocation is deemed to have information content.   In the second phase, the mode of 100 
tickets on state C is tested against the second highest allocation, 80 tickets on state E.    
These are compared against a uniform distribution of the tickets across the two state (in 
this case 90 tickets on each).   Here categorical data analysis yields a p-value which is 
greater than 0.05.   Therefore, in this example, the mode is not significantly different than 
the second highest allocation. 
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 A B C D E F Total Chi-Square p-value 
Actual 10 20 100 40 80 50 300  
Uniform 50 50 50 50 50 50  3.13858E-24 
         
Actual   100  80    
Uniform   90  90   0.136037165 
Table 5. Illustration of two stage evaluation of allocations 
 
 
This process was used to describe a result as being in one of three possible states: 
 
1. Not Significant - p-value of first or second test is > .05 
2. Correct - p-value of both first and second test is < .05 and the mode is correct 
3. Incorrect - p-value of both first and second test is < .05 and the mode is incorrect 
 
3.1.1.6 Decisiveness and Correctness 
In terms of a market's performance, two interesting metrics can be calculated using the 
categorization of Correct, Incorrect and Not Significant: 
 
Decisiveness = Number Significant/Total Number of markets 
or 
Decisiveness = (Number Correct + Number Incorrect)/Total Number of markets 
 
 
Correctness = Number Correct/Number Significant  
or 
Correctness = Number Correct/(Number Correct + Number Incorrect) 
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Decisiveness is a representation of the market's ability to make a judgment.    Correctness 
is the probability that this judgment is correct.   Both are important considerations for a 
prediction market designer. 
 
Decisiveness and correctness values from two different test cases will be compared for 
statistically significant differences using the Fisher's exact test on the contingency  tables 
shown in Table 6 and Table 7 
 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 
Significant Number Correct in case 1
 
+ 
Number Incorrect in case 1 
Number Correct in case 2
 
+ 
Number Incorrect in case 2 
Not Significant Number Not Significant in 
case 1 
Number Not Significant in 
case 2 
Table 6. Contingency table to test differences in decisiveness .The subscripts refer to case number  
 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 
Correct Number Correct in case 1 Number Correct in case 2 
Not Correct Number Incorrect in case 1 Number Incorrect in case 2 
Table 7. Contingency table to test differences in correctness 
 
3.1.1.7 Evaluating Prediction Markets - Accuracy and Precision 
Typically, a measurement system is judged by two characteristics: precision and accuracy.   
Precision is a measure of the repeatability or variance in the measurements.   Accuracy is 
a measure of the degree to which the correct quantity is reported.   As shown in Figure 2 
these two need not be related.  The best measurement system is both accurate and precise, 
the worst is neither. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of accuracy vs. precision.   Each dot represents a different measurement.    The 
axis in the plots represent two variables and the correct value is the origin. 
 
Table 8 summarizes the market measures discussed in this section and whether they 
characterize the precision or accuracy of the market.    The correct, incorrect, not 
significant parameter characterizes both the precision and accuracy of the market.   In the 
present study, since the researcher has full knowledge of all relevant information, these 
parameters can be computed as the market is progressing.   In practice, a prediction 
market organizer can only make this characterization when the market is complete and if 
the state of the phenomenon the market was trying to predict is known.    The Wurtz 
distance between the cumulative allocation and AIA distribution is another valuable 
measurement of both the market's precision and accuracy.   In the present study, since the 
draw information is always known, the AIA distribution can be calculated and the Wurtz 
.....
..
.....
..
.. ...
..
. ...
..
Accurate but not Precise Precise but not Accurate
Accurate and Precise Neither Accurate nor Precise
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distance computed.     However, in a real prediction market it is usually not possible to 
know all the information possessed by the participants.    Entropy is a parameter which 
can only give information on the precision on the market.   However, it has the 
characteristic that it can be used at any time, even while the market is operating, by both 
the researcher and the practitioner.     
 
 
Measure Level Measure of Precision or 
Accuracy? 
Correct, Incorrect, Not-
significant 
Research: After stage 
Practice: Ex-post 
Precision and Accuracy 
Wurtz distance between 
result and AIA distribution 
Research: After stage 
Practice: Generally not 
possible to calculate 
Precision and Accuracy 
Entropy At any stage Precision 
Decisiveness On a group of results Precision 
Correctness On a group of results Accuracy 
Table 8. Summary of market measurement instruments. 
 
 
Decisiveness and correctness will be used extensively in this work.    Decisiveness gives 
a very valuable characterization of the precision of a market.   A market with higher 
precision is able to make a prediction more often - a very valuable characteristic to the 
prediction market organizer.    Correctness is the ability of the market to correctly predict 
once it has become decisive - or reached a statistically significant result.    The prediction 
market organizer is keenly interested in both high decisiveness and correctness. 
 
3.1.2 What are the Mechanisms Involved in the Information 
Assimilation Process? 
As mentioned, the idea and understanding that markets can assimilate information date 
back to some of the earliest work on economics.   Smith (1776) and Hayek (1945) wrote 
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of this and the concept was used to build the fundamental Theory of Rational 
Expectations and the Efficient Market Hypothesis - important pillars in modern 
economics.    The ability of markets to assimilate information was empirically shown by 
Plott (1988).   In the present study the process of assimilation will be described in terms 
of two components: 
• The collection of diverse information - individuals using their own information 
make a judgment about the implications of that information and bring this to the 
market.    This process is sometimes referred to as dissemination. 
• The market's judgment on the implications of this gathered information - an 
inductive process which Plott (2003) and others call information aggregation. 
 
A market without feedback can be studied to isolate the collection process.  This process, 
if present, should enable a market to perform better than a simple collection of its 
components. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Markets without feedback can collect information and outperform the average of 
their parts.  
 
Feedback markets can be compared to no-feedback markets to understand the effect of 
the inductive process.   The level of agreement in the markets can be studied with the 
market entropy. 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
Feedback markets have an inductive process, above and beyond collection, which 
creates agreement which increases precision.   
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Feedback vs. no-feedback markets can be compared to estimate the amount of 
information which is being assimilated.   The evaluation of the Wurtz distance between 
the cumulative allocation and the AIA distribution is a market measurement which 
characterizes the degree of information assimilation. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
Feedback markets have an inductive process, above and beyond collection, which 
can assimilate more information than markets without feedback.  
 
The information cascade effect which develops a mirage as described in Section 2.3.2.1 is 
expected to be seen on occasion in feedback markets.   It is expected that this would be 
data and path dependent (e.g., a  Polya process cf. Lloyd & Kotz, 1977).    Various tests 
will be used to detect their presence in the data. 
 
Hypothesis 4: 
Information mirages are present in markets with feedback.  They are an artifact of 
the inductive process.  These mirages are an error mechanism which reduces the 
market's overall accuracy. 
 
Table 9 presents a summary of research hypotheses for the research question "What are 
the mechanisms involved in the information assimilation process?" 
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Research Question Hypothesis Relevance 
What are the mechanisms 
involved in the information 
assimilation process? 
1. Markets without feedback 
can collect information and 
outperform the average of 
their parts.  
How does a market achieve its 
results and how can it be 
managed? 
2. Feedback markets have an 
inductive process, above and 
beyond collection, which 
creates agreement which 
increases precision.   
3. Feedback markets have an 
inductive process, above and 
beyond collection, which can 
assimilate more information 
than markets without 
feedback.  
4. Information mirages are 
present in markets with 
feedback. They are an artifact 
of the inductive process.  
These mirages are an error 
mechanism which reduces the 
market's overall accuracy. 
What are the error 
mechanisms in markets?    
And how can they be 
managed? 
Table 9. Summary of research hypotheses for the first research question  "What are the mechanisms 
involved in the information assimilation process? 
 
3.1.3 How does the Presence and Type of Feedback impact Market 
Performance? 
The addition of feedback is expected to add the inductive process of information 
aggregation which should increase the precision of the market, but this process is also 
expected to create information mirages which will reduce accuracy.     
 
Hypothesis 5: 
Adding feedback increases the decisiveness of a market at the expense of 
correctness.  
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Three levels of feedback will be explored in the present study.   First, no feedback on 
ticket allocations makes the market an incentivized poll.     For feedback, the total 
accumulated tickets can be represented in two formats, as a frequency or as a percentage 
of the total.    When total tickets numbers are shown, participants can derive the number 
of participants who have preceded them.    However, if percentages of total tickets are 
shown then this will not be possible.   In addition the percentage vs. frequency may 
impact the participant's estimation of Bayesian probabilities (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 
1995). 
 
Table 10 summarizes the feedback types of interest. 
 
Factor Level Description 
Feedback 
Type 
No-feedback No feedback is provided – incentivized poll 
Percentage allocation Percentages of total accumulated allocated 
tickets shown 
Total Allocation 
(frequency) 
Total accumulated allocated tickets shown 
Table 10. Market Structure factors of Interest 
 
 
Displaying frequency data on ticket allocations is expected to maximize the observational 
learning, which should result in increased decisiveness over percent feedback markets at 
the expense of some level of correctness.    
 
Hypothesis 6: 
The type of feedback can modulate the induction process - more informative 
feedback increases decisiveness at the cost of correctness. 
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Table 11 presents a summary of research hypotheses for the research question "How does 
the presence and type of feedback impact market performance?" 
 
Research Question Hypothesis Relevance 
How does the presence and 
type of feedback impact 
market performance? 
5. Adding feedback increases 
the decisiveness of a market 
at the expense of correctness.  
What is the relationship 
between prediction market 
designs and performance?  
Which structure should an 
organizational decision maker 
choose for their particular 
task? 
6. The type of feedback can 
modulate the induction 
process - more informative 
feedback increases 
decisiveness at the cost of 
correctness.  
Table 11. Summary of research hypotheses for the second  research question "How does the presence 
and type of feedback impact market performance?" 
 
3.1.4 How do Individuals use Information in the Allocation Process? 
In the absence of feedback (that is, information on how the others participants are 
allocating their tickets) the research discussed in  Section 2.2 suggests that many 
participants will act Bayesian-like in their allocations over a range of inputs.   However, 
the deviation from Bayesian behavior is difficult to predict.   For example, consider the 
case where a participant receives a ball draw of all the same type.   Base rate neglect 
(section 2.2.2.2.1)  and pseudiagnosticiy (section 2.2.2.2.3) would suggest the participant 
would overestimate the probability that the ball drawn is the correct state.   However, 
conservatism (section 2.2.2.2.2) would suggest an underestimation of the probability. 
 
Hypothesis 7: 
In the absence of public data, participant's allocate tickets in a Bayesian-like 
method. 
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Information integration theory as described in section 2.2.2.2.1 would suggest that 
participants generally use algebraic rules to combine public and private information. 
 
 Hypothesis 8: 
In the presence of public data, participants allocate tickets by integrating public 
and private data 
 
Drawing from the discussion of preference reversals in section 2.2.3.2.3 it is expected 
that a large percentage of participants will make percentage bets (bets with a high 
probability of winning) , with a fewer number maximizing expected winnings.    Or, in 
the terms used by Slovic and Lichtenstein (2006), they will favor P bets (probability) 
over $ bets. 
 
Hypothesis 9: 
Participants will favor bets with a higher probability of winning over bets which 
maximize expected winnings 
 
Finally, based on prior work, it is expected that there will be significant diversity in the 
overall individual strategies. 
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Research Question Hypothesis Relevance 
How do individuals use 
information in the allocation 
process?  What are the 
models for individual 
behavior? 
7. In the absence of public 
data, participants allocate 
tickets allocate tickets in a 
Bayesian-like method 
Can the performance of the 
market be improved  by 
changing participants' 
behavior?  
Who should be invited to 
participate? 
8. In the presence of public 
data, participants allocate 
tickets by integrating public 
and private data 
9. Participants will favor bets 
with a higher probability of 
winning over bets which 
maximize expected winnings 
Table 12. Summary of research hypotheses for the third research question "How do individuals 
use information in the allocation process?" 
 
3.1.5 Summary of Research Hypotheses 
Table 13 presents a summary of the research questions, associated hypotheses and 
relevance to the prediction market organizer. 
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Research Question Hypothesis Relevance 
What are the mechanisms 
involved in the 
information assimilation 
process? 
1. Markets without feedback can 
collect information and 
outperform the average of their 
parts.  
How does a market achieve its 
results and how can it be 
managed? 
2. Feedback markets have an 
inductive process, above and 
beyond collection, which creates 
agreement  (precision).   
3. Feedback markets have an 
inductive process, above and 
beyond collection, which can 
assimilate more information than 
markets without feedback.  
4. Information mirages are 
present in markets with feedback. 
They are an artifact of the 
inductive process.  These mirages 
are an error mechanism which 
reduces the market's overall 
accuracy. 
What are the error 
mechanisms in markets?    
And how can they be 
managed? 
 
How does the presence 
and type of feedback 
impact market 
performance? 
5. Adding feedback increases the 
decisiveness of a market at the 
expense of correctness.  
What is the relationship 
between prediction market 
designs and performance?  
Which structure should an 
organizational decision maker 
choose for their particular 
task? 
6. The type of feedback can 
modulate the induction process - 
more informative feedback 
increases decisiveness at the cost 
of correctness. 
 
How do individuals use 
information in the 
allocation process?   
What are the models for 
individual behavior? 
7. In the absence of public data, 
participants allocate tickets 
allocate tickets in a Bayesian-like 
method 
Can the performance of the 
market be improved  by 
changing participant's 
behavior?  
Who should be invited to 
participate? 
8. In the presence of public data, 
participants allocate tickets by 
integrating public and private 
data 
9. Participants will favor bets with 
a higher probability of winning 
over bets which maximize 
expected winnings 
Table 13. Summary of research questions, associated hypotheses and relevance to the prediction 
market organizer. 
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3.2 Experiment Design 
A simplified version of the experimental prediction markets used by Plott et al. (2003) 
was used.    With a few modifications, this market can be conducted asynchronously via 
an online survey.    
 
The overall design is shown in Table 14.    Feedback type has three levels: no-feedback 
(called here an incentivized poll); total accumulated tickets shown as frequency; or, total 
accumulated tickets shown as percentages of the total.    
 
 Market Symbol 
 
 
Feedback Type 
No-feedback IP  (Incentivized Poll) 
Percentage of ticket 
allocations show (%) 
Pct (or %) 
Total ticket Allocation 
Shown (Frequency) 
Freq 
Table 14. Overview of experimental design 
 
A flow chart of the survey is shown in Figure 3.     Participants were recruited from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk.   After consent and a short set of demographic questions they 
participated in two incentivized poll markets.   Next,  they were randomly assigned to one 
of the feedback groups – either being shown total accumulated tickets as a frequency or 
as a percentage of the total.    After completing these four markets they completed a short 
set of survey questions. 
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Figure 3. Experiment flow chart 
 
 
Two experiments were conducted.   The primary difference was the draw tables used.  
Draw tables can be produced prior to the market implementation and individual draw sets 
taken sequentially from them.    
 
3.2.1 Simplified Experimental Prediction Market 
The market used in the present research is a simplified version of the prediction market 
studied by Plott et al. (2003).     Participants will be given private data and, depending on 
the market structure, may be able to observe how other participants have acted  (public 
data).    The private data consists of a set of draws from an urn.   As used by Plott et al. 
(2003), the urn contains 15 balls with a distribution biased by a prior selection of the 
correct state. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the operation of a frequency market.   To begin, the correct state of 
nature, that which participants are attempting to ascertain, is chosen at random from an 
urn (or bingo cage) consisting of six balls – here considered simply to be letters A 
through F.   Suppose this random selection chooses B to be the correct state.     The 
second urn (or bingo cage) would then be populated with 5 B balls, and 2 balls of each of 
Amazon 
Mechanical 
Turk 
Population
Consent
Volunteer
Instructions
Demographics
2 IP Mkts
4 Freq 
Mkts
4 % 
Mkts
Random 
Assignment
Survey
Q’s
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the other types.    Each market participant is then given the results of three draws, with 
replacement, from the bingo cage.   For example, from the figure the first set of three 
draws was E, B and F.   This set of three draws will be called here a draw set.  These 
draw sets are the private information of the participants.    Each participant was given an 
allocation of 100 tickets to distribute across the six states.   The participant's task is to 
allocate these tickets in the best way given their particular set of information.    As the 
market begins, the first participant is given his private information (draw set) of E,B,F.   
He sees the prior allocation is all 0 and can understand that he is the first market 
participant.   For this example, imagine he allocates his 100 tickets as 12 to state A, 8 to 
state B and C, 16 to state D and E and 40 to state F.    The next participant is shown a 
draw set of C,D,A and the public information, the total accumulated ticket allocation by 
prior respondents, of 12,8,8,16,16,40 (the values allocated to states A through F 
respectively).    They would then allocate their 100 tickets based on this information.   In 
this illustration they allocated tickets as 24,10,23,23,10,10 to states A through F.    The 
total accumulated number of tickets becomes 36,18,31,39,26,50.    These are the totals 
which would be shown to participant 3 along with their draw set of F,D,E. 
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Figure 4. Illustration of market operation 
 
 
This market process places two restrictions not seen in the markets used by Plott et al. 
(2003) in order to operate asynchronously: 
• Each participant is given a set order and must allocate all their tickets at that time.   
Generally, participants would prefer to place their tickets later in the process.   
However, if the scope is a series of markets, and the participant’s position in the 
allocation queue is randomly chosen, then, on average, no participant would be 
disadvantaged over the series of markets. 
• Each participant must allocate all of their tickets.   While not a requirement of the 
markets used by Plott et al. (2003), it is conceptually consistent with the these 
markets since there was no benefit to holding unallocated tickets at the end of the 
market since they did not carry over to the next market. 
 
Rather than assembling all participants together, the modified structure allows 
participants to respond asynchronously – thereby greatly boosting the ability to gather 
large numbers of responses.   The asynchronous nature of the proposed structure may 
Draw Set # Draw 1 Draw 2 Draw 3
1 E B F
2 C D A
3 F D E
4 E A C
Draw Table
Participant1
Draw 1 Draw 2 Draw 3
E B F
A B C D E F
Prior Allocation 0 0 0 0 0 0
Respondent 1 
Allocation
12 8 8 16 16 40
Total 12 8 8 16 16 40
Participant 2
Draw 1 Draw 2 Draw 3
C D A
A B C D E F
Prior Allocation 12 8 8 16 16 40
Respondent 2 
Allocation
24 10 23 23 10 10
Total 36 18 31 39 26 50
B selected as 
correct state
B
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also have value as an organizational market – allowing organizations to collect data from 
busy participants who may be geographically dispersed across time zones.   
 
    
3.2.2 Random Draw Experiment 
For the random draws experiment, hundreds of draw tables were produced with Matlab's 
rand command which uses the Ziggurat algorithm (Marsaglia & Tsang, 2000).    These 
draw tables were then used sequentially as the experiment progressed.  The same draw 
tables were applied to each market type (no-feedback, frequency feedback and percent 
feedback).  
 
3.2.3 Mirage Prone Draw Experiment 
In the mirage prone draw set experiment, one draw table was reused for all markets.     
 
To select the draw table a large number of possible draw tables were generated.    These 
draw tables were processed through a simulator (see section 5.2) to analyze the potential 
performance of each draw table in different prediction markets.   Table 15 shows the 
draw table to be used in the experiment.   Here, A is the correct state.    For example, the 
first participant would receive a draw set of D, F, D.   The second participant would 
receive a draw set of E,F,D.  
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Table 15. Experimental Draw Table for Mirage Prone Draw Experiment. 
 
 
This particular draw table was chosen due to its ability to generate mirages in the 
simulator environment.    Table 16 shows the statistics of the draw table.    Compared to 
the urn, the signal for the correct state is weaker (25% vs. 33.3% for the correct state in 
the case of 12 draw sets).    Furthermore, the draws for the correct state come later in the 
draw table.   While the simulator showed this has no effect in a market without feedback, 
the simulator demonstrated that this arrangement is capable of producing information 
mirages in feedback markets.  
 
 
Table 16. Statistics of the draw table compared to the Urn. 
Correct State = A
Draw Set 1st draw 2nd draw 3rd draw
1 D F D
2 E F D
3 F C A
4 D D E
5 A D E
6 A E B
7 A A B
8 E C C
9 A A B
10 C F B
11 A B A
12 C B D
13 A A A
State Count Percent Count Percent
A 9 25.0% 5 33.3%
B 6 16.7% 2 13.3%
C 5 13.9% 2 13.3%
D 7 19.4% 2 13.3%
E 5 13.9% 2 13.3%
F 4 11.1% 2 13.3%
Draw Table Urn
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The mirage tendency of the draw set can be illustrated in Table 17 and Table 18.   Table 
17  shows the draw sets at each stage (participant) as well as the AIA posterior 
probability given the cumulative draws.     Note that for stages one through eight, D is the 
most likely state (largest AIA probability).    From stages 9-13, state A, which is the urn 
correct state, becomes the most likely.    Table 18 illustrates the cumulative allocation if 
participants had access to all accumulated draws and they allocated their 100 tickets in 
direct proportion to the AIA posterior probability.   Even with these rational responses, an 
information mirage would develop on state D. 
 
 
Table 17. Mirage prone draw set and AIA posterior probability. 
 
 
AIA Posterior Probability
Random Draw
1st draw 2nd draw 3rd draw Stage A B C D E F
D F D 1 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 49.0% 7.8% 19.6%
E F D 2 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 57.1% 9.1% 22.8%
F C A 3 6.3% 2.5% 6.3% 39.3% 6.3% 39.3%
D D E 4 2.0% 0.8% 2.0% 77.8% 5.0% 12.4%
A D E 5 2.2% 0.4% 0.9% 85.6% 5.5% 5.5%
A E B 6 4.9% 0.8% 0.8% 76.4% 12.2% 4.9%
A A B 7 24.1% 1.5% 0.6% 60.2% 9.6% 3.9%
E C C 8 20.5% 1.3% 3.3% 51.2% 20.5% 3.3%
A A B 9 61.1% 1.6% 1.6% 24.4% 9.8% 1.6%
C F B 10 57.1% 3.7% 3.7% 22.8% 9.1% 3.7%
A B A 11 88.1% 2.3% 0.9% 5.6% 2.3% 0.9%
C B D 12 77.8% 5.0% 2.0% 12.4% 2.0% 0.8%
A A A 13 98.2% 0.4% 0.2% 1.0% 0.2% 0.1%
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Table 18. Accumulated allocation if each participant allocates in proportion to the current AIA 
probability. 
 
3.3 Survey Implementation 
In order to generate a large sample of participants the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome) on-line recruitment mechanism was used.    
Amazon Mechanical Turk (referred to as AMT) was developed as a way to recruit 
workers for small tasks (called by AMT as HITs for Human Interface Tasks).    For 
example, businesses often use AMT workers (referred to as Turkers) to screen customer 
blog posts for inappropriate comments.    Social scientists are finding the internet 
(Birnbaum, 2004) and AMT (Mason & Suri, 2010) to be an excellent source of high 
quality participants.     
 
The interaction between participants necessitated a more complex survey implementation 
than normally seen in social science experiments.    Figure 5 illustrates the survey 
architecture.    AMT workers log into their accounts at Amazon.com and access AMT 
Accumulated Allocation
Stage A B C D E F
1 8 8 8 49 8 20
2 11 11 11 106 17 42
3 18 14 18 145 23 82
4 20 15 20 223 28 94
5 22 15 21 309 34 100
6 27 16 21 385 46 105
7 51 17 22 445 56 108
8 71 19 25 497 76 112
9 133 20 27 521 86 113
10 190 24 31 544 95 117
11 278 26 31 550 97 118
12 355 31 33 562 99 119
13 454 32 34 563 99 119
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tasks (HITs) with their web browser.   The entire survey ran within the AMT frame and 
had to interface into the AMT account information.    The survey itself was hosted on a 
separate site (lunarpages.com).     The php scripts ran on these hosted servers and 
accessed a MySQL database to store information and retrieve summaries of responses 
from prior participants.    All interfaces to AMT account settings, survey scripts and the 
MySQL database were available via the internet.     The final set of scripts contained over 
400 lines of code. 
 
 
Figure 5. Survey Architecture 
 
The survey includes (see Appendix for details): 
• An IRB approved consent form. 
• Collection of basic demographics: gender, age, education level and major 
Amazon.com
Web Hosting (Lunarpages.com)
Local Control (Notebook)
AMT Workers (Turkers )
AMT (Amazon 
Mechanical Turk)
Database (MySQL)
Survey Scripts 
php scripts run on 
Apache web server 
(Linux OS)
Workers  access 
AMT and the survey 
via their web 
browser (e.g. 
internet explore)
AMT jobs are called HITs – Human Interface Task
Amazon Account Information
Amazon Web Services
AMT interfaces 
with account 
information and 
uses web services 
for state control
Files are edited locally 
with a tool such as 
‘Programmer’s 
Notepad’
Files are 
uploaded to 
web server 
with FTP
MySQL database 
administered 
with 
phpMyAdmin
Settings are accessed via Amazon  
account controls and web services.   
A set of DOS command line tools are 
provided by Amazon (protocol is XML 
and SOAP)
php scripts 
control the 
storing of data
The AMT HIT is linked to the first php script.    Subsequent  
scripts are called as a linked list.   The web pages running on 
the hosting site are displayed in the AMT window .
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• An attention test - a Likert scale question which simply asked 'select strongly agree' 
• A set of instructions on the incentivized poll market 
• Two no feedback (IP) markets 
• For the random draws experiment a third IP market was given which had a fixed draw 
and was used for screening purposes (see section 4.1.4) 
• A set of instructions for the feedback market (either frequency or percent depending 
on the random assignment).   
• Four feedback markets (Figure 6 gives a screen shot of the actual implementation) 
• A post test survey question "Did you encounter a situation where there was a 
contradiction between your private (draw) information and the market information?" 
• If the participant responded yes, they were presented with the question - ' How did 
you resolve the contradiction?' with choices of: 
o I relied on private information 
o I relied on public information 
o I attempted to integrate the two information sources 
o I just spread out my tickets across all options 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Actual implementation of the frequency feedback market. 
 
 
The markets were designed to stagger the start.    This was done so that each participant 
would see a variety of total accumulated public data in the feedback markets and a range 
of private data in the mirage prone draw experiment.    To illustrate, if there were no 
staggering, the first participant would see a total accumulated allocation of tickets as 0 for 
each state in each of the four feedback markets.   By contrast, the last participant would 
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have the advantage of seeing the allocations of all prior participants for each market.    By 
staging the start, it allowed each participant to see a range of total accumulated responses.    
This not only makes the potential rewards fairer, but also improves the diversity of 
responses obtained.   This staging will be explained in the following sections  
 
3.3.1 Staging in Random Draw Experiment 
To stage, or stagger, the start, a number of seed responses were generated and entered 
into the MySQL database.   Table 19 illustrates the staging method used.    To explain, 
consider the case of participant 1.   After completing the no feedback markets they would 
receive draw set 11 in their first feedback market.    As public data, they would see the 
accumulated allocation of seed responses 1 through 10.    For their second market, they 
would be the first participant, receiving draw set 1 and would be shown a total 
accumulated allocation of 0 for each state as public information.   In their third feedback 
market they would receive draw set 16 and see the accumulated allocation of seeds 1 
through 15 as the public data.   Finally, in market 4 they would receive draw set 6 and see 
the total accumulated allocation of seeds 1 through 5.    In this example, the participant's 
total accumulated allocation ranged from 0 in market 2 to 1,500 in market 3.    All 
markets which included seeded values were excluded from the analysis.   So, there is a 
research cost for this staging. 
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Table 19. Staging for random draws experiment. 
 
 
3.3.2 Staging in Mirage Prone Draw Experiment 
Six versions of the mirage prone draw table (Table 15) were used.  The 5 additional 
versions are simple 1:1 mappings from the original as shown in Figure 7.    Each original 
state is mapped to a new state.   This technique allows the correct state to vary and 
provides more variety of draw sets while still allowing comparison of results. 
 
 
Draw 
Set #
Feedback 
Market #1
Feedback 
Market #2
Feedback 
Market #3
Feedback 
Market #4
1 Seed 1 Participant 1 Seed 1 Seed 1
2 Seed 2 Participant 2 Seed 2 Seed 2
3 Seed 3 Participant 3 Seed 3 Seed 3
4 Seed 4 Participant 4 Seed 4 Seed 4
5 Seed 5 Participant 5 Seed 5 Seed 5
6 Seed 6 Participant 6 Seed 6 Participant 1
7 Seed 7 Participant 7 Seed 7 Participant 2
8 Seed 8 Participant 8 Seed 8 Participant 3
9 Seed 9 Participant 9 Seed 9 Participant 4
10 Seed 10 Participant 10 Seed 10 Participant 5
11 Participant 1 Participant 11 Seed 11 Participant 6
12 Participant 2 Participant 12 Seed 12 Participant 7
13 Participant 3 Participant 13 Seed 13 Participant 8
14 Participant 4 Participant 14 Seed 14 Participant 9
15 Participant 5 Participant 15 Seed 15 Participant 10
16 Participant 6 Participant 16 Participant 1 Participant 11
17 Participant 7 Participant 17 Participant 2 Participant 12
18 Participant 8 Participant 18 Participant 3 Participant 13
19 Participant 9 Participant 19 Participant 4 Participant 14
20 Participant 10 Participant 20 Participant 5 Participant 15
71 
 
Figure 7. Mappings used to create alternate version of draw table 
 
 
Table 20 and Table 21 illustrate the staging method for the mirage prone experiment.    
IPA-1 and IPB-1 are the first two IP markets.   FA-1 through FD-1 are the first four 
frequency feedback markets.   PA-1 through PD-1 are the first four percentage feedback 
markets.    IPB-1, FB-1, FC-1, FD-1, PB-1, PC-1 and PD-1 were all seeded with 
computer generated responses and are indicated with light blue shading in Table 20.   To 
understand this consider a series of  participants - labeled in the table as Resp1 for the 
first participant, Resp2 for the second responded, and so forth.   A random assignment 
into either the frequency or percentage markets is simulated.   For example, participant 1 
(resp1) would first receive draw set #1 (that is be the first participant in market IPA-1) 
from transform 1 (see Figure 7 - draw set #1 from transform 1 is 2,5,2 or B,E,B) for his 
first IP market.    In his second IP market he would receive the thirteenth draw set from 
the untransformed draw table (1,1,1 or A,A,A).   I illustrate that the random assignment 
would place him into the frequency markets.   In his first frequency market he would 
receive draw set number 1 from transform 2 of the draw table (2,5,2 or B,E,B).  Since he 
is the first participant in this market  his public data will be all zeros (0,0,0,0,0,0).    In his 
next frequency market, FB-1, he will receive the fourth draw set from transformation 
Mapping 1 Mapping 2 Mapping 3 Mapping 4 Mapping 5
A C D B D E
B F B F E A
C A A E F F
D B C C A B
E D F A C D
F E E D B C
Original 
Draw 
State
Mapped State
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draw table 3 (2,2,1 or B,B,A).    The public data he will see is the sum of the seed 
allocations SB1-1 + SB1-2 + SB1-3 (all computer generated).   In this way, each 
participant in the feedback markets will have a variety in the number of prior participants.    
Note that if the seed allocations were not used, participant 1 would be the first participant 
in every market.   Every draw he saw would be simple transformations of the same draw 
(two balls the same).   In every feedback market he would see no public information.    
Also, without the seeding and staging, participant 13 would see all ball draw sets as three 
balls the same (e.g., A,A,A) and he would have access to the allocations of all twelve 
prior participants as his public information.    Finally, any market with seed values are not 
used in the calculation of statistics for market performance (that is, they are removed 
from the sample). 
 
Table 20. Illustration of the staging method for the mirage prone experiment- IP and Frequency 
Markets. 
 
 
IPA-1 IPB-1 FA-1 FB-1 FC-1 FD-1
Transform 1 none 2 3 4 5
Correct State 3 1 4 2 4 5
1 Resp 1 NA Resp 1 SB1-1 SC1-1 SD1-1
2 Resp 2 NA Resp 3 SB1-2 SC1-2 SD1-2
3 Resp 3 NA Resp 5 SB1-3 SC1-3 SD1-3
4 Resp 4 NA Resp 7 Resp 1 SC1-4 SD1-4
5 Resp 5 NA Resp 10 Resp 3 SC1-5 SD1-5
6 Resp 6 NA Resp 15 Resp 5 SC1-6 SD1-6
7 Resp 7 NA Resp 17 Resp 7 Resp 1 SD1-7
8 Resp 8 NA Resp 18 Resp 10 Resp 3 SD1-8
9 Resp 9 NA Resp 19 Resp 15 Resp 5 SD1-9
10 Resp 10 NA Resp 21 Resp 17 Resp 7 Resp 1
11 Resp 11 NA Resp 22 Resp 18 Resp 10 Resp 3
12 Resp 12 NA Resp 26 Resp 19 Resp 15 Resp 5
13 Resp 13 Resp 1 Resp 27 Resp 21 Resp 17 Resp 7
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Table 21.  Illustration of the staging method for the mirage prone experiment - Percent Markets. 
 
3.4 Research Analysis Overview and Tools 
In addition to those measures discussed in section 3.1.1 several other tools and techniques 
are used in the analysis.   
 
3.4.1 Evaluating Draw Sets 
To evaluate the effect of different draw sets a quantitative method of evaluating the draw 
set is needed.    As a draw set progresses through the draws the AIA value will eventually 
signal the correct Urn state with a high probability.   A Wurtz distance can be calculated 
between the current AIA and the final AIA.    Evaluating this as a time series can be a 
valuable way to study and characterize draw sets.  Consider the draw set illustrated in 
Figure 8.   This plot shows the Wurtz distance between the current AIA and the final AIA 
(after 20 draws) at each stage (participant) in the draw set.   In this example the correct 
PA-1 PB-1 PC-1 PD-1
Transform 2 3 4 5
Correct State 4 2 4 5
1 Resp 2 SB1-1 SC1-1 SD1-1
2 Resp 4 SB1-2 SC1-2 SD1-2
3 Resp 6 SB1-3 SC1-3 SD1-3
4 Resp 8 Resp 2 SC1-4 SD1-4
5 Resp 9 Resp 4 SC1-5 SD1-5
6 Resp 11 Resp 6 SC1-6 SD1-6
7 Resp 12 Resp 8 Resp 2 SD1-7
8 Resp 13 Resp 9 Resp 4 SD1-8
9 Resp 14 Resp 11 Resp 6 SD1-9
10 Resp 16 Resp 12 Resp 8 Resp 2
11 Resp 20 Resp 13 Resp 9 Resp 4
12 Resp 23 Resp 14 Resp 11 Resp 6
13 Resp 24 Resp 16 Resp 12 Resp 8
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state is F.   Many early draws of F, quickly drive the AIA to a high probability for state F.   
By draw number 7, the probability that the correct state is F has reached nearly 100%. 
 
 
Figure 8. A well behaved draw table.  The x axis of the graph is the market stage (or number of 
participants). 
 
Contrast this to the draw set illustrated in Figure 9.   The correct state is E.    It takes 
nearly 13 draws before the correct state is predicted with greater than 80% probability.   
It is anticipated that the shape of the path towards the asymptotic value of AIA will 
influence feedback prediction markets.   A simple quantitative metric which could be 
used to characterize this aspect of the draw set is simply the sum of these AIA Wurtz 
distances  as shown in the equation below.   This can be thought of as a measure of the 
area under the curves.   The sum of the Wurtz distances for the draw set in Figure 8 is 
1.00 while the sum for the draw set in Figure 9 is 7.29. 
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Draw Set # 1st Draw 2nd Draw 3rd Draw
1 F F C
2 F F C
3 F C F
4 B B D
5 D B F
6 E F B
7 F A F
8 E F A
9 C E F
10 F F F
11 F F F
12 E C A
13 A B F
14 F F D
15 A F E
16 D D C
17 A A A
18 C E F
19 F B B
20 B D C
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Figure 9. A non-well behaved draw table.   Many draws are required to reach the AIA asymptote    
The x axis of the graph is the market stage (or number of participants). 
 
3.4.2 Understanding Individual Allocations 
Individual responses can be compared to hypothetical responses to be categorized.   This 
can lead to insights into the market processes, be useful for screening purposes and be 
useful for building models of markets as explored in the discussion section. 
 
There are various theoretical frameworks available when considering different 
methodologies for allocating tickets.   The framework shown in Figure 10 compares 
methods based on their use of information and computation required.   MaxiMin 
(maximize the minimum) in this market uses no data and requires the minimum level of 
computation - simply allocating the same number of tickets across each state.    A percent 
allocation method would allocate tickets in direct proportion to their probabilities.   This 
would require more computation to determine these percentages.    This task would get 
more burdensome if public data is available and were used in the allocation determination.   
Finally, MaxEV (maximize the expected value) requires one calculation step beyond 
Percent.   That is, it must allocate to maximize winnings given the estimated probabilities. 
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Draw Set # 1st Draw 2nd Draw 3rd Draw
1 E E F
2 F A F
3 B E D
4 E F F
5 E D D
6 D F D
7 D A B
8 D F B
9 E F E
10 E E E
11 C D D
12 A C E
13 E E D
14 C A E
15 E C B
16 B F E
17 A E B
18 F D A
19 F D E
20 F C E
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Figure 10. Qualitative comparison of basic allocation methods 
 
 
First consider the IP markets where the only information available is the draw set.   Two 
methods of computing probabilities were considered.   First, probabilities could be 
estimated by the simple percentages from the ball draw.   For example, if the draw were 
A,A,C a participant might estimate the probability to be 66.6% for A and 33.3% for C 
and then allocate tickets in that ratio.    An alternative would be to calculate the Bayesian 
probability.   Given the probabilities were equal for all states when the correct state was 
initially selected, one can determine the posterior probabilities of any given ball being 
correct given a type of draw set.  Table 22 shows the calculated Bayesian posterior 
probabilities given any set of ball draws.    A participant could then allocate tickets in 
these proportions.  The expected value of an allocation can be calculated by multiplying 
the number of tickets allocated on any state by the probability of that state and summing 
all the products.   It is straightforward to show that to maximize the expected value one 
should allocate all tickets on the option with the highest probability.    In the case where 
there are options with equal probabilities, any allocation where all tickets are distributed 
across these equal probability options will be a maximum. 
Use of Data
Computation
MaxiMin
Percent MaxEV
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Table 22. Bayesian probabilities given the draw sets shown. 
 
 
Table 23 shows the result of categorizing the IP market responses of those who passed 
the attention test from the mirage prone draw set experiment.    MaxiMin was the most 
prevalent strategy followed closely by allocation to Bayesian probabilities.    Allocating 
to simple percentages was quite rare.    As discussed in the literature review, this is 
consistent with prior studies.   To simplify further work, the style of allocating to simple 
percentages was dropped. 
 
 
 Count Percent 
Match allocation to simple percentage from ball draw 14 3.7% 
Match allocation to Bayesian probabilities 158 41.9% 
Maximize expected winnings based on probabilities 27 7.2% 
Equal allocation on each state (MaxiMin) 178 47.2% 
Table 23. Categorization of responses in IP market to theoretical models from the random draws 
experiment.   In this analysis, only participants who passed the attention test are considered 
 
 
Extending the calculation of probabilities to the use of both public and private data is 
complicated.    Two methods were used in the present study as illustrated in Figure 11.   
In this example the participant received a draw set of A,A,C and was shown a public 
distribution of accumulated tickets of 77,51,171,51,51,299.     Two interpretations of the 
Most 
Frequent 
(e.g. A)
2nd Most 
Frequent 
(e.g. B)
2nd Most 
Frequent 
(e.g. C)
Each Not 
Drawn (e.g. 
DEF)
Three matching draws 
(e.g. AAA)
75.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8%
Two matching draws 
(e.g. AAB)
49.0% 19.6% 7.8% 7.8%
Three different draws 
(e.g. ABC)
23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 9.5%
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public data were considered here.   First, the simple percentages could be calculated as 
shown (e.g., 77 tickets allocated to state A is 77/700 or 11%).     This is all the 
information available to participants in the percentage markets.    In a second 
interpretation a participant could attempt to infer the draw sets of prior market 
participants based on how they allocated their tickets.    Some assumption would need to 
be made on how participants had allocated tickets in order to use this method.    The 
method used here assumes each participant allocated tickets in direct proportion to their 
draw.   In this example, 700 total tickets have been allocated indicating there were 7 prior 
participants (and thus 7 draw sets or 21 total balls drawn from the urn).   The 51 tickets 
allocated to state B could imply that there have been 1.53 (51/700 * 21) balls drawn for 
that state.    These assumptions could then be used in a calculation of Bayesian 
probabilities.   In the case where public information is simply converted into percentages, 
this percentage can be used as the prior probability and the ball draw used to calculate the 
posterior probability.   In the case where public ticket allocations are converted to some 
equivalent number of ball draws, then the method of calculating Bayesian probabilities 
discussed above for IP markets can simply be extended to include the private draw set 
combined with the ball draws as implied by the public data.    In the example of Figure 11 
these two methods arrive at different predictions for the most likely correct state.   When 
using the public data as a simple percent, the private draw set of 2 balls on state A weighs 
the final probability more than the 42.7% prior probability of state F and predicts state A 
as the most likely with a 35.4% probability.   However, if ticket counts are converted to 
ball draws based on simple allocation percents, the combined private draw set and 
inferred public draws imply state F is much more likely at 91.7% probability.    The 
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method of converting the public allocation into ball draws can be considered to use more 
information available since it considers the total number of participants.   
 
 
Figure 11. Possible methods of using Bayesian probability to combine public and private data. 
 
 
Figure 12 shows a summary of the allocation styles used to characterize the responses in 
this experiment.    This figure shows the predicted allocations given the private and 
public information show at the top of the figure (that is a draw set of A,D,A and public 
information of 23,43,19,26,53,36).   In addition, it compares the algorithm's predicted 
allocation to a hypothetical participant's allocation of 10,20,10,15,25,20 using the Wurtz 
distance.    A modified  MaxiMin implementation was used because it is not possible to 
evenly divide 100 tickets into 6 buckets.   The modified MaxiMin algorithm used here 
allocates the extra 4 tickets across states with a ball in the draw set (even in situations 
with Public information).    The next two algorithms use only private data  (the draw set).   
First DrawPct calculates the Bayesian posterior probability based on the draw set and 
Each expressed as a % of 
the total.  e.g. for A 77/700 
= 11%)
Assume each respondent allocated tickets in direct 
proportion to their draw.  e.g. 700 total tickets => 7 
respondents => 7*3 or 21 balls drawn.   So, 51 tickets on B 
indicates (51/700)*21=1.53 B balls drawn
Calculate Bayesian Posterior 
probabilities assuming the 
prior (base) rate as 
indicated by the %’s of 
public data – the draw of 2 
balls tips the scales to A
Calculate Bayesian Posterior 
probabilities by calculating 
the Bayesian probability 
implied by the public data 
as ball draws and then 
update with one’s private 
draw – 8.97 ball draws on F 
dominates
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allocates tickets accordingly.   The DrawEV algorithm also calculates the Bayesian 
probability but then will maximize the expected value of the allocation by placing all 
tickets on the most likely correct state.    Next, an algorithm that uses only public 
information is considered.   The Mimic algorithm allocates tickets in direct proportion to 
the public allocation.    The PublicEV algorithm will maximize the expected value 
assuming the probabilities implied by the public distribution of tickets.    The final four 
algorithms integrate public and private data as described in the last paragraph and 
illustrated in Figure 12.    AllPct uses the public allocation percentages as the prior in a 
Bayesian posterior probability calculation.   AllPctEV then maximizes the expected value 
of the ticket allocations based on those calculated probabilities.   AllDraws decomposes 
the public data and calculates an implied ball draw assuming prior participants had 
allocated tickets  in direct proportion to their draw sets.   AllDraws then calculates a 
Bayesian posterior probability by combining the private draw set with this implied public 
set of draws and then allocates tickets in proportion to the implied probabilities.   The 
AllDrawsEV algorithm will allocate tickets to maximize expected value given the 
probabilities calculated in AllDraws. 
 
Figure 12 shows that for this illustration the best fit to the participant's allocation is the 
Mimic algorithm as determined by having the smallest Wurtz distance.     In general, the 
algorithms lower on this figure use more available information.    Only the top three 
algorithms are used to categorize participant's allocations in IP markets.   Only the top 7 
are used to categorize participant's allocations in Percent markets.   And, all are used to 
categorize participant's allocations in Frequency markets. 
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Figure 12. Summary of the allocation styles studied. 
 
 
3.4.3 Inferential Tools and Considerations 
Non-parametric inferential tools were generally used.   Two by two contingency tables 
were evaluated with Fisher's Exact test (Fisher, 1954) due to its superior performance 
when entries are small.   Differences in means were generally tested using Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon U test (Mann & Whitney, 1947) to avoid any issues with the 
assumptions of underlying distribution characteristics.   Generally, inferential tests 
assume independence between observations.    Due to the nature of the experimental 
procedure, each participant participated in multiple markets.   Due to the staggered start, 
no two markets had the exact same set of participants.   However, there was some amount 
of overlap.   While this is not a major challenge to the significance test results, this 
overlap produces some weakening of the independence assumption of most inferential 
1st 
draw
2nd 
draw
3rd 
draw #A #B #C #D #E #F
A D A 23 43 19 26 53 36
10 20 10 15 25 20
Private Data Public Data
Respondent's Allocation
No use of information Wurtz
1 MaxiMin 19 16 16 17 16 16 0.170
Use of draw only
2 DrawPct - Bayesian % based on private data only 49 8 8 20 8 8 0.436
3 DrawEV - Maximize expected winnings based on DrawPct 100 0 0 0 0 0 0.900
Use of Public Info Only
4 Mimic - match public allocation 12 22 10 13 27 18 0.045
5 PublicEV - Maximize expected winnings based on PublicPct 0 0 0 0 100 0 0.750
Use Public & Private data - Public data as simple % base rate
6 AllPct - Bayesian % based on private data and public data as % 40 12 5 18 15 10 0.330
7 AllPctEV - Maximize expected winnings based on AllPct 100 0 0 0 0 0 0.900
Use Public & Private data - Public data as ball draws
8 AllDraws - Bayesian % based on private data and public data as draws 40 12 5 18 15 10 0.331
9 AllDrawsEV - Maximize expected winnings based on AllDraws 100 0 0 0 0 0 0.900
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tests.   The researcher is unaware of any correction for this slight bias, so readers should 
keep in mind that results may not quite as strong as the p-value suggests. 
  
 
3.5 Potential Limitations of Experimental Methods 
The key limitations are discussed. 
 
3.5.1 Sequencing Participants 
In the experiments of Plott et al. (2003) participants were free to allocate any number of 
tickets at any time.    If a participant believes they can make better predictions using the 
public data, then there is incentive to wait.     If a participant feels they have very good 
private data (e.g., a private draw of three balls all of the same type) they are also incented 
to wait since their allocation may influence others to allocate their tickets to the same 
bucket and thereby reducing their winnings (in parimutuel markets used by Plott but not 
in the fixed winning market).     
 
The fixed winning market has slightly different dynamics.   As in the Plott experiments 
there is incentive to see other's allocations in the sense that it reveals more private 
information.   However, since each ticket has a fixed winning amount, independent of 
what other market participants have done, there's no incentive to wait to reveal your own 
private data to the group. 
 
However, the proposed asynchronous market may have benefits to organizations and be a 
preferred method of conducting prediction markets.   This asynchronous nature could be  
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valuable in a busy organization where it may be difficult to schedule a common time 
block across all market participants.   Secondly, the waiting behavior described above, 
while benefitting the individual, may not benefit the organization.   If this type of 
mechanism were used in an organization, the participant’s turn could be determined with 
a random draw.   As markets may be an ongoing event (e.g., a recurring forecast) then 
participants would be expected to get turns at all stages of the market (early to late). 
 
3.5.2 Learning 
Learning in games is an important consideration  (Erev & Roth, 1998).    This includes 
both learning in terms of the game itself, but also in how the participants act.  Camerer 
(1992) has a good discussion on the topic relevant to markets: 
 
 
Learning effects are mixed too. There is rapid learning in some simple 
market environments (e.g., in double auctions for commodities, Smith, 
1982) but not in more complicated environments (Smith, Suchanek, & 
Williams, 1988; Camerer & Weigelt, 1990; Ball, Bazerman, & Carroll, in 
press). Furthermore, many studies suggest that experience or expertise 
are no guarantee of superior performance in naturally occurring tasks 
(e.g., Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Camerer & Johnson, 1991). 
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4 Experimental Results 
The experimental results are reviewed.   Some limited discussion is included in this 
section as well.   The complexity of analysis requires that some of the  discussion be 
provided with the results rather than later in the general discussion chapter. 
 
 
4.1 General Considerations 
This section will address some of the  general considerations around the survey results. 
 
4.1.1 Data Collection  
Table 24 shows the data collection statistics.    
 
The Random Draws Experiment was conducted from July 11, 2011 to July 27, 2011.   
503 participants were used in the analysis.   Participants earned a base of $0.10 and a 
bonus based on their performance.   The bonus was calculated as their total number of  
correct tickets divided by their total tickets times $1.50 (the mean bonus amount was 
$0.108).     The Attention test (section 3.3) and no feedback screener (section 4.1.4) were 
used in this experiment.    
 
The Mirage Prone Draw Experiment was conducted over a 5 day period from November 
9, 2010 to November 13, 2010.   During that time 316 participants entered the survey and 
228 completed the survey.    Each participant that finished was paid $0.15 plus a bonus 
based on performance.    The bonus was calculated as their total number of  correct 
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tickets divided by their total tickets times $1.    The survey generated over 51k SQL 
records. 
 
 
 Random draws experiment Mirage Prone Data 
Data Collection 
Period 
7/11/11 to 7/27/11 11/9/10 to 11/13/10 
Incentives Base of $0.10 plus bonus with 
a maximum of $1.5 
depending on the number of 
correct tickets 
Base of $0.15 plus bonus with a 
maximum of $1 depending on 
the number of correct tickets 
Number of 
participants used 
503 participants 228  participants 
Screening Attention test and 
performance on a No-
feedback market test case 
No Screening 
Table 24. Survey Data Collection Summary 
 
4.1.2 Demographics 
Demographic data was collected immediately after the consent.    Table 25 gives a 
summary of the demographic responses.    In both experiments there were slightly more 
male participants.   While the majority of participants were under 30 years old, there were 
42.5% over 30.    The participants were generally well educated with 70.2% stating they 
had earned their college degree. 
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 Random Draws Mirage 
Prone 
What is your gender?  
Male 55.1% 53.7% 
Female 44.9% 46.1% 
   
What is your age?  
Under 18 Screened out Screened 
out 
18-29 years old 55.1% 57.1% 
30-49 years old 37.2% 36.6% 
50-64 years old 7.4% 5.0% 
65 years and over 0.4% 0.9% 
   
What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
some high school 1.8% 0.9% 
high school graduate 7.6% 6.5% 
some college/trade/technical/vocational training 21.3% 22.0% 
college graduate 39.2% 39.1% 
some postgraduate work  10.5% 8.1% 
graduate degree 19.7% 23.0% 
   
   
What was your major (if more than one then select the most recent)?  
Liberal Arts 11.1% 9.3% 
Science 13.3% 14.3% 
Mathematics/Statistics 3.0% 5.6% 
Engineering 15.5% 17.1% 
Business 10.1% 10.2% 
Education 4.6% 3.7% 
Other major 11.5% 10.2% 
No Response 30.8% 29.6% 
Table 25. Summary of Demographic Responses 
 
 
4.1.3 Careless Responses 
Some Turkers may use AMT as a means to provide substantial supplemental income.   
Since workers are paid per task completed, there can be internally generated pressure on 
participants to complete as many tasks as possible in the time they have available to work.   
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Other researchers have reported careless responses in their experiments (Paolacci, 
Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).   This behavior was also inferred in the present study. 
 
As mentioned, an attention test was included.    This test, mixed in with the psychological 
factor Likert graded questions simply asked the participant to select 'Strongly Agree.'   
17.1% of all participants failed to select 'strongly agree.'    There was a significant 
Pearson Correlation of .206 (p-value of .002) between bonus amount and passing or 
failing the attention test. 
 
Table 26 illustrates the impact of careless responses on a market.   Participant number 
four receives a draw of D,D,E in an IP market.   He proceeded to allocate all 100 tickets 
on state C.     
 
 
Table 26. IP market with spurious input from Participant 5.   The correct state is A 
 
To check to determine if perhaps this participant simply got C and D mixed up, all of the 
responses from this participant are shown in Table 27.  Notice a similar type of error in 
1st Draw 2nd Draw 3rd Draw A B C D E F
Participant 1 D F D 5 5 5 50 30 5
Participant 2 E F D 15 10 10 20 25 20
Participant 3 F C A 35 15 25 10 5 10
Participant 4 D D E 0 0 100 0 0 0
Participant 5 A D E 25 15 20 19 10 11
Participant 6 A E B 30 30 10 10 10 10
Participant 7 A A B 29 12 8 6 20 25
Participant 8 E C C 19 41 16 5 2 17
Participant 9 A A B 25 10 5 10 25 25
Participant 10 C F B 50 10 10 10 10 10
Participant 11 A B A 10 16 24 16 18 16
Participant 12 C B D 12 22 22 22 11 11
Participant 13 A A A 75 5 5 5 5 5
330 191 260 183 171 165
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their first IP market with 100 tickets allocated to state A while their draw was C,B,E.  He 
also had similar illogical responses in the feedback markets.   For example, in his final 
market he received a draw of D,F,F and the maximum public allocations were on states B 
and C.   He, however, allocated 0 tickets on state F (the most likely from the draw) and 0 
tickets on B (the most likely based on public information). 
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Table 27. All allocations from participant highlighted in Table 26. 
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4.1.4 Screening 
Screening participants is an option to control careless responses.   Two screening 
methods were employed in the random draws experiment.   First, participants who failed 
the attention test (a Likert scale question which simply asked the participant to select 
'Strongly Agree') were screened.    Second, participants were screened based on their 
response in a benchmark no-feedback market.    Screened participants completed the 
survey as would a non-screened participant.  They were also paid the base compensation 
as well as the bonus.    However, screened participant's data was not included in the 
general database and therefore was not incorporated into the markets. 
 
In the random draws experiment, participants were presented a third no-feedback market.   
This market had a constant draw of ECE (that is, two E balls and one C ball).    
Theoretical distributions based on the four methods identified for no-feedback markets 
were calculated as shown in Table 28.    The Wurtz distance between the participant's 
allocation and each of these distributions was then calculated.    The minimum of these 
Wurtz distance was then compared to 0.25.    If the minimum Wurtz distance was greater 
than 0.25 the participant's results were not stored in the main database and were 
effectively screened from later participants. 
 
 
 
Table 28. Predicted responses to ECE draw for each allocation method. 
 
A B C D E F
Maximin 16 16 17 16 19 16
Pct 0 0 33 0 67 0
Bayes 8 8 19 8 49 8
EV 0 0 0 0 100 0
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4.2 Market Performance with Random Draws 
This section will describe the results from the random draws experiment. 
 
4.2.1 Information Collection in Markets with No-feedback 
The ability of a market to collect information can be studied in the no-feedback markets.    
As mentioned previously, market aggregation can be broken into two components: 
collection of the individual analysis and judgment of private information; and a market 
level induction process to evaluate the collected information.   The no-feedback markets 
can be used to study the first process since induction is not possible.    Table 29 illustrates 
the comparison.   The table shows nine draw sets and the allocations made by participants.   
For example, the first participant received a draw of B,A,F and allocated tickets across 
states A-F as 32,32,1,2,1,32.    The two step process outlined in section 3.1.1.5 can then 
be used on this distribution.   Since the respondent allocated 32 tickets on states A, B and 
F the result is 'Not Significant.'   Each of the nine respondents' allocations can be 
evaluated with the result of 1 'Correct,' 3 'Not Correct' and 5 'Not Significant.'    
Correctness can be calculated for these responses as 1/3, and decisiveness as 4/9.     This 
can be compared to the sum of all allocations shown at the bottom as 168, 188, 168, 114, 
128, 134 for states A-F.   This cumulative allocation can be characterized as 'Not 
Significant.'    When multiple markets are considered then values for correctness and 
Decisiveness can be computed and compared to the correctness and decisiveness of the 
individuals. 
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Table 29. Illustration of individual versus market results. 
 
 Table 30 shows the decisiveness and correctness of the no-feedback market by stage 
(participant).   In addition the performance of the individuals included in those market 
results is also shown.  The individual results are calculated in the same method as the 
market results.   The two stage inferential process described in Section 3.4.1 can be 
applied to the individual's allocation.   These can then be used to calculate decisiveness 
and correctness values.   The two decisiveness and correctness values can be compared 
with the Fisher's Exact Test and the resulting p-value is also shown. 
 
 
Respondent 1st 2nd 3rd A B C D E F Characterization
1 B A F 32 32 1 2 1 32 Not Significant
2 A B A 36 16 12 12 12 12 Correct
3 C F E 10 10 15 15 25 25 Not Significant
4 C A D 20 20 20 20 10 10 Not Significant
5 E C D 20 20 20 20 10 10 Not Significant
6 A A A 10 10 20 20 20 20 Not Significant
7 C A B 20 10 50 5 5 10 Incorrect
8 B B C 10 60 10 10 5 5 Incorrect
9 E E C 10 10 20 10 40 10 Incorrect
168 188 168 114 128 134 Not Significant
AllocationsDraws
Total
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Table 30. Summary of decisiveness and correctness  of individual responses vs. no-feedback markets 
by market stage (e.g., number of participants) from the random draws experiment 
 
As seen, after stage 6 the market outperforms the collection of individual responses in 
both decisiveness and correctness with statistical significance of .05. 
 
4.2.2 Information Aggregation in Markets with Feedback 
The information aggregation capability of markets can be studied by comparing the 
performance of markets with different types of feedback. 
4.2.2.1 Modal Performance 
First, the basic performance of the markets is examined.  Table 31 shows the performance 
of the no-feedback and feedback markets described as correct, incorrect or not significant 
as described in section 3.1.1.5.    Table 32 shows the same results expressed as 
Stage Individuals Markets p-value Individuals Markets p-value
1 33.3% 33.3% 0.5856 50.0% 50.0% 0.6378
2 37.5% 43.8% 0.2929 58.3% 57.1% 0.5738
3 38.2% 39.6% 0.4974 58.2% 57.9% 0.5949
4 37.0% 35.4% 0.4903 52.1% 70.6% 0.1341
5 35.8% 39.6% 0.3681 47.7% 63.2% 0.1666
6 35.4% 52.1% 0.0215 48.0% 68.0% 0.0577
7 34.2% 60.4% 0.0005 45.2% 65.5% 0.0399
8 35.4% 56.3% 0.0045 45.6% 77.8% 0.0019
9 36.6% 58.3% 0.0030 44.9% 75.0% 0.0028
10 36.0% 62.5% 0.0004 44.5% 73.3% 0.0030
11 36.6% 58.3% 0.0027 43.0% 71.4% 0.0043
12 35.9% 58.3% 0.0020 43.0% 71.4% 0.0041
13 36.5% 56.3% 0.0058 44.3% 81.5% 0.0002
14 36.0% 58.3% 0.0020 44.6% 82.1% 0.0001
15 36.5% 56.3% 0.0056 46.0% 92.6% 0.0000
16 37.0% 52.1% 0.0275 45.8% 100.0% 0.0000
17 36.9% 56.3% 0.0063 45.5% 100.0% 0.0000
18 37.3% 60.4% 0.0013 45.0% 100.0% 0.0000
19 36.8% 60.4% 0.0010 44.9% 100.0% 0.0000
20 36.6% 58.3% 0.0023 45.0% 100.0% 0.0000
Decisiveness Correctness
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percentages.   After 16 stages, no-feedback markets show no incorrect results.   However, 
approximately 42% (20 out of 48) are unable to be judged as statistically significant.    
 
Table 31 also shows the modal performance of the feedback markets.   It is immediately 
noted that in contrast to the no-feedback markets, there are a large fraction of the results 
which are incorrect in the final stages of the markets.    Nearly 18% of the markets end 
the test in an incorrect state.    Also of note is that the percentage of markets judged as not 
significant is much smaller than in the no-feedback case (approximately 18% vs. 42% for 
the no-feedback markets). 
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Table 31. No-feedback and feedback market results as counts by market stage (e.g., number of 
participants) from the random draws experiment 
 
 
Stage Correct Incorrect Not Sig. Correct Incorrect Not Sig.
1 8 8 32 15 17 57
2 12 9 27 19 15 55
3 11 8 29 28 15 46
4 12 5 31 29 13 47
5 12 7 29 31 20 38
6 17 8 23 37 20 32
7 19 10 19 41 18 30
8 21 6 21 43 19 27
9 21 7 20 42 14 33
10 22 8 18 43 15 31
11 20 8 20 45 16 28
12 20 8 20 45 17 27
13 22 5 21 47 16 26
14 23 5 20 48 16 25
15 25 2 21 51 16 22
16 25 0 23 53 14 22
17 27 0 21 55 15 19
18 29 0 19 56 16 17
19 29 0 19 56 17 16
20 28 0 20 56 16 17
No-Feedback Feedback
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Table 32. No-feedback and feedback market results as percentages by market stage (e.g., number of 
participants) from the random draws experiment. 
 
 
The decisiveness and correctness results of the no-feedback and feedback markets are 
shown in Table 33.    After just a few stages the decisiveness value of the feedback 
markets is descriptively larger than the no-feedback markets.     After 13 stages the 
correctness of the no-feedback markets is larger than the correctness of the feedback 
markets.  The values are compared as described in section 3.1.1.6 and the resulting p-
value is shown in the table.    After stage 15 the differences for both decisiveness and 
correctness are different at the 5% level.    These results illustrate the fundamental 
tradeoff between these two market types.    The feedback is enabling the induction 
Stage Correct Incorrect Not Sig. Correct Incorrect Not Sig.
1 16.7% 16.7% 66.7% 16.9% 19.1% 64.0%
2 25.0% 18.8% 56.3% 21.3% 16.9% 61.8%
3 22.9% 16.7% 60.4% 31.5% 16.9% 51.7%
4 25.0% 10.4% 64.6% 32.6% 14.6% 52.8%
5 25.0% 14.6% 60.4% 34.8% 22.5% 42.7%
6 35.4% 16.7% 47.9% 41.6% 22.5% 36.0%
7 39.6% 20.8% 39.6% 46.1% 20.2% 33.7%
8 43.8% 12.5% 43.8% 48.3% 21.3% 30.3%
9 43.8% 14.6% 41.7% 47.2% 15.7% 37.1%
10 45.8% 16.7% 37.5% 48.3% 16.9% 34.8%
11 41.7% 16.7% 41.7% 50.6% 18.0% 31.5%
12 41.7% 16.7% 41.7% 50.6% 19.1% 30.3%
13 45.8% 10.4% 43.8% 52.8% 18.0% 29.2%
14 47.9% 10.4% 41.7% 53.9% 18.0% 28.1%
15 52.1% 4.2% 43.8% 57.3% 18.0% 24.7%
16 52.1% 0.0% 47.9% 59.6% 15.7% 24.7%
17 56.3% 0.0% 43.8% 61.8% 16.9% 21.3%
18 60.4% 0.0% 39.6% 62.9% 18.0% 19.1%
19 60.4% 0.0% 39.6% 62.9% 19.1% 18.0%
20 58.3% 0.0% 41.7% 62.9% 18.0% 19.1%
No-Feedback Feedback
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process which is allowing the markets to come to more conclusions about the correct 
state (decisiveness).    However, the induction process, which makes the markets subject 
to information mirages, adversely impacts the correctness of those judgments. 
 
Table 33. Decisiveness and correctness for feedback and no-feedback markets by market stage (e.g., 
number of participants) from the random draws experiment. 
 
 
The feedback markets consist of two types of feedback: frequency and percentage.   The 
modal results of these two are shown in Table 34 and Table 35.    
Stage No-FB FB p-value No-FB FB p-value 
1 33.3% 36.0% 0.4548 50.0% 46.9% 0.5400
2 43.8% 38.2% 0.3257 57.1% 55.9% 0.5756
3 39.6% 48.3% 0.2122 57.9% 65.1% 0.3951
4 35.4% 47.2% 0.1255 70.6% 69.0% 0.5840
5 39.6% 57.3% 0.0357 63.2% 60.8% 0.5415
6 52.1% 64.0% 0.1192 68.0% 64.9% 0.4969
7 60.4% 66.3% 0.3081 65.5% 69.5% 0.4433
8 56.3% 69.7% 0.0840 77.8% 69.4% 0.2931
9 58.3% 62.9% 0.3648 75.0% 75.0% 0.5995
10 62.5% 65.2% 0.4486 73.3% 74.1% 0.5640
11 58.3% 68.5% 0.1570 71.4% 73.8% 0.5043
12 58.3% 69.7% 0.1266 71.4% 72.6% 0.5503
13 56.3% 70.8% 0.0648 81.5% 74.6% 0.3382
14 58.3% 71.9% 0.0780 82.1% 75.0% 0.3212
15 56.3% 75.3% 0.0187 92.6% 76.1% 0.0550
16 52.1% 75.3% 0.0054 100.0% 79.1% 0.0090
17 56.3% 78.7% 0.0057 100.0% 78.6% 0.0053
18 60.4% 80.9% 0.0090 100.0% 77.8% 0.0029
19 60.4% 82.0% 0.0057 100.0% 76.7% 0.0021
20 58.3% 80.9% 0.0046 100.0% 77.8% 0.0034
CorrectnessDecisiveness
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Table 34. Market results for frequency and percent markets as counts by market stage (e.g., number 
of participants) from the random draws experiment.  
 
 
 
Stage Correct Incorrect Not Sig. Correct Incorrect Not Sig.
1 6 8 32 9 9 25
2 9 6 31 10 9 24
3 14 6 26 14 9 20
4 13 7 26 16 6 21
5 17 12 17 14 8 21
6 19 12 15 18 8 17
7 21 11 14 20 7 16
8 22 11 13 21 8 14
9 23 8 15 19 6 18
10 22 10 14 21 5 17
11 24 10 12 21 6 16
12 24 10 12 21 7 15
13 26 10 10 21 6 16
14 27 10 9 21 6 16
15 29 10 7 22 6 15
16 31 9 6 22 5 16
17 31 10 5 24 5 14
18 31 10 5 25 6 12
19 31 10 5 25 7 11
20 31 10 5 25 6 12
Frequency Percent
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Table 35. Market results for frequency and percent markets as percentage by market stage (e.g., 
number of participants) from the random draws experiment 
 
Table 36 shows the decisiveness and correctness results for the two types of feedback 
markets.   Descriptively, after 5 market stages the frequency feedback markets exhibit 
higher decisiveness.    Descriptively, after 4 market stages the percent feedback markets 
exhibit higher correctness.     Significance testing, as described in section 3.1.1.6 shows 
that the difference in correctness is significant at the 5% level for stages 15,16,17,18 and 
20 and significant at the 10% level after stage 13.   The difference in correctness is not 
statistically significant.   At the small effect size observed (approximately 5% difference 
in correctness) it would require approximately 600 total feedback markets to observe 
statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Stage Correct Incorrect Not Sig. Correct Incorrect Not Sig.
1 13.0% 17.4% 69.6% 20.9% 20.9% 58.1%
2 19.6% 13.0% 67.4% 23.3% 20.9% 55.8%
3 30.4% 13.0% 56.5% 32.6% 20.9% 46.5%
4 28.3% 15.2% 56.5% 37.2% 14.0% 48.8%
5 37.0% 26.1% 37.0% 32.6% 18.6% 48.8%
6 41.3% 26.1% 32.6% 41.9% 18.6% 39.5%
7 45.7% 23.9% 30.4% 46.5% 16.3% 37.2%
8 47.8% 23.9% 28.3% 48.8% 18.6% 32.6%
9 50.0% 17.4% 32.6% 44.2% 14.0% 41.9%
10 47.8% 21.7% 30.4% 48.8% 11.6% 39.5%
11 52.2% 21.7% 26.1% 48.8% 14.0% 37.2%
12 52.2% 21.7% 26.1% 48.8% 16.3% 34.9%
13 56.5% 21.7% 21.7% 48.8% 14.0% 37.2%
14 58.7% 21.7% 19.6% 48.8% 14.0% 37.2%
15 63.0% 21.7% 15.2% 51.2% 14.0% 34.9%
16 67.4% 19.6% 13.0% 51.2% 11.6% 37.2%
17 67.4% 21.7% 10.9% 55.8% 11.6% 32.6%
18 67.4% 21.7% 10.9% 58.1% 14.0% 27.9%
19 67.4% 21.7% 10.9% 58.1% 16.3% 25.6%
20 67.4% 21.7% 10.9% 58.1% 14.0% 27.9%
Frequency Percent
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Table 36. Decisiveness and correctness for the two types of feedback markets studied - frequency and 
percent feedback by market stage (e.g., number of participants) from the random draws experiment 
 
Figure 13 summarizes the descriptive results at the end of the experiment (after stage 20).    
No-feedback markets offer a perfect correctness, but at the expense of limited 
decisiveness.    Frequency feedback markets exhibit the greatest decisiveness, but at the 
cost of some errors.    Percent feedback markets, which moderate the feedback to some 
extent, slightly improve the correctness at the cost of some decisiveness. 
 
Stage Freq Pct p-value Freq Pct p-value 
1 30.4% 41.9% 0.1837 42.9% 50.0% 0.4826
2 32.6% 44.2% 0.1828 60.0% 52.6% 0.4682
3 43.5% 53.5% 0.2322 70.0% 60.9% 0.3810
4 43.5% 51.2% 0.3040 65.0% 72.7% 0.4176
5 63.0% 51.2% 0.1794 58.6% 63.6% 0.4718
6 67.4% 60.5% 0.3229 61.3% 69.2% 0.3654
7 69.6% 62.8% 0.3259 65.6% 74.1% 0.3392
8 71.7% 67.4% 0.4166 66.7% 72.4% 0.4165
9 67.4% 58.1% 0.2472 74.2% 76.0% 0.5636
10 69.6% 60.5% 0.2490 68.8% 80.8% 0.2314
11 73.9% 62.8% 0.1839 70.6% 77.8% 0.3688
12 73.9% 65.1% 0.2510 70.6% 75.0% 0.4614
13 78.3% 62.8% 0.0851 72.2% 77.8% 0.4202
14 80.4% 62.8% 0.0529 73.0% 77.8% 0.4452
15 84.8% 65.1% 0.0280 74.4% 78.6% 0.4604
16 87.0% 62.8% 0.0079 77.5% 81.5% 0.4703
17 89.1% 67.4% 0.0121 75.6% 82.8% 0.3400
18 89.1% 72.1% 0.0374 75.6% 80.6% 0.4150
19 89.1% 74.4% 0.0625 75.6% 78.1% 0.5132
20 89.1% 72.1% 0.0374 75.6% 80.6% 0.4150
CorrectnessDecisiveness
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Figure 13. Summary of market performance illustrating the tradeoff between correctness and 
decisiveness after stage 20 for the random draws experiment. 
 
4.2.2.2 Wurtz Distance to Final AIA 
Table 37 shows the mean value of the Wurtz distance between the cumulative allocation 
at any given stage and the AIA distribution (as described in section 3.1.1.3).    For each 
market, the AIA distribution is determined by calculating the Bayesian posterior 
probability of the cumulative ball draws at that stage.   The Wurtz distance is then 
calculated between this distribution and the cumulative allocation.   Finally, the mean 
value of this metric across all markets is calculated and is displayed in the table.    The 
two distributions of metrics were compared using a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon non-
parametric test and the p-value reported in the table.    Descriptively, after stage 3, the 
feedback markets exhibit a lower Wurtz distance to the AIA than no-feedback markets.    
This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level after stage 14, and significant at 
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the 10% level after stage 11.    This indicates that feedback markets are getting closer to 
the AIA distribution, which is one evaluation of the correct result. 
 
 
Table 37. Mean value of Wurtz distance between cumulative allocation and AIA distribution by 
market stage (e.g., number of participants) from the random draws experiment 
 
 
Table 37 also shows the same information for the two types of feedback markets.    
Descriptively, frequency feedback markets display a lower AIA Wurtz distance after 
stage 7.   This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level at stage 19 and 
significant at the 10% level after stage 18. 
Stage No-Feedback Feedback p-value Frequency Percent p-value
1 0.23576 0.23079 0.446 0.22463 0.23738 0.332
2 0.28738 0.29557 0.345 0.28688 0.30486 0.256
3 0.38687 0.37741 0.368 0.37014 0.38519 0.433
4 0.45423 0.43268 0.280 0.43087 0.43461 0.456
5 0.49727 0.48191 0.303 0.49130 0.47186 0.250
6 0.54540 0.52373 0.237 0.52547 0.52187 0.462
7 0.56816 0.55308 0.251 0.54846 0.55803 0.330
8 0.59958 0.59223 0.324 0.58619 0.59869 0.330
9 0.61472 0.60693 0.288 0.60328 0.61083 0.382
10 0.64252 0.62299 0.124 0.61519 0.63134 0.401
11 0.64898 0.62500 0.095 0.61731 0.63323 0.316
12 0.66247 0.63999 0.064 0.63204 0.64850 0.333
13 0.67711 0.65422 0.078 0.64611 0.66289 0.277
14 0.70328 0.67875 0.036 0.66650 0.69185 0.149
15 0.72647 0.70193 0.038 0.69303 0.71145 0.178
16 0.73792 0.71266 0.040 0.70376 0.72219 0.163
17 0.74668 0.71943 0.012 0.70957 0.72997 0.153
18 0.74960 0.71816 0.001 0.70496 0.73229 0.067
19 0.75679 0.72530 0.002 0.71123 0.74035 0.032
20 0.75972 0.72541 0.001 0.71174 0.74003 0.057
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4.2.2.3 Entropy 
Entropy of the cumulative allocation was measured and is an indication of the certainty of 
the market.    Table 38 gives the mean value of the entropy of the cumulative allocation 
across all markets.    Feedback markets are seen to have lower entropy than no-feedback 
markets, with this difference being statistically significant at the 5% level (Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon non-parametric test) after stage 3.       
 
 
 
Table 38. Mean entropy by stage by market stage (e.g., number of participants) from the random 
draws experiment 
 
Table 38 also gives the mean entropy of the cumulative allocation for the feedback 
markets broken down by feedback type.   Descriptively, after stage 8 the frequency 
Stage No FB FB p-value Freq Pct p-value
1 2.1680 2.1640 0.4240 2.2088 2.1162 0.1457
2 2.3725 2.3213 0.3950 2.3253 2.3171 0.2517
3 2.4425 2.3474 0.0030 2.3516 2.3429 0.2287
4 2.4781 2.3938 0.0019 2.3973 2.3900 0.3155
5 2.4987 2.4212 0.0001 2.4198 2.4226 0.4494
6 2.5044 2.4263 0.0000 2.4235 2.4293 0.3791
7 2.5132 2.4430 0.0001 2.4432 2.4428 0.3916
8 2.5130 2.4523 0.0002 2.4485 2.4563 0.2491
9 2.5124 2.4604 0.0003 2.4591 2.4618 0.2925
10 2.5195 2.4650 0.0000 2.4591 2.4714 0.2189
11 2.5269 2.4682 0.0000 2.4632 2.4734 0.2623
12 2.5297 2.4740 0.0000 2.4687 2.4796 0.2623
13 2.5315 2.4759 0.0000 2.4678 2.4845 0.1757
14 2.5348 2.4789 0.0000 2.4713 2.4870 0.0994
15 2.5362 2.4787 0.0000 2.4682 2.4899 0.0542
16 2.5372 2.4826 0.0000 2.4721 2.4939 0.0450
17 2.5396 2.4870 0.0000 2.4775 2.4972 0.0490
18 2.5411 2.4869 0.0000 2.4756 2.4990 0.0315
19 2.5436 2.4881 0.0000 2.4762 2.5007 0.0242
20 2.5454 2.4875 0.0000 2.4740 2.5020 0.0109
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markets exhibit lower entropy.   This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level 
after stage 16 and significant at the 10% level after stage 14. 
 
The entropy distributions are also of interest.   Table 39 shows the means as well as the 
standard deviations of the distributions for the feedback and no-feedback markets by 
market stage.   In addition to the mean differences just described, the table shows that the 
standard deviation of the feedback markets is approximately twice as large as for the no-
feedback markets.    The Levene's test (Levene, 1960) p-value is also shown which test 
for the homogeneity of variance of the two distributions.    This test is significant at the 5% 
level after stage 2, indicating a non-homogenous variance. 
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Table 39. Characteristics of the entropy distribution for no-feedback and feedback markets by 
market stage (e.g., number of participants) from the random draws experiment 
 
Table 40 shows the mean and standard deviation of the entropy distributions of the two 
types of feedback markets over all stages.    No difference is noticed in the standard 
deviations and the Levene's test p-value is not significant at the 10% level. 
Levene's
Stage Mean SD Mean SD p-value
1 2.1680 0.5188 2.1640 0.5257 0.9133
2 2.3725 0.1799 2.3213 0.3090 0.0162
3 2.4425 0.1524 2.3474 0.2691 0.0262
4 2.4781 0.1060 2.3938 0.2015 0.0036
5 2.4987 0.0700 2.4212 0.1623 0.0007
6 2.5044 0.0665 2.4263 0.1448 0.0005
7 2.5132 0.0525 2.4430 0.1298 0.0001
8 2.5130 0.0474 2.4523 0.1166 0.0002
9 2.5124 0.0617 2.4604 0.1047 0.0020
10 2.5195 0.0531 2.4650 0.0918 0.0011
11 2.5269 0.0427 2.4682 0.0927 0.0002
12 2.5297 0.0403 2.4740 0.0852 0.0000
13 2.5315 0.0362 2.4759 0.0807 0.0003
14 2.5348 0.0358 2.4789 0.0774 0.0001
15 2.5362 0.0347 2.4787 0.0733 0.0001
16 2.5372 0.0376 2.4826 0.0668 0.0003
17 2.5396 0.0387 2.4870 0.0623 0.0002
18 2.5411 0.0406 2.4869 0.0636 0.0002
19 2.5436 0.0372 2.4881 0.0652 0.0002
20 2.5454 0.0350 2.4875 0.0651 0.0002
No-Feedback Feedback
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Table 40. Characteristics of the entropy distribution for frequency feedback and percent feedback 
markets by market stage (e.g., number of participants) from the random draws experiment. 
 
 
Figure 14, a histogram of the feedback and no-feedback entropy distributions after stage 
20, allows a visual comparison.   For the no-feedback markets all but 1 of the final 
entropy values lie in the range of 2.5 to 2.58 (with the lowest final entropy for a  no-
feedback market in the 2.36 bin).    By contrast, the feedback markets exhibit a large tail 
of low entropy values ranging down to a low in the 2.22 bin.   This illustrates the 
induction process as the market agrees on a correct value and lowers the entropy. 
Levene's
Stage Mean SD Mean SD p-value
1 2.2088 0.4742 2.1162 0.5776 0.402175
2 2.3253 0.3156 2.3171 0.3054 0.691826
3 2.3516 0.2710 2.3429 0.2703 0.738352
4 2.3973 0.2093 2.3900 0.1952 0.927856
5 2.4198 0.1815 2.4226 0.1410 0.831904
6 2.4235 0.1583 2.4293 0.1307 0.985383
7 2.4432 0.1351 2.4428 0.1256 0.638948
8 2.4485 0.1244 2.4563 0.1089 0.769353
9 2.4591 0.1062 2.4618 0.1042 0.388213
10 2.4591 0.0984 2.4714 0.0849 0.933079
11 2.4632 0.1009 2.4734 0.0839 0.99216
12 2.4687 0.0924 2.4796 0.0774 0.819908
13 2.4678 0.0894 2.4845 0.0703 0.723931
14 2.4713 0.0818 2.4870 0.0725 0.896783
15 2.4682 0.0780 2.4899 0.0671 0.910567
16 2.4721 0.0700 2.4939 0.0621 0.996285
17 2.4775 0.0636 2.4972 0.0598 0.983483
18 2.4756 0.0668 2.4990 0.0584 0.624467
19 2.4762 0.0670 2.5007 0.0615 0.562066
20 2.4740 0.0641 2.5020 0.0637 0.663406
Frequency Percent
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Figure 14. Histogram of final entropy distributions (after stage 20) for the random draws experiment. 
 
4.2.2.4 Relationship between Mean Entropy and Decisiveness 
An inversely monotonic relationship is expected between mean entropy and decisiveness.  
Figure 15 shows the relationship as measured after stage 20.      
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Figure 15. Relationship between mean entropy and decisiveness for each market type (after stage 20) 
for the random draws experiment. 
 
4.2.3 Mirage Tendencies in Feedback Markets 
The tendency of the induction process in feedback to create information mirages is 
studied. 
4.2.3.1 Qualitative Analysis of Incorrect Feedback Markets 
Examining individual markets can illustrate some of the dynamics taking place in 
markets which come to a statistically significant but incorrect conclusion (see section 
3.1.1.5).    Table 41 gives the relevant details for a frequency feedback market.    The 
correct state for this market is E.   The histogram in Table 42 shows the correct state has a 
total of 17 draws while state D, the eventual erroneous prediction, has 10 draws.   The 
mirage begins early with the second participant (P2).   He receives two draws of state D 
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and makes a rational allocation of 50 tickets on that state.    Participant 3, who receives a 
draw of BFB places 30 tickets on D even though it was not in his draw as a result of the 
large public allocation on that state.    Participant 4, who receives a strong draw for the 
correct state, makes a temperate allocation to that state and puts 17 tickets on state D 
even though it wasn't in his draw.    Participant 13 is also significant in that he allocates 
70 tickets on state D given a single draw.    An important characteristic of this draw set is 
the lack of draws on the correct state from participant 3 through participant 10.   This 
allows the mirage to build as 8 draws to the error state occur in that span. 
 
 
Table 41. Frequency market which exhibits an information mirage.  
 
Frequency Market Bubble (DG=11)
Respondent 1st 2nd 3rd A B C D E F
1 F C C 3 10 25 3 4 55
2 D D F 10 10 10 50 10 10
3 B F B 12 15 8 30 5 30
4 B E E 5 9 19 17 35 15
5 E B A 30 20 10 10 20 10
6 F E C 5 13 20 35 15 12
7 C C E 15 15 15 20 15 20
8 E C E 10 10 10 30 10 30
9 A A B 23 12 13 20 12 20
10 E C F 14 14 17 15 17 23
11 D D E 0 0 0 50 50 0
12 E C B 10 30 20 10 20 10
13 B C E 3 3 3 70 8 13
14 A B F 15 15 15 20 15 20
15 D F F 0 0 0 34 0 66
16 E E D 5 5 5 10 50 25
17 A C D 20 17 21 18 12 12
18 D D C 22 20 18 12 13 15
19 E E A 20 10 10 10 40 10
20 E D E 0 0 0 40 60 0
222 228 239 504 411 396
Draws Allocations
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Table 42. Histogram of states for draw set shown in Table 41. 
 
Table 43 illustrates a mirage in a percent market.   The correct state is D and the 
erroneous mode occurs on state C.    The mirage begins with the first participant who 
receives a strong signal for state C with two draws.   He makes an allocation which 
closely resembles the Bayesian posterior probability (since there is no-feedback at this 
point the probabilities can be calculated as in a no-feedback market and are 49% for state 
C, 19.6% for state F and 7.8% for the other states).   This initial allocation of 50 tickets 
on state C pull 92 tickets from participants 2-5 even though none of them received a draw 
of C.    Participant 4 is significant in that he ignored his strong private information of two 
draws for state E, the correct state, and placed the largest number of tickets on states B 
and C.    Participant 8 is also significant in that he received another strong signal for state 
E but also placed the largest number of tickets on other states. 
 
Histogram
State Frequency
A 6
B 8
C 11
D 10
E 17
F 8
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Table 43. Percentage feedback market which exhibits an information mirage.  
 
 
 
Table 44. Histogram of the states in the draw set in Table 43. 
 
 
4.2.3.2 Market Results as a Function of Draw Set Characteristics 
In section 3.4.1 a metric the 'Sum of AIA distances' was introduced to characterize draw 
sets.   A larger sum of AIA distances indicates a draw set which is more prone to 
information mirages because the random nature of the draws takes longer to achieve an 
AIA distribution which gives high probability to the correct state.   This metric was 
Percent Market Bubble (DG=11)
Respondent 1st 2nd 3rd A B C D E F
1 F C C 5 5 50 5 5 30
2 D D F 20 30 20 20 10 0
3 B F B 6 50 25 6 3 10
4 B E E 10 30 30 10 10 10
5 E B A 17 17 17 15 17 17
6 F E C 15 10 15 10 15 35
7 C C E 15 20 30 10 15 10
8 E C E 0 20 30 0 20 30
9 A A B 10 30 35 0 5 20
10 E C F 20 10 15 30 15 10
11 D D E 5 5 10 50 20 10
12 E C B 10 10 40 10 10 20
13 B C E 11 19 26 13 12 19
14 A B F 15 20 30 10 10 15
15 D F F 0 20 60 0 0 20
16 E E D 3 4 3 30 30 30
17 A C D 25 0 30 45 0 0
18 D D C 10 10 30 30 10 10
19 E E A 15 15 25 15 15 15
20 E D E 10 35 25 15 5 10
222 360 546 324 227 321
Draws Allocations
Histogram
State Frequency
A 6
B 8
C 11
D 10
E 17
F 8
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compared to the Wurtz distance between final AIA and the cumulative allocation which 
is a measure of how well the market is performing (with perfect information assimilation 
the cumulative allocation will equal AIA).    Figure 16 shows a scatter plot of these two 
metrics for each market in the random draws experiment broken out as feedback (circles) 
vs. no-feedback markets (asterisks).     The dotted blue (feedback) and solid red (no-
feedback) lines show the result of linear regression fit to the data points.   For feedback 
markets the slope coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level (p=0.0112).  For 
the no-feedback markets the slope coefficient is not statistically significant at the 5% 
level (p=0.8666).   This indicates the hypothesized relationship exists for feedback 
markets and, as expected, does not exist for no-feedback markets. 
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Figure 16. Wurtz distance between AIA and cumulative allocation as a function of the Sum of AIA 
distances after stage 20 for all markets in the random draws experiment. 
 
4.3 Market Performance under Mirage Prone Conditions 
The results of the markets under the mirage prone draw set condition is examined.   A 
total of 91 markets were completed in the experiment.    Each market had 13 stages.    
The breakdown was 33 no-feedback markets and 58 feedback markets (30 frequency 
feedback and 28 percent feedback). 
 
4.3.1 Market's Performance with Mirage Prone Draw Sets 
The market's performance with the mirage prone draw set is examined in the next 
sections 
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4.3.1.1 Modal Performance 
The performance of the mode is examined first.  Table 45 gives modal performance of 
the no-feedback and feedback  markets expressed as counts.    Table 46 shows the same 
information expressed as percentages.   The allocations are judged as correct, incorrect or 
not significant as explained in section 3.1.1.5.   Both markets had significant 
improvements in the thirteenth stage due to the draw of three balls on the correct state 
(see draw table in section 3.2.3). 
 
 
 
Table 45. Performance of no-feedback and feedback markets under the mirage prone draw set 
expressed as counts by market stage (e.g., number of participants). 
 
 
 
Stage Correct Incorrect Not Sig Correct Incorrect Not Sig
1 1 20 12 0 26 32
2 1 14 18 0 25 33
3 0 14 19 0 21 37
4 0 19 14 0 29 29
5 0 22 11 0 30 28
6 2 19 12 0 25 33
7 3 17 13 2 27 29
8 3 16 14 1 27 30
9 6 12 15 2 26 30
10 5 12 16 0 20 38
11 6 8 19 3 20 35
12 5 10 18 3 22 33
13 13 7 13 8 20 30
No-Feedback Feedback
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Table 46.  Performance of no-feedback and feedback markets  under the mirage prone draw set 
expressed as percentages by market stage (e.g., number of participants).. 
 
Table 47 gives the decisiveness and correctness values as calculated from these basic 
results.    Descriptively, the no-feedback markets have higher decisiveness than feedback 
markets although this result is not significant at the 5% or 10% levels.   No-feedback 
markets have higher correctness than feedback markets with the result being significant at 
the 5% level after stages 9,10,11 and 13. 
 
 
Stage Correct Incorrect Not Sig Correct Incorrect Not Sig
1 3.0% 60.6% 36.4% 0.0% 44.8% 55.2%
2 3.0% 42.4% 54.5% 0.0% 43.1% 56.9%
3 0.0% 42.4% 57.6% 0.0% 36.2% 63.8%
4 0.0% 57.6% 42.4% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0%
5 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 51.7% 48.3%
6 6.1% 57.6% 36.4% 0.0% 43.1% 56.9%
7 9.1% 51.5% 39.4% 3.4% 46.6% 50.0%
8 9.1% 48.5% 42.4% 1.7% 46.6% 51.7%
9 18.2% 36.4% 45.5% 3.4% 44.8% 51.7%
10 15.2% 36.4% 48.5% 0.0% 34.5% 65.5%
11 18.2% 24.2% 57.6% 5.2% 34.5% 60.3%
12 15.2% 30.3% 54.5% 5.2% 37.9% 56.9%
13 39.4% 21.2% 39.4% 13.8% 34.5% 51.7%
No-Feedback Feedback
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Table 47. Decisiveness and correctness for the feedback and no-feedback markets by stage for the 
mirage prone draw set by market stage (e.g., number of participants).. 
 
Table 48 compares the decisiveness and correctness of the no-feedback and feedback 
markets after 13 stages with the mirage prone draw set.   Descriptively, the decisiveness 
of no-feedback markets has increased slightly while the correctness has decreased 
somewhat.   By contrast, the feedback markets show dramatic reductions in both 
decisiveness and correctness.   The values are tested for statistical significance with the 
Fisher's exact test as described in section 3.4.3.    As indicated in the table, for no-
feedback markets the values of decisiveness and correctness are not different at the 5% 
level while both the correctness and decisiveness are different at the 5% level for 
feedback markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage No-Feedback Feedback p-value No-Feedback Feedback p-value
1 63.6% 44.8% 0.065 4.8% 0.0% 0.447
2 45.5% 43.1% 0.500 6.7% 0.0% 0.375
3 42.4% 36.2% 0.357 0.0% 0.0% 1.000
4 57.6% 50.0% 0.317 0.0% 0.0% 1.000
5 66.7% 51.7% 0.122 0.0% 0.0% 1.000
6 63.6% 43.1% 0.048 9.5% 0.0% 0.203
7 60.6% 50.0% 0.225 15.0% 6.9% 0.325
8 57.6% 48.3% 0.263 15.8% 3.6% 0.174
9 54.5% 48.3% 0.361 33.3% 7.1% 0.030
10 51.5% 34.5% 0.086 29.4% 0.0% 0.014
11 42.4% 39.7% 0.484 42.9% 13.0% 0.050
12 45.5% 43.1% 0.500 33.3% 12.0% 0.112
13 60.6% 48.3% 0.180 65.0% 28.6% 0.013
Decisiveness Correctness
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  Random Draws Mirage Prone p-value 
Decisiveness No-feedback 56.3% 60.6% .436 
Feedback 70.8% 48.3% .005 
 
Correctness No-feedback 81.5% 65.0% .173 
Feedback 74.6% 28.6% <.001 
Table 48. Comparison of decisiveness and correctness after 13 stages for feedback and no-feedback 
markets in the mirage prone draw set experiment. 
 
4.3.1.2 Impact of Feedback Type 
Table 49 gives the modal performance of the frequency and percentage markets under the 
mirage prone draw set expressed as counts.  Table 50 gives same information expressed 
as percentages. 
 
 
Table 49. Performance of frequency and percent feedback markets with mirage prone draw set 
expressed as counts by market stage (e.g., number of participants). 
 
 
 
Stage Correct Incorrect Not Sig Correct Incorrect Not Sig
1 0 15 15 0 11 17
2 0 13 17 0 12 16
3 0 10 20 0 11 17
4 0 14 16 0 15 13
5 0 18 12 0 12 16
6 0 15 15 0 10 18
7 1 15 14 1 12 15
8 0 14 16 1 13 14
9 0 15 15 2 11 15
10 0 10 20 0 10 18
11 2 10 18 1 10 17
12 2 10 18 1 12 15
13 5 8 17 3 12 13
Frequency Percent
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Table 50.  Performance of frequency and percent feedback markets with mirage prone draw set 
expressed as percentages by market stage (e.g., number of participants). 
 
Table 51 shows the values of decisiveness and correctness as calculated from the results 
shown in Table 49 and Table 50.    Descriptively, the percentage markets have slightly 
higher decisiveness and frequency markets have slightly higher correctness.   Both of 
these results are opposite to the relationship seen in the random draws experiment.   
However, both of these results are not statistically significant.   
 
 
Stage Correct Incorrect Not Sig Correct Incorrect Not Sig
1 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 39.3% 60.7%
2 0.0% 43.3% 56.7% 0.0% 42.9% 57.1%
3 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 39.3% 60.7%
4 0.0% 46.7% 53.3% 0.0% 53.6% 46.4%
5 0.0% 60.0% 40.0% 0.0% 42.9% 57.1%
6 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 35.7% 64.3%
7 3.3% 50.0% 46.7% 3.6% 42.9% 53.6%
8 0.0% 46.7% 53.3% 3.6% 46.4% 50.0%
9 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 7.1% 39.3% 53.6%
10 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 35.7% 64.3%
11 6.7% 33.3% 60.0% 3.6% 35.7% 60.7%
12 6.7% 33.3% 60.0% 3.6% 42.9% 53.6%
13 16.7% 26.7% 56.7% 10.7% 42.9% 46.4%
No-Feedback Feedback
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Table 51. Comparison of decisiveness and correctness by stage for the two types of feedback under 
the mirage prone draw set by market stage (e.g., number of participants).. 
 
 
4.3.2 Evaluation for Information Mirages 
The data characteristics which could identify information mirages is examined. 
4.3.2.1 AIA Wurtz Distance 
Table 52 gives the mean of the Wurtz distance between the cumulative allocation and the 
AIA distribution across the various stages.   The distribution of Wurtz distance values are 
compared for a difference in the mean with the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon non-parametric 
test and the p-value reported in the table.    In contrast to the result in the random draws 
experiment (Table 37) the no-feedback markets actually produce a lower Wurtz distance.   
This result is statistically significant at the 5% level after stage 11.     This indicates that 
no-feedback markets are producing a more accurate result. 
 
 
 
Stage Frequency Percent p-value Frequency Percent p-value
1 50.0% 39.3% 0.290 0.0% 0.0% 1.000
2 43.3% 42.9% 0.590 0.0% 0.0% 1.000
3 33.3% 39.3% 0.421 0.0% 0.0% 1.000
4 46.7% 53.6% 0.397 0.0% 0.0% 1.000
5 60.0% 42.9% 0.149 0.0% 0.0% 1.000
6 50.0% 35.7% 0.203 0.0% 0.0% 1.000
7 53.3% 46.4% 0.397 6.3% 7.7% 0.704
8 46.7% 50.0% 0.504 0.0% 7.1% 0.500
9 50.0% 46.4% 0.496 0.0% 15.4% 0.206
10 33.3% 35.7% 0.534 0.0% 0.0% 1.000
11 40.0% 39.3% 0.584 16.7% 9.1% 0.534
12 40.0% 46.4% 0.410 16.7% 7.7% 0.469
13 43.3% 53.6% 0.303 38.5% 20.0% 0.255
CorrectnessDecisiveness
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Table 52. Mean Wurtz distance  between the AIA distribution and the final cumulative ticket 
allocation for feedback and no-feedback  markets by stage (No-feedback N=33; Feedback N=58) 
 
 
Figure 17 shows a histogram of these distributions after stage 13 and may be able to give 
some insight into the differences.    Notice that the smallest as well as largest Wurtz 
distances come from feedback markets.    One explanation is that for the very low Wurtz 
distances, the induction process is driving the market result towards the actual AIA 
distribution.    However, this induction can create an information mirage which would 
drive the market towards a large Wurtz distance (away from the correct AIA distribution). 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage No-Feedback Feedback p-value
1 0.2215 0.2822 0.031
2 0.3319 0.3480 0.280
3 0.3651 0.3490 0.251
4 0.5138 0.5095 0.401
5 0.6071 0.5886 0.410
6 0.5375 0.5203 0.318
7 0.4530 0.4442 0.334
8 0.3851 0.3777 0.404
9 0.4723 0.4842 0.147
10 0.4291 0.4384 0.155
11 0.6823 0.7037 0.006
12 0.5867 0.6036 0.024
13 0.7677 0.7945 0.004
Mean Wurtz distance between
 AIA and Cumulative allocation 
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Figure 17. Wurtz distance between cumulative allocation at stage 13 and the AIA distribution for no-
feedback and feedback markets in the mirage prone draw set experiment. 
 
4.3.2.2 Variance in Entropy Distributions 
Variance in the entropy distributions can provide additional insight into the information 
mirages.   Table 53 shows the mean and standard deviations of the entropy distributions 
for the no-feedback and feedback markets for each stage.    The feedback markets have a 
lower mean and larger standard deviation.    The differences in the means is statistically 
significant at the 5% level after stage 9.    Levene's test is used to judge the difference in 
the variance of the distributions.    After stage 10 the two distributions have statistically 
significant difference in their variance at the 5% level.   The markets with feedback have 
greater variance than the no-feedback markets. 
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Table 53. Mean entropy by stage  (e.g., number of participants) for feedback and no-feedback 
markets under the mirage prone draw set (No-feedback N=33; Feedback N=58) 
 
 
Figure 18 is a box plot of the two distributions by stage illustrating the differences.   This 
shows that in addition to wider standard deviations, the large outliers primarily are 
feedback markets. 
 
Stage No FB FB
MW         
p-value No FB FB
Levene      
p-value
1 2.0776 2.1238 0.0293 0.3995 0.5963 0.2373
2 2.3377 2.2872 0.2152 0.1857 0.4292 0.0811
3 2.4185 2.4015 0.2972 0.1376 0.2300 0.2370
4 2.4205 2.3946 0.1964 0.1066 0.2413 0.0641
5 2.4574 2.4178 0.4458 0.0873 0.2025 0.0641
6 2.4886 2.4505 0.3324 0.0639 0.1701 0.0756
7 2.5045 2.4674 0.0726 0.0550 0.1253 0.1113
8 2.5162 2.4859 0.0968 0.0443 0.1090 0.1326
9 2.5296 2.5003 0.0213 0.0316 0.0838 0.0809
10 2.5404 2.5092 0.0036 0.0258 0.0726 0.0275
11 2.5428 2.5144 0.0045 0.0227 0.0614 0.0094
12 2.5482 2.5193 0.0006 0.0196 0.0511 0.0034
13 2.5413 2.5191 0.0032 0.0224 0.0479 0.0117
Mean Standard Deviation
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Figure 18. Entropy distributions for no-feedback and feedback markets  by market stage (e.g., 
number of participants).  Key: The dark line in the middle of the boxes is the median.     The top and  
bottom of the box indicates the 75th and 25th percentiles, respectively.   The T-bars, or whiskers, 
extend to 1.5 times the height of the box (if the data are distributed normally, approximately 95% or 
the data are expected to lie between the inner fences).   The circles are outliers beyond the fences.    
Asterisks or stars are extreme outliers that have values more than three times the height of the boxes. 
 
 
The inductive process present in feedback markets could lead to this type of effect.   As a 
feedback market's inductive processes favors a particular state - whether it is a correct 
state or an information mirage - this would drive the entropy lower.    The mirage prone 
draw set has elements that could drive this inductive process both in the direction of the 
mirage or in the direction of a correct answer.    This conflict could result in the greater 
variance of entropy in feedback markets observed. 
4.3.2.3 Relationship of Cumulative Allocation to Draw Set Characteristics 
The relationship between the average allocation of tickets and the draw characteristics 
can shed some light on the information mirage effect.   Table 54 shows the mirage prone 
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draw set used and the sum of draws by state per stage.    The A state, the urn correct 
value, has the largest sum (12) with the D state having a total of 7 draws.    
 
 
Table 54. Mirage prone draw set and the sum of draws by stage 
 
 
Table 55 shows the sum of order weighted draws.   In an information mirage, earlier 
draws are more influential since allocations which are a result of those draws can cause 
later participants to allocate more tickets to that state.   The weighting factor studied here 
is a simple linear function as shown, with the first draw weighted at 13 (the total number 
of stages) and the final draw weighted at 1. 
 
1st 2nd 3rd A B C D E F 
D F D 0 0 0 2 0 1
E F D 0 0 0 3 1 2
F C A 1 0 1 3 1 3
D D E 1 0 1 5 2 3
A D E 2 0 1 6 3 3
A E B 3 1 1 6 4 3
A A B 5 2 1 6 4 3
E C C 5 2 3 6 5 3
A A B 7 3 3 6 5 3
C F B 7 4 4 6 5 4
A B A 9 5 4 6 5 4
C B D 9 6 5 7 5 4
A A A 12 6 5 7 5 4
Draws Sum of Draws
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Table 55. Mirage prone draw set and the sum of order weighted draws by stage 
 
The average cumulative allocation of all participants passing the attention test are then 
calculated by stage and by market type as shown in Table 56 and Table 57.    For 
example, after 13 stages, participants had allocated an average of 278.3 tickets on state A 
in the no-feedback markets.    From these tables it is seen that in no-feedback markets, 
the largest cumulative allocation after the final stage is on state A, the urn correct state 
and the state with the largest sum of draws (12 total draws as shown in Table 54).    By 
contrast the largest average cumulative allocation after stage 13 in the feedback markets 
was 267.4 for state D.    State D has the largest order weighted sum of draws (69) as 
shown in Table 55. 
1st 2nd 3rd Weighting A B C D E F 
D F D 13 0 0 0 26 0 13
E F D 12 0 0 0 38 12 25
F C A 11 11 0 11 38 12 36
D D E 10 11 0 11 58 22 36
A D E 9 20 0 11 67 31 36
A E B 8 28 8 11 67 39 36
A A B 7 42 15 11 67 39 36
E C C 6 42 15 23 67 45 36
A A B 5 52 20 23 67 45 36
C F B 4 52 24 27 67 45 40
A B A 3 58 27 27 67 45 40
C B D 2 58 29 29 69 45 40
A A A 1 61 29 29 69 45 40
Draws Sum of Weighted Draws
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Table 56. Mean cumulative allocations by stage (e.g., number of participants)  for no-feedback 
markets (N=33) 
 
 
 
 
Table 57. Mean cumulative allocations by stage (e.g., number of participants)  for feedback markets 
(N=58) 
 
The relationship is further explored through regression between the mean cumulative 
allocations and both the sum of draws and the order weighted sum of draws.    Table 58 
shows the slope coefficient and its associated p-value of a linear regression of the mean 
cumulative allocation and both the sum of draws and the order weighted sum of draws.    
A B C D E F
10.6 8.7 10.5 39.9 9.9 20.3
23.4 20.1 28.6 58.8 31.1 37.9
41.5 31.1 55.8 71.9 44.2 55.5
52.0 43.0 70.5 108.2 61.9 64.4
72.3 57.3 88.0 124.6 78.6 79.2
97.9 75.2 101.2 137.7 97.7 89.9
128.2 96.4 114.3 148.8 111.1 100.5
141.4 108.7 140.3 165.0 131.7 111.0
171.5 128.0 151.5 179.1 145.2 122.8
183.8 148.7 174.8 192.5 156.4 141.9
217.6 166.6 189.5 205.6 166.8 151.9
230.7 184.3 217.0 223.8 178.8 163.5
278.3 195.0 227.1 235.2 188.2 174.3
A B C D E F
10.6 11.7 12.4 34.8 13.0 17.5
20.8 23.0 24.8 59.3 32.7 39.4
38.6 36.2 43.1 74.5 46.6 61.1
49.5 47.9 55.5 109.2 62.1 75.8
66.7 59.0 67.2 134.5 83.2 89.4
87.5 76.4 80.2 150.5 102.4 103.1
115.5 96.3 89.4 167.1 116.9 114.7
128.1 110.9 113.4 181.9 135.4 130.3
153.8 128.7 126.7 197.7 148.6 144.3
166.3 145.3 145.4 215.7 161.8 164.8
194.4 163.9 158.1 230.8 174.5 177.7
209.7 182.3 178.4 251.5 187.4 189.8
243.7 193.4 190.7 267.4 202.1 201.7
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This shows that the regression slope for the sum of draws is statistically significant at the 
10% level for each stage and is significant at the 5% level for many stages including the 
final stage.    By contrast, the regression vs. the order weighted sum of draws for the later 
stages (stages 10-13) are not statistically significant at the 10% level.     For no-feedback 
markets, the average cumulative allocations fit the sum of draws better than the order 
weighted sum of draws. 
 
 
Table 58. Regression results for no-feedback markets by stage (e.g., number of participants). 
 
Table 59 gives the same information for the feedback markets.    Here the relationships 
have changed.   In the later stages (stage 9-13) the relationship between the average 
cumulative allocation and the sum of draws are not statistically significant at the 10% 
level.   However, for all stages, the average cumulative allocation and the order weighted 
sum of draws is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Stage Slope p Value slope p value
1 14.3 0.000 1.1 0.000
2 10.4 0.004 0.8 0.004
3 9.8 0.032 0.8 0.030
4 11.3 0.016 0.9 0.019
5 9.5 0.025 0.8 0.024
6 8.8 0.054 0.8 0.044
7 8.0 0.074 0.7 0.068
8 11.2 0.044 0.9 0.085
9 10.8 0.038 1.0 0.077
10 11.8 0.095 0.8 0.174
11 10.6 0.068 1.0 0.191
12 12.1 0.067 0.9 0.300
13 11.9 0.017 1.3 0.231
Regression
Weighted Sum
Regression
Sum of Draws
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Table 59. Regression results for feedback markets by stage (e.g., number of participants). 
 
 
4.4 Individual Allocations 
The allocations by the participants are studied in this section. 
 
4.4.1 Rounding and Position Bias 
All allocations were examined for potential biases.   Figure 19 is a histogram of the final 
digit of the allocation.   For example, if the participant allocated 22 tickets on state B, 
then this chart would record that as a 2.    In Figure 19 all allocations of 0 total have been 
removed (in other words, those shown as 0 are 10, 20, 30 etc.).    This shows participants 
had a pronounced bias to round their allocations to a value a multiple of 10 or 5. 
 
Stage Slope p Value slope p value
1 10.6 0.002 0.8 0.002
2 11.2 0.001 0.9 0.001
3 11.4 0.006 0.9 0.003
4 12.7 0.001 1.1 0.001
5 12.8 0.002 1.1 0.001
6 13.4 0.006 1.2 0.001
7 12.8 0.021 1.3 0.002
8 13.5 0.049 1.3 0.004
9 10.1 0.132 1.4 0.005
10 11.6 0.240 1.5 0.008
11 7.0 0.317 1.5 0.005
12 8.4 0.259 1.6 0.008
13 6.8 0.184 1.8 0.002
Regression Regression
Sum of Draws Weighted Sum
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Figure 19. Histogram of final digit of allocation (e.g. 13 would be recorded here as 3) for all IP 
markets (with responses of 0 removed) illustrating the rounding effect 
 
 
Since the predominant number of workers in AMT's workforce read left to right (as well 
as this is the way the AMT web pages and this survey were built), a tendency to allocate 
from left to right was investigated.   Figure 20 shows two grouped histograms.   First the 
ratio of tickets allocated to a particular state divided by the total allocation is shown (that 
is, the total of the distribution is 1).   Along with this is the distribution of urn correct 
states.    In the absence of any bias, these should be approximately the same.   However 
they differ with a p-value of less than .001.    Descriptively, notice that allocations to state 
A, B, C and D are all higher than expected and allocations to states E and F are both 
lower than expected.   This supports the hypothesis of a left to right bias. 
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Figure 20. Comparison of average ticket allocation by state to urn correct draw 
 
4.4.2 No-feedback Markets: Allocations vs. Probability 
Figure 21 is a box plot of each individual allocation versus the corresponding Bayesian 
probability as derived from the three ball draws for the IP markets.    The Bayesian 
probabilities are at discrete values because there are only three types of ball draws (all 
balls the same, two balls the same or all balls different) which breaks down to 7 different 
probabilities (see Table 22).    The line where the allocation is equal to the Bayesian 
Probability has been drawn on the figure.   Any allocation above this line could be 
considered an over allocation to the probability and any allocation below the line could 
be considered an under allocation to the probability.    A least squares linear regression 
was performed and the resulting regression line is also drawn.    Note that the regression 
line indicates that participants have a bias which creates over allocation for low 
probability situations and an under allocation for higher probability draws.   One possible 
explanation for this effect is the well studied tendency for individuals to overestimate the 
probability of low probability events and underestimate the probability of high 
0
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probability events (section  2.2.2.2.2).   As will be discussed later (section 5.1.3), this bias 
has a detrimental impact on market performance. 
 
 
Figure 21. Allocations vs. Bayesian probability - IP markets.   Data points are represented by the box 
plot.   The dashed line shows where the Allocation is equal to the Bayesian Probability.   The solid 
line is the regression fit to the data. 
 
4.4.3 Feedback Markets: Influence of Public Data on Allocations 
The influence of public information on the allocation by participants is studied.    In this 
analysis the allocations are grouped by the number of balls drawn for a particular state.   
To illustrate the method, consider an individual who has a ball draw of ECE and is 
presented a public cumulative allocation of: A:55; B:32; C:110; D:21; E:11; and, F:71.    
This participant has been shown a total of 300 tickets.   In terms of percent of this total 
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the cumulative allocations would be: A:18.3%;  B:10.7%; C:36.7%; D:7.0%; E:3.7%; and, 
F:23.7%.   For this illustration, imagine the participant allocated their own tickets as: A:4; 
B:3; C:40; D:3; E:40; and, F:10.    Then for the groups the following data points would be 
added:  
• 0 balls drawn group:  
o State A - Allocation:4; Public:18.3% 
o State B- Allocation:3; Public:10.7%  
o State D- Allocation:3; Public:7.0% 
o State F- Allocation:10; Public:23.7% 
• 1 ball drawn group:  
o State C- allocation:40, Public:36.7% 
• 2 balls drawn group:  
o State E- allocation:40, Public:3.7% 
• 3 balls drawn group: 
o No data points added since this situation did not occur. 
 
Each allocation can thus be categorized and scatter plots generated for each group.   
Figure 22 shows a scatter plot for all allocations where one ball was drawn.     The plots 
show the data for both frequency and percentage feedback markets.    Note that this 
scatter includes responses for all stages of the market; so, in frequency markets 
participants were seeing different levels of total tickets allocated.    For each scatter a 
least squares linear regression is calculated (using data from both frequency and 
percentage markets in the regression) and is shown as the line in the figure.    As 
expected, the positive slope indicates that increasing levels of public allocation increase 
the participant's allocation. 
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Figure 22. Scatter plot of participant's allocation vs. the public cumulative allocation for the case 
where they receive only one of the indicated ball in their draw set.   The regression fit is shown as the 
line and is calculated using all data points (from both percentage and frequency markets). 
 
 
The regression calculations for each of the four groups (number of balls drawn) are 
summarized in Table 60.  The value of the slope is indicative of the strength of the effect 
of public data.   Note that for 0-2 balls drawn the p-value of slope coefficient is 0 
indicating the value is statistically significant at the 5% level.   However, the R2 value is 
relatively low for all cases.   This indicates the relationship accounts for a very small 
percentage of the observed variance - at most 12.9% for the one ball drawn case.    The  
Cook's distance (Cook, 1977) for the point with the maximum value is also recorded in 
the table.   These are all comfortable levels as the general rule of thumb is a value above 
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1 is needed before a single data point can impact the overall regression values.    Notable 
is the result for the 3 ball drawn case.   Note that this case has the fewest observations 
with a sample size of 98.   Here, the slope is not statistically significant at the 5% or 10% 
levels.      Table 61 is included for reference, and shows the distribution of allocations 
under the same conditions for the no-feedback market case. 
 
 
 Constant Slope 
 B SE p B SE p 
0 balls drawn 5.89 .25 <.005 38.27 1.44 <.005 
1 ball drawn  12.01 .41 <.005 49.51 2.14 <.005 
2 balls drawn  23.70 1.44 <.005 50.24 6.38 <.005 
3 balls drawn  47.31 6.73 <.005 -3.94 24.78 .874 
 
  
F 
Max 
Cook's 
Dist 
 
R
2
 
 
N 
0 balls drawn  710.1 0.138 .096 6727 
1 ball drawn  537.3 0.149 .129 3627 
2 balls drawn  61.9 0.210 .067 870 
3 balls drawn  .025 0.110 -.01 98 
 
Table 60. Summary of regression analysis of the impact of public data on participant's allocations 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of same state 
balls in draw set 
Allocation (out of 100)  
N Mean SD 
0 10.42 6.83 5,901 
1 21.48 9.39 2,578 
2 39.13 19.52 1,006 
3 44.43 26.16 61 
Table 61.   Summary of participant's allocations in no-feedback markets as a function of the number 
of a particular ball they received in their draw set. 
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Multivariate regression was preformed to understand the relative values of the influence 
of public data as the private information changes.    A change in the slope would indicate 
a type of integration of public and private data in the sample.   In the first regression 
analysis the public data is qualified by a dummy variable set to the number of ball draws.   
The equation fit was: 
Predicted Allocation = B0 + B1*Dummy0*(Public in %) + B2*Dummy1*(Public in %) +                      
                              B3*Dummy2*(Public in %) + B4*Dummy3*(Public in %) 
 
where 
DummyN = 1 if N balls drawn and 0 otherwise 
The results of fit to this equation are shown below in Table 62.   All coefficients are 
statistically significant and different.   This result supports the conclusion that public and 
private information is being integrated.   The values of the coefficients are seen to 
increase with increasing numbers of balls drawn.   This indicates that as more informative 
private information is received, the participant is placing a higher value on public 
information. 
 
 Coefficient SE p-value VIF 
B0 9.86 .24 <.0005 - 
B1 17.51 1.50 <.0005 1.87 
B2 59.49 1.49 <.0005 1.78 
B3 104.95 1.94 <.0005 1.25 
B4 120.85 4.23 <.0005 1.03 
Table 62. Multivariate Regression Results.  Fit to equation shown above.   VIF (variance inflation 
factor) is a multicollinearity metric.  Generally VIF values below 5-10 are considered to show low 
levels of collinearity. 
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In a second multivariate regression, the data is fit to a linear model with an interaction 
term.    The equation fit is shown below: 
                      Predicted Allocation = C0  +  C1*#_Balls_Drawn +  C2*Public in % +                              
                                                           C3*#_Balls_Drawn*Public in %  
 
Table 63 shows the values for the coefficients fit to the model above.  The VIF (variance 
inflation factor - a multicollinearity metric) for the C3 term is slightly high at 6.25 
indicating some of the variance it accounts for is shared by other coefficients.   However, 
the value is less than 10 and does not substantially impact the model validity. 
 
 Coefficient SE p-value VIF 
C0 5.34 0.30 <.0005 - 
C1 8.344 0.34 <.0005 4.92 
C2 39.99 1.69 <.0005 1.80 
C3 5.28 1.625 .001 6.25 
Table 63. Multivariate Regression Results.  Fit to equation shown above.   VIF (variance inflation 
factor) is a multicollinearity metric.  Generally VIF values below 5-10 are considered to show low 
levels of collinearity. 
 
The implied univariate regression coefficients derived from this multivariate analysis are 
shown in Table 64.   These are similar to the values derived from the univariate 
regression as shown in Table 60.   The notable exception is the implied relationship for 3 
balls drawn, where the implied relationship has a smaller constant (30.37 vs. 47.31) and a 
large positive slope (55.84). 
 
 Constant Slope 
0 balls drawn 5.34 40.00 
1 ball drawn 13.68 45.28 
2 balls drawn 22.03 50.56 
3 balls drawn 30.37 55.84 
Table 64. Linear relationships implied by the multivariate analysis. 
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After completing the markets, participants were asked "Did you encounter a situation 
where there was a contradiction between your private (draw) information and the market 
information?"   A yes and no selection was presented.  If the participant selected yes, then 
they were shown the choices displayed in Figure 23.   31% of the respondents indicated 
they attempted to integrate public and private data when they had conflicting inputs. 
 
 
Figure 23. How participant's reported resolving conflicts between public and private data. 
 
4.4.4 Categorizing responses into styles 
Table 65 (random draws experiment) and Table 66 (mirage prone experiment) gives the 
results of fitting the experimental allocations to the models of different allocation styles 
(shown in Figure 12).    The model compares the participant's allocation to each style and 
selects the one with the minimum Wurtz distance.  If the minimum Wurtz distance is 
greater than 0.25 the response is grouped into the 'No Fit' category. 
 
Analysis of the results in Table 65 show that for IP markets the dominant styles used are 
MaxiMin and DrawPct.    DrawEV is seen to be relatively rare.    The relative 
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relationship between DrawPct and DrawEV agrees with prior research where P, or 
probability, bets are observed more frequently than $, or maximum expected value, bets 
(see section 2.2.3.2.3). 
 
From Table 65, for feedback markets, the relatively large fraction which most closely 
matches the mimic style is surprising at 26.2% in percent markets and 22.1% in 
frequency markets.   MaxiMin and Mimic, which are relatively low information and 
computation strategies, make up nearly 50% of the participants.    Also surprising is the 
very low percentage of participant's allocations which match a strategy that attempts to 
integrate public and private data (AllPct, AllPctEV, AllDraws or AllDrawsEV).    In fact 
there is a complete lack of participant allocations matching either the AllPctEV or 
AllDrawsEV strategies.    The previous section (Section 4.4.3) showed that participant 
allocations were influenced by public information; however the effect  must more subtle 
than the style models indicate. 
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Table 65. Descriptive results from categorization of participant's allocations (from the random draws 
experiment) 
 
 
 
Table 66. Descriptive results from categorization of participant's allocations(from the mirage prone 
draw experiment - those failing attention test removed) 
 
 
Table 67 gives a summary across three broad strategy types comparing MaxiMin, Percent 
based strategies (DrawPct+Mimic+AllPct+AllDraws) and MaxEV strategies 
(DrawEV+MimicEV+AllPctEV+AllDrawsEV) for the random draws experiment.    The 
ratio of participants maximizing expected value is relatively stable in the range of 10% in 
each market type.   Note that the MaxiMin fraction drops by nearly 10% when feedback 
No Percent Frequency
Feedback Feedback Feedback
MaxiMin 33.9% 24.4% 23.0%
DrawPct 48.1% 24.7% 24.2%
DrawEV 9.5% 7.0% 10.7%
Mimic - 26.2% 22.1%
PublicEV - 0.7% 1.0%
AllPct - 9.4% 6.6%
AllPctEV - 0.0% 0.0%
AllDraws - - 4.2%
AllDrawsEV - - 0.0%
No Fit 8.5% 7.6% 8.1%
Sample N 1,491         939            1,048         
IP Pct Freq 
MaxiMin 33.7% 23.6% 27.2%
DrawPct 40.3% 24.8% 24.8%
DrawEV 8.8% 6.7% 6.1%
Mimic 21.0% 17.5%
PublicEV 0.6% 0.5%
AllPct 11.1% 4.9%
AllPctEV 0.0% 0.0%
AllDraws 5.8%
AllDrawsEV 0.0%
No Fit 17.2% 12.2% 13.3%
Sample N 377 343 412
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is present.   Also, note that the fraction matching percent and EV types increases by 
approximately this same value. 
 
 
Table 67. Grouping of styles into major categories  (random draws)  
 
 
Table 68 shows the same summary for the mirage prone data set.   While the percentage 
of responses which match to MaxiMin are similar in the two experiments, the percentage 
of No Fit is higher in the mirage prone draw experiment while the ratio of percent and 
EV type strategies is lower.   The change in the bonus and base ratio (see Table 24) and 
the presence of a no-feedback market screener are likely reasons for the shift. 
 
 
Table 68. Grouping of styles into major categories  (mirage prone draw)  
 
 
Participants' responses can also be grouped in terms of information usage.   Table 69 is a 
recasting of Table 65 in terms of information usage.   MaxiMin falls into the 'Little Info 
Use' category.  DrawPct and DrawEV fall into the 'Primarily Private Info' category.   
Mimic and PublicEV fall into the 'Primarily Public Info' category.    AllPct, AllPctEV, 
AllDraws and AllDrawsEV fall into the 'Integrate Public & Private' category.   In no-
No Percent Frequency
Feedback Feedback Feedback
MaxiMin 33.9% 24.4% 23.0%
Percent Type 48.1% 60.3% 57.2%
EV Type 9.5% 7.8% 11.7%
No Fit 8.5% 7.6% 8.1%
No Percent Frequency
Feedback Feedback Feedback
MaxiMin 33.7% 23.6% 27.2%
Percent Type 40.3% 46.4% 52.9%
EV Type 8.8% 7.3% 6.6%
No Fit 17.2% 12.2% 13.3%
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feedback markets approximately one third of participants' responses fit to models which 
imply little use of information, while approximately 58% fit to models which did use the 
private information available.   In feedback markets approximately a quarter of 
participants' responses were fit to models which use little information (e.g. MaxiMin).   
Approximately one third fit to models which use only private information (e.g. allocation 
in proportion to probabilities).   Another quarter fit to models which use only public 
information (e.g. allocating in proportion to public information).   Finally, only 10% of 
participant's responses fit to models which integrate public and private information. 
 
 
 
Table 69. Categorization of participants' responses by use of information (random draws experiment) 
 
 
  
No Percent Frequency
Feedback Feedback Feedback
Little Info Use 33.9% 24.4% 23.0%
Primarily Private Info 57.6% 31.7% 34.9%
Primarily Public Info - 26.9% 23.2%
Integrate Public & Private - 9.4% 10.8%
No Fit 8.5% 7.6% 8.1%
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5 Discussion, Conclusions and Next Steps 
This section discusses and interpret the results, suggest future work and analyzes the 
application of simulation technology to the study of markets. 
 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
The research conclusions are reviewed in the context of the research questions and 
experimental hypotheses. 
 
5.1.1 What are the Mechanisms Involved in the Information 
Assimilation Process? 
The idea and understanding that markets can assimilate information dates back to some 
of the earliest work on economics.   Smith (1776) and Hayek (1945) wrote of this and the 
concept was used to build the fundamental Theory of Rational Expectations and the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis - important pillars in modern economics.    The ability of 
markets to assimilate information was empirically shown by Plott (1988).   In the present 
study the process of assimilation was discussed in terms of two components: 
• The collection of diverse information - individuals using their own information 
make a judgment about the implications of that information and bring this to the 
market. 
• The market's judgment on the implications of this gathered information - an 
inductive process which Plott (2003) and others call information aggregation. 
By studying markets with and without feedback these two mechanisms can be studied in 
more detail.    
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Hypothesis: 
1. Markets without feedback can collect information and outperform the average 
of their parts. 
 
Hypothesis supported - In section 4.2.1 it was shown that no-feedback markets are 
capable of collecting information in that their performance exceeded that of the collection 
of the individuals.   Specifically, the null hypotheses that Decisiveness and Accuracy 
were equal for markets and the collections of individuals were both rejected (Table 30). 
 
Hypothesis: 
2. Feedback markets have an inductive process, above and beyond collection, 
which creates agreement (precision). 
 
Hypothesis supported - Mean entropy of the cumulative allocations was examined.   The 
data showed that feedback markets had statistically significantly lower entropy than 
markets without feedback; this is an indication of the inductive information aggregation 
mechanism. 
 
Hypothesis: 
3. Feedback markets have an inductive process, above and beyond collection, 
which can assimilate more information than markets without feedback. 
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Hypothesis supported - In section 4.2.2 the performance of markets with and without 
feedback was explored in order to understand the additive impact of the market's 
inductive processes.   The performance of the markets in terms of their decisiveness, the 
ability of a market to come to a statistically significant conclusion, and correctness, the 
ability of a market to come to a correct conclusion, was examined.   It was shown that 
getting aggregation levels beyond the no-feedback case is a tradeoff with feedback 
markets offering additional decisiveness at the expense of correctness.    The actual 
induction mechanism itself was examined by looking at the mean Wurtz distance 
between the cumulative allocations and the AIA distribution (or Aggregate Information 
Available, the Bayesian posterior probability of the simple sum of all ball draws - a 
potential measure for perfect complete information aggregation as suggested by Plott et al 
(2003)).   The data showed that feedback markets' cumulative allocations had statistically 
significantly lower Wurtz distances to the AIA distribution indicating they were 
aggregating information above and beyond the collection of information by no-feedback 
markets.     
 
Hypothesis: 
4. Information mirages are present in markets with feedback. They are an artifact 
of the inductive process.  These mirages are an error mechanism which reduces 
the market's overall accuracy. 
 
Hypothesis supported - Information mirages were postulated to be one of the failure 
mechanisms of feedback markets.    In the random draws experiment some clues were 
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observed which supported information mirages as a mechanism.   Section 4.2.3.1 
reviewed the allocations of several feedback markets in detail which provided some 
qualitative evidence for information mirages.   In section 4.2.3.2 the metric  'Sum of AIA 
distances' (section 3.4.1) for each market in the random draws experiment was compared 
to the market's aggregation performance by looking at the Wurtz distance between the 
current AIA distribution and the cumulative ticket allocation.   A statistically significant 
linear relationship (with positive slope) was seen for feedback markets, while no such 
relationship was seen for no-feedback markets. 
 
The information mirage phenomenon was studied further using a mirage prone draw set 
which was repeatedly applied to all markets.   This was seen to negatively impact the 
correctness of both no-feedback and feedback markets; but with a much greater impact to 
the feedback markets as shown in Table 70.   After 13 stages, the correctness of feedback 
markets was seen to drop to 28.6% compared to 74.6% in the random draws experiment.  
This change was statistically significant at the 5% level (p-value of less than .001).  The 
correctness of the no-feedback markets was only reduced from 81.5% to 65%.   This 
change was not statistically significant at the 5% level (p-value of .173).  Note that there 
were other factors which may have contributed such as the change in incentives and the 
use of screening methods in the random draws experiment (see Table 24). 
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  No-feedback Feedback p-value 
Decisiveness Random Draws 56.3% 70.8% 0.065 
Mirage Prone 60.6% 48.3% 0.180 
 p-value .436 .005  
Correctness Random Draws 81.5% 74.6% 0.338 
Mirage Prone 65.0% 28.6% 0.013 
 p-value .173 <.001  
Table 70. Comparison of decisiveness and correctness of no-feedback and feedback markets at stage 
13 over the two experiments. 
 
 
The fingerprint of information mirages was seen in several analyses of the mirage prone 
data set.   In section 4.3.2.1 it was seen that in contrast to the result of the random draws 
experiment, the Wurtz distance between the AIA distribution and the final cumulative 
allocation was statistically significantly lower for no-feedback markets.     A histogram 
(Figure 17) showed that the feedback markets had long tails of very low values - where 
induction was creating agreement on correct assessments - and very large values - where 
induction was creating agreement on incorrect assessments as information mirages.     
Similarly, the distributions for entropy were studied and also shown to have statistically 
significant greater variance.     
 
The most conclusive evidence for information mirages in the feedback markets was seen 
in section 4.3.2.3.   The relationship between the mean number of tickets allocated and 
the sum of draws and the order weighted sum of draws was investigated.   Table 58 
showed a statistically significant linear relationship between the sum of draws and the 
cumulative allocation for no-feedback markets.   By contrast, the relationship between the 
order weighted sum of draws and cumulative allocations was not significant at the end of 
the market.    In stark contrast, Table 59 showed the opposite.   For feedback markets the 
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relationship between the sum of draws and cumulative allocations was not significant at 
the end of the market while the relationship between the order weighted sum of draws 
and cumulative allocations was statistically significant.   This indicates that for feedback 
markets early draws have a persistent impact on the cumulative allocation to later 
participants. 
 
Charles Mackay, in his book ‘Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of 
Crowds (1932)’ states: 
"Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that they go mad in 
herds, while they only recover their senses slowly, and one by one." 
 
He conveys a perspective that the root causes of bubbles are drastically irrational 
behavior brought about by the situation of the interactions.   However, another 
perspective is that irrational behavior is not required to generate bubbles.    Is the logical 
argument of the third person in an information cascade whose preceding participants have 
both chosen a different door than their private information indicates (as discussed in 
section 2.3.2.1) irrational?    Instead, bubbles and mirages can also be caused by system 
structure, diversity in participants and probabilistic variations in information.    Vives 
writes (2008): 
“It is found that apparently contending theories, such as market informational 
efficiency and herding, build in fact on the same principles of Bayesian decision 
making.   The upshot is that we do not need “irrational” agents to explain 
herding behavior, crisis, and crashes.” 
 
In fact, a market subject to a mirage prone data resembles a Prisoner's Dilemma (Zwick, 
2011) where individual rationality results in collective irrationality. 
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Table 71 summarizes the experimental hypotheses and their evaluation in this work for 
the research question "What are the mechanisms involved in the information assimilation 
process?"  
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Hypothesis Evaluation 
1. Markets without 
feedback can collect 
information and 
outperform the average of 
their parts. 
Supported - Section 4.2.1 - Markets vs. the collection of 
individual allocations have statistically significant higher 
decisiveness and correctness. 
2. Feedback markets have 
an inductive process, 
above and beyond 
collection, which creates 
agreement (precision). 
Supported - Section 4.2.2.3 - Feedback markets have 
statistically significantly lower entropy. 
3. Feedback markets have 
an inductive process, 
above and beyond 
collection, which can 
assimilate more 
information than markets 
without feedback. 
Supported - Section 4.2.2.2 - Feedback markets have 
statistically significantly lower Wurtz distances between 
the cumulative allocations and the AIA distribution. 
4. Information mirages 
are present in markets 
with feedback. They are 
an artifact of the 
inductive process.  These 
mirages are an error 
mechanism which 
reduces the market's 
overall accuracy. 
Supported - Section 4.2.3.1 showed qualitative data on the 
presence of information mirages.  Section 4.2.3.2 showed 
that feedback markets have a statistically significant linear 
relationship between the Wurtz distance between the AIA 
distribution and the cumulative allocation and the sum of 
Wurtz distance between the intermediate (stage) AIA and 
the final AIA distribution.   Section 4.3.1.1 showed a 
dramatic and statistically significant reduction in both 
decisiveness and correctness for feedback markets when 
the mirage prone draw set was applied.    By contrast, no-
feedback markets showed no statistically significant 
change.   Section 4.3.2.1 showed that under the mirage 
prone draw set the no-feedback markets exhibited 
statistically significantly smaller Wurtz distance between 
the cumulative allocation and the AIA distribution than 
feedback markets.   This was seen to be the exact opposite 
relationship observed in the random draws experiment.    
Section 4.3.2.3 showed a statistically significant linear 
relationship between the sum of draws and the cumulative 
allocation for no-feedback markets (and no relationship for 
feedback markets).   By contrast, a statistically significant 
linear relationship between the order weighted sum of 
draws and the cumulative allocation was found for 
feedback markets (and no relationship for no-feedback 
markets). 
Table 71. Summary of hypotheses and evaluations for the first research question - "What are the 
mechanisms involved in the information assimilation process?" 
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5.1.2 How does the Presence and Type of Feedback Impact Market 
Performance? 
 
Hypothesis: 
5. Adding feedback increases the decisiveness of a market at the expense of correctness. 
 
Hypothesis Supported - Section 4.2.2.1 showed that markets with feedback had 
statistically significantly higher decisiveness than markets without feedback.   However, 
markets without feedback had statistically significantly higher levels of correctness. 
 
Hypothesis: 
6. The type of feedback can modulate the induction process - more informative feedback 
increases decisiveness at the cost of correctness. 
 
Hypothesis Supported - Section 4.2.2.1 showed that frequency feedback markets had 
statistically significantly higher decisiveness than percent feedback markets.    
Descriptively, percent feedback markets had higher correctness than frequency feedback 
markets, but that difference was not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
The addition of feedback and the choice of type of feedback affords a tradeoff between 
decisiveness and correctness.   Figure 24 (duplicate of Figure 13 shown here for the 
reader's convenience) illustrates this tradeoff.   Adding feedback increases the 
information assimilation ability of a market by adding the inductive ability.   This 
increases decisiveness and reduces entropy.   However, it brings the possibility of 
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information mirages which reduce correctness.   Frequency feedback, which delivers 
more information to the market than percent feedback, descriptively increases both 
effects over percent feedback.   This suggests there is the possibility to modulate the 
inductive effect to some extent and match the market performance to the needs of the 
organizer (see section 5.3.1 for more discussion). 
 
 
Figure 24. Summary of market performance illustrating the tradeoff between correctness and 
decisiveness after stage 20 of the random draws experiment. 
 
One analogy is to think of the feedback market as an amplifier - a Bayesian amplifier.   
An amplifier takes a weak signal and turns it into a strong signal.   Unfortunately, 
amplifiers will amplify noise just as well as signal.   Changing the presence and type of 
feedback could be thought of as changing the amplification level.  
 
In section 1.1.3 one of the four conditions in Surowiecki's main thesis for the wisdom of 
crowds was independence.   Complete independence would imply no feedback.   In fact, 
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no feedback markets did have distinct advantages, such as higher correctness.   However, 
markets with feedback, and thus some level of dependence, also displayed valuable 
characteristics, such as higher decisiveness. 
 
Comparing the results of section 4.2.2.2, where it was shown that markets with feedback 
had lower Wurtz distances to the final AIA distribution, and section 4.2.2.1, where it was 
shown that no feedback markets had higher correctness, presents an apparent paradox.   
Both of these results represent measures of accuracy and feedback markets outperformed 
in the first and no-feedback markets outperformed in the latter.   The resolution to the 
paradox comes from realizing that correctness is based on the two stage evaluation 
process described in section 3.1.1.5.   Once a market allocation is judged as correct, 
additional allocation of tickets to the correct state  will not increase the measures of  
correctness;  however, they will decrease the Wurtz distance to final AIA.   So, once 
statistical significance of the result is established, additional gains from the inductive 
process do not benefit correctness.   However, this inductive process does create 
information mirages which are adversely affecting correctness.   This explains how 
information aggregation is simultaneously increasing accuracy as judged by the Wurtz 
distance to final AIA and decreasing accuracy as judged by correctness. 
 
Table 72 presents a summary of the research hypotheses and their evaluation for the 
research question "How does the presence and type of feedback impact market 
performance?" 
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Hypothesis Evaluation 
5. Adding feedback 
increases the 
decisiveness of a 
market at the 
expense of 
correctness. 
Supported - Section 4.2.2.1 showed that markets with 
feedback had statistically significantly higher decisiveness 
than markets without feedback.   However, markets without 
feedback had statistically significantly higher levels of 
correctness. 
6. The type of 
feedback can 
modulate the 
induction process - 
more informative 
feedback increases 
decisiveness at the 
cost of correctness. 
Supported - Section 4.2.2.1 showed that frequency feedback 
markets feedback had statistically significantly higher 
decisiveness than percent feedback markets.    Descriptively, 
percent feedback markets had higher correctness than 
frequency feedback markets but that differences was not 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Table 72. Summary of second research hypotheses and their evaluation "How does the presence and 
type of feedback impact market performance?" 
 
5.1.3 How do Individuals use Information in the Allocation Process? 
 
Hypothesis: 
7. In the absence of public data, participants allocate tickets in a Bayesian-like 
method (with base rate neglect growing with increasing number of matching balls 
drawn) 
 
Hypothesis partially supported - The literature, as discussed in Section 2.2, presented 
potentially conflicting arguments for non-Bayesian behavior.   For example, Base rate 
neglect (section 2.2.2.2.1)  and pseudiagnosticiy (section 2.2.2.2.3) might suggest a 
different behavior than conservatism (section 2.2.2.2.2).   
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The participants tended to behave more as predicted in section 2.2.2.2.2..   Figure 21 in 
section 4.4.2 illustrated that participants over-allocate in low Bayesian probability 
circumstances and under-allocate in high Bayesian probability circumstances    
 
In the case of markets, this misallocation tendency has a negative effect on market 
performance as well as the individual's financial performance.    Figure 25 shows the 
same data with an overlay to explain this.   As will be shown in the simulation in section 
5.2.5 markets where participants use more computation and information intensive 
strategies (such as maximizing expected value) improve market performance.   This 
implies that allocations which would move the regression line closer to the allocation is 
equal to the probability line would result in improved market performance.   Further, a 
strategy that maximizes expected value will result in a regression line that under allocates 
on low probability events and over allocates on high probability events.    
 
Figure 25.  Allocations vs. Bayesian probability from no-feedback markets. 
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Hypothesis: 
8. In the presence of public data, participants allocate tickets by integrating public 
and private data 
 
Hypothesis Supported - Section 4.4.3 analyzed the relationship between participants' 
allocations, the public information available and their private information.   Multivariate 
regression indicated as the number of balls drawn for a particular state increased in the 
draw set the influence of public data increased.   Table 63 showed the interaction term 
(C3), which attempts to directly assess the integration effect,  to be statistically 
significant and positive in value.   The analysis with coefficients shown in Table 62 also 
demonstrated a differing influence of public data depending on the number of balls drawn.   
This analysis, however, did not constrict the model to linearity as the previous model did.   
The increase in the coefficients demonstrated a non-linear effect.    Table 73 lists the 
coefficients from Table 62 along with the value of the increase.   Notice that the rate of 
change in the coefficient values increases and then decreases as the number of balls 
drawn increases. 
 
Coefficient Value Difference from prior 
Coefficient 
B1 (0 Balls Drawn) 17.51 - 
B2  (1 Ball Drawn) 59.49 41.98 
B3 (2 Balls Drawn) 104.95 45.46 
B4 (3 Balls Drawn) 120.85 16.00 
Table 73. Coefficients from Table 62 
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The results for multivariate regression and univariate regression were different for the 
case where three balls were drawn.   Table 60 showed the univarate analysis to predict no 
relationship between the allocation and public data.   However, the multivariate analysis 
did predict a relationship regardless of the equation form (Table 62 and Table 63).  Figure 
26 shows the scatter plot of allocations versus public allocation for the three balls drawn 
case.   The univariate (from Table 60) and multivariate (from Table 63) predicted 
allocation lines are shown.   Visual inspection shows neither line to be an obviously 
superior fit to the data.   The small sample size (N=98) for this case is likely to be part of 
the issue for the univariate model.  In the multivariate case, the model is able to draw 
upon the other cases to strengthen the overall model and thus may have superior 
prediction capability.    
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Figure 26. Allocations vs. public data for 3 balls drawn. 
 
In addition to non-linearity in the relationship between allocations and balls drawn, there 
may be non-linearity in the relationship to allocation and public data.  Figure 27 shows 
the allocations by participants in feedback markets for the random draws experiment 
when two balls were drawn.   The pluses are allocations made by the AllPct algorithm 
(section 4.4.4).   The pluses vary around a continuous curve because the allocation to an 
individual state has dependence on the distribution of the rest of the public allocations 
and how these relate to the ball draw in the draw set.    The pluses trace a non-linear 
curve with changes in public allocation having more impact at lower values of public 
allocation.    The slope of the regression fit to the experimental data points appears 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Three balls drawn  N=98
Public Allocation (%)
Re
sp
on
de
n
ts
 
Al
lo
ca
tio
n
 
 
Freq
Pct
MV Regression
UV Regression
158 
similar to the slope of the reference curve for higher values of public allocation.    There 
is some resemblance of the AllPct style curve and the shape of the experimental data 
points; however, the experimental points are notably lower (that is lower allocation than 
the AllPct style curve).     
 
 
Figure 27. Participant's allocation vs. public allocation from random draws experiment for two balls 
drawn (shown as circles) with reference points added for the AllPct strategy (shown as pluses). 
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Hypothesis Supported - Section 4.4.4 showed that strategies that maximize expected 
value are quite rare while strategies that generally allocate to percentages are common.   
One potential explanation for this behavior can be derived from analysis using the 
Prospect Theory curve of values.    
 
 
 
Figure 28.  Simulated Prospect Theory Utility Curve 
 
 
Figure 28 shows a representation of a participant's utility curve.   The curve was 
generated with the equation 
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by spreading their allocations uniformly.   Expected utility can then be computed for 
various allocations and these can be searched for a maximum.   To illustrate, consider a 
no-feedback market where a participant's draw was AAB.   To maximize the dollar 
payout, a participant should allocate 100 tickets on A.   The expected payout is  
 
100*(.49)+0*(.51)=49 correct tickets 
 
Given the utility curve shown, the expected value of this allocation is: 
 
Value(100 correct)*(.49) + Value(0 Correct)*(.51) 
2.82*.49 + (-1.28)*.51 = 0.73 
 
Using numerical analysis, a maximum for this was found for 70 tickets on A, 30 tickets 
on B and 0 tickets on the remaining.   Its utility is 
 
Value(70 correct)*.49 + Value(30 correct)*.196 + Value(0 correct)*.314 
2.36*.49 + 1.04*.196 + (-.853)*.314 = 1.09 
 
So, given this utility curve, in order to maximize the expected utility for this draw, the 
participant would not allocated all 100 tickets on A.   Of course this utility curve was not 
derived from any empirical data and was only used to illustrate the point, but the analysis 
does show a rational explanation for the small fraction of participants whose allocations 
matched the strategies that maximize the expected payout. 
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As noted, analysis of the individual responses indicate evidence for information 
integration.   In section 4.4.4 categorization of individual responses in feedback markets 
showed approximately 10% of participants' responses fit to models which integrate public 
and private data.   In section 4.4.3 multivariate analysis showed a statistically significant 
evidence for information integration taking place.   However, these effects are rather 
subtle compared to the  resounding evidence for information integration seen in the 
market results.   This illustrates that the effects seen in markets represent an emergent 
phenomenon (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005).   That is, the market results are a phenomenon 
that might not be predicted by analyzing the behavior of individuals in different market 
situations.   For future work, it would be interesting to study the allocations by 
individuals in different feedback situations.   A heterogeneous regression analysis in this 
manner could uncover new perspectives in the information integration process.  It is quite 
possible that the 90% of respondents whose responses do not fit to a model which 
integrate public and private data may have a subtle bias in their responses which do 
integrate data but are not strong enough to register as that type of algorithm. 
 
Table 74 presents a summary of the hypotheses and their evaluation for the research 
questions "How do individuals use information in the allocation process?"    
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Hypothesis Evaluation 
7. In the absence of 
public data, 
participants allocate 
tickets allocate 
tickets in a 
Bayesian-like 
method 
Partially Supported - Section 4.4.2 showed that participants 
over allocate in low Bayesian probability circumstances and 
under allocate in high Bayesian probability circumstances. 
8. In the presence 
of public data, 
participants allocate 
tickets by 
integrating public 
and private data 
Supported - In section 4.4.3 multivariate regression indicated 
as the number of balls drawn for a particular state increased 
in the draw set the influence of public data increased.    
9. Participants will 
favor bets with a 
higher probability 
of winning over 
bets which 
maximize expected 
winnings 
Supported - Section 4.4.4 showed that strategies that 
maximize expected value are quite rare while strategies that 
generally allocate to percentages are common. 
Table 74. Summary of hypotheses and their evaluation for the third research question "How do 
individuals use information in the allocation process?" 
 
 
5.2 Simulating Markets 
Simulation is capable of bringing valuable insights to the study of markets.   The idea of 
simulating markets is explored in this section and a prototype simulator to test these 
concepts is explored. 
 
5.2.1 Simulation Goals 
The experimental methods used in the present research have been shown to be effective 
in studying market performance under different conditions.    However, developing the 
software to carry out such research is complicated, collecting data from live participants 
can be time consuming and participants must be compensated.    Building computer 
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models to simulate markets is an alternative method which allows investigation of 
various market characteristics without these limitations.    
 
Simulation models can also be used to understand phenomenon seen in real world 
markets.   Epstein and Axtell (1996) argue that agent based simulation provides a 
different way to explain social phenomenon .   They argue that being able to explain a 
phenomenon is equivalent to asking if one can 'grow' it in an artificial environment.    
They express this process as “a generative kind of social science.” 
 
A simulation model is a representation of reality and can never fully recreate the effects 
seen in the real world.   In simulating a market, as in any simulation project, it is critical 
to identify the specific goals of the simulation in order to tailor and optimize the 
simulation towards those goals (Sterman, 2000). 
 
5.2.2 Characteristics of Interest 
A simulation platform can be used to study various characteristics of a market.  Table 75 
list just a few factors and methods to study them in the simulation environment.   
Simulation allows study of these factors by conducting extensive sensitivity analyses. 
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Factor Simulation Procedure 
 
Number of participants Simulate over a range of participants and vary by 
market type to understand the sensitivity 
Diversity Change the ratios of allocation strategies to determine 
the impact on performance 
Degree of positive 
feedback 
Simulate a varying percentage of participants whose 
allocation strategies exhibit positive feedback 
Degree of negative 
feedback 
Simulate a varying percentage of participants whose 
allocation strategies exhibit negative feedback 
Signal Strength Simulate with varying signal strength.   In this case 
signal strength is increased by adding more balls of 
the correct state to the urn. 
Noise Level Noise can be simulated by randomly altering a ball 
draw 
Table 75. Summary of factors which can be studied in a market simulator. 
 
The performance of the market as a function of the number of participants in the market 
is of great interest to the market designer.   Depending on the circumstances it is likely 
under some degree of control by the market implementer.   For example, the designer 
may wish to understand the market performance with few participants. 
 
Other factors of interest may be more difficult for the designer to influence.   The degree 
of diversity, the degree of positive feedback and the degree of negative feedback are key 
examples.    The designer may influence diversity by who they invite to participate in the 
market.   Training for participants could impact the positive and negative feedback effect.  
For example, helping participants to understanding the cascade tendency could decrease 
positive feedback. 
 
Other factors may be outside the control of the designer but having an understanding of 
these factors could help in the analysis of the market results.    Key factors in this 
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category are signal strength and the presence of noise.   Signal strength relates to the 
amount of information available to market participants in the problem space.   Noise 
relates to how clearly available information is interpreted.   To illustrate, consider a 
forecasting prediction market.    If the participants have a lot of information relevant to 
the forecast (e.g., inventory levels, customer insights, ecosystem factors, etc.) they would 
be able to make more knowledgeable assessments.   If the information is unclear (e.g., 
customers giving conflicting signals, channel partners giving ambiguous responses, etc.) 
or noisy then individual assessments are more difficult. 
 
5.2.3 Simulator Architecture 
Figure 29 shows the architecture of the prototype prediction markets simulator.    The 
blocks include: 
 
Set of Allocation Strategies - A set of allocation strategies are needed.   In the prototype 
simulator the strategies described in section 3.4.2 are used.    Different types of markets 
are defined by the range of strategies used in the market.   For example, for a no-feedback 
market (Incentivized Poll) only strategies that use private data are employed.   For 
percentage feedback markets, only strategies that use percent values of public data are 
used.      
 
Select Strategy - Once a set of possible strategies are defined based on the market type to 
be simulated one strategy from this set is chosen using a random process.   The selected 
strategy is then passed into the Generate Allocation block. 
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Generate Allocation - This block receives a strategy from the select strategy block, a 
draw from the Draw Engine and public information from the Market block.   When the 
allocation is generated it is delivered to the Market block. 
 
Draw Engine - This block simulates the two urn processes.   It first selects a ball at 
random as the correct state and then populates a second urn with a biased distribution of 
balls.   This second urn is then sampled to generate the draw set.    
 
Market Block - The Market block is a collection of all previous allocations and maintains 
the current cumulative allocation.     
 
Stochastic Generator - This block is used to simulate randomness.   Two sources of 
randomness were simulated: 1) noise in evaluating the draw; 2) noise in generating the 
allocation.   In the draw evaluation noise process one or more of the draws delivered from 
the draw engine are randomly changed.   A model parameter is used to vary the degree of 
this noise.   The second source of randomness involves random deviation from the 
strategy derived allocation.   In the implementation used some number of tickets are 
added to, or subtracted from, the allocation generated by the allocation strategy.   The 
level of this degree of randomness is controlled by another parameter. 
 
Simulation Controller - the controller block repeats the sequence until the specified 
number of market stages are complete. 
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Figure 29. Market Simulator Architecture 
 
5.2.4 Simulator Calibration and Validation 
Once the architecture was implemented the parameters of the simulator must be specified; 
that is, the model had to be calibrated.     The set of allocation strategies described in 
section 3.4.2 were used.    The simulator used the Matlab command randsample to select 
one strategy from the alternatives.   This method allows sampling with replacement based 
on a vector of probabilities.   These probability distributions used were based on the 
frequency of each strategy observed from the experimental data as discussed in section 
4.4.4.      
 
Sets of market simulations were compared to experimental data in order to validate the 
models.   Two methods were used in this process.  First, the raw market results such as 
number of correct, incorrect and not significant were compared to experimental data.   
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Second, individual allocations generated by the simulator were used to extract allocation 
style characteristics as defined in section 4.4.4.   These were then compared to the 
experimental data.   The parameters in the stochastic generator were then adjusted to 
improve the fitness of the model generated data in relation to the experimental data. 
 
The distributions across styles shown in Table 65 were used for the initial simulation.   
Values of the stochastic engine parameters were varied to improve the fit.   Table 76 and 
Table 77 show a comparison of the experimental and simulated decisiveness and 
correctness for the prototype.    A Fisher's Exact test p-value testing the differences is 
also shown.   The goal of the calibration process was to make the differences not 
significant.    The simulator does a good job of matching the decisiveness and correctness 
of the no-feedback markets with p-values usually greater than .05.    The match for 
feedback markets is not as good, especially for the latter stages of the market. 
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Table 76. Experimental vs. simulated decisiveness and Fisher's Exact test p-value. Low p-values 
indicate the two distributions are statistically significantly different. 
 
 
Stage Experiment Simulation p value Experiment Simulation p value
1 33.3% 37.8% 0.328 36.0% 22.7% 0.005
2 43.8% 49.0% 0.294 38.2% 37.2% 0.468
3 39.6% 49.0% 0.136 48.3% 45.3% 0.331
4 35.4% 49.0% 0.049 47.2% 49.5% 0.380
5 39.6% 49.8% 0.115 57.3% 54.3% 0.333
6 52.1% 50.4% 0.472 64.0% 55.8% 0.081
7 60.4% 53.0% 0.203 66.3% 57.6% 0.068
8 56.3% 54.6% 0.475 69.7% 58.7% 0.027
9 58.3% 55.4% 0.408 62.9% 61.1% 0.414
10 62.5% 55.4% 0.214 65.2% 62.8% 0.374
11 58.3% 59.0% 0.522 68.5% 61.7% 0.122
12 58.3% 62.2% 0.352 69.7% 62.0% 0.093
13 56.3% 62.8% 0.229 70.8% 62.5% 0.074
14 58.3% 63.0% 0.312 71.9% 63.7% 0.074
15 56.3% 64.2% 0.174 75.3% 65.4% 0.036
16 52.1% 66.4% 0.035 75.3% 66.9% 0.065
17 56.3% 68.2% 0.066 78.7% 68.0% 0.023
18 60.4% 66.8% 0.230 80.9% 69.4% 0.013
19 60.4% 66.6% 0.238 82.0% 70.6% 0.013
20 58.3% 68.4% 0.105 80.9% 71.7% 0.038
No Feedback Feedback
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Table 77.  . Experimental vs. simulated correctness and Fisher's Exact test p-value  Low p-values 
indicate the two distributions are statistically significantly different. 
  
 
Figure 30 compares the decisiveness and correctness after stage 20 for both the simulator 
and the experiment.    This shows the simulator correctly captures the tradeoff between 
decisiveness and correctness seen in the experimental data; however, without as 
pronounced an effect as seen in the experiment. 
 
Stage Experiment Simulation p value Experiment Simulation p value
1 50.0% 51.9% 0.328 46.9% 50.2% 0.005
2 57.1% 58.8% 0.294 55.9% 52.7% 0.468
3 57.9% 63.7% 0.136 65.1% 54.1% 0.331
4 70.6% 68.2% 0.049 69.0% 57.6% 0.380
5 63.2% 71.5% 0.115 60.8% 59.7% 0.333
6 68.0% 74.2% 0.472 64.9% 60.9% 0.081
7 65.5% 78.1% 0.203 69.5% 62.0% 0.068
8 77.8% 81.7% 0.475 69.4% 64.4% 0.027
9 75.0% 82.3% 0.408 75.0% 66.9% 0.414
10 73.3% 83.8% 0.214 74.1% 68.2% 0.374
11 71.4% 85.4% 0.522 73.8% 69.7% 0.122
12 71.4% 87.8% 0.352 72.6% 72.1% 0.093
13 81.5% 88.2% 0.229 74.6% 73.9% 0.074
14 82.1% 89.8% 0.312 75.0% 75.8% 0.074
15 92.6% 90.3% 0.174 76.1% 76.3% 0.036
16 100.0% 90.7% 0.035 79.1% 78.6% 0.065
17 100.0% 90.9% 0.066 78.6% 78.8% 0.023
18 100.0% 92.2% 0.230 77.8% 80.1% 0.013
19 100.0% 94.9% 0.238 76.7% 81.0% 0.013
20 100.0% 95.0% 0.105 77.8% 81.5% 0.038
No Feedback Feedback
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Figure 30. Comparison of experimental and simulated decisiveness and correctness after stage 20 
 
 
5.2.5 Initial Simulation Results 
To illustrate the application of a market simulator the prototype simulator was used to 
study the impact of changing the proportions of allocation styles on market performance.   
One hypothesis is that allocation strategies with low computation and low information 
usage  (Figure 10) degrade overall market performance.    This hypothesis was tested 
with the prototype simulator.    No-feedback and frequency feedback markets were 
simulated with varying proportions of allocation styles.    Table 78 shows the conditions 
simulated.    First the proportions of strategies as derived in the random draws experiment 
were simulated as a baseline.   Then a light and heavy computation mix were simulated.  
In the no-feedback market a light computation mix put more MaxiMin into the market at 
the expense of the DrawPct and DrawEV strategies.    For the heavy computation mix, 
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the opposite was used with a smaller percentage of MaxiMin and larger percentage of 
DrawPct and DrawEV.    Similarly, a light and heavy compute ratio of strategies for the 
frequency feedback markets was simulated.   The light compute scenarios increased the 
proportion of MaxiMin and Mimic at the expense of the other, higher computation 
strategies.   The heavy compute scenario reduced MaxiMin and Mimic to add more 
weight to the higher computation strategies. 
 
 
Table 78. Simulated market performance under different proportions of allocation styles. 
 
Simulating 100,00 markets affirms the hypothesis.  In both market types the light 
compute scenario reduces both decisiveness and correctness while the heavy compute 
scenario increase both decisiveness and correctness.     
 
As Light Heavy As Light Heavy
Expt. Compute Compute Expt. Compute Compute
MaxiMin 33.9% 66.5% 16.5% 23.0% 40.0% 13.9%
DrawPct 48.1% 20.0% 60.0% 24.2% 6.1% 25.0%
DrawEV 9.5% 5.0% 15.0% 10.7% 1.8% 15.0%
Mimic - - - 22.1% 40.0% 8.0%
PublicEV - - - 1.0% 0.0% 0.0%
AllPct - - - 6.6% 2.0% 10.0%
AllPctEV - - - 0.0% - 5.0%
AllDraws - - - 4.2% 2.0% 10.0%
AllDrawsEV - - - 0.0% - 5.0%
No Fit 8.5% 8.5% 8.5% 8.1% 8.1% 8.1%
Markets Simulated 100,000    100,000    100,000    100,000  100,000    100,000     
Decisiveness 67.5% 41.5% 78.5% 74.1% 35.5% 85.9%
Correctness 93.5% 81.0% 95.5% 80.6% 62.9% 84.6%
No Feedback Markets Frequency Feedback Markets
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This illustration presents one example of the many types of analyses which a simulator 
can permit. 
 
 
5.3 Considerations  for Prediction Market Designers 
The relevance of these results to the designer of prediction markets is explored. 
 
5.3.1 Choosing a Feedback Type 
Choosing the type of feedback to use in a prediction market is an important design 
consideration.     Figure 31 shows the decisiveness and error rate as measured from the 
random draws experiment.   Error rate is defined as 1-correctness and so is a simple 
remapping of Figure 13.      However, this chart resembles an efficient horizon chart used 
in finance which is usually plotted as return on the y axis and risk on the x axis.     So 
decisiveness is analogous to return in that the market designer wishes to get some 
information out of the market and error rate is analogous to financial risk. 
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Figure 31. Decisiveness and error rate observed in the random draws experiment 
 
 
So it is clear the market designer can trade some error rate to get more information from 
the market.    The designer can judge the impact of an error in the market and choose 
accordingly.    But, how much real value is the extra decisiveness of a feedback market 
really worth?    Table 79 gives a summary of the no-feedback and feedback markets after 
stage 20 from the random draws experiment.     Here, the results of Table 31 and  Table 
32  are shown as percentages.    Feedback markets are providing significant results in 
22.6%  more markets than no-feedback markets.        However, the incremental rates of 
judging incorrect values is 18% while the incremental correct values are only 4.6%.    
This can be considered that the correctness on the additional 22.6% market which were 
determined to be significant is only 20%! (that's 4.6/(4.6+18)). 
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Table 79. Comparison of no-feedback and feedback markets. 
 
 
As a different way to analyze the results, the product of correctness and decisiveness 
could be examined as a single metric of market performance.     
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This metric, percent correct, is shown in Table 80.    By this metric, frequency feedback 
markets are the best performing. 
Correct Incorrect Not Sig.
No Feedback 58.3% 0.0% 41.7%
Feedback 62.9% 18.0% 19.1%
Change -4.6% -18.0% 22.6%
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Table 80. Percent correct by market type. Percent correct is the product of correctness and 
decisiveness.   Results are shown by market stage (number of participants) for the random draws 
experiment. 
 
The characteristics of the application may help the prediction market designer choose a 
market structure.    Table 81 illustrates one selection framework.  The expected signal 
strength and project characteristics are used here as the selection criteria.   Project 
characteristics shown are Mission Critical and Exploratory are illustrated below: 
• Mission Critical: e.g., prediction market is being used to support a forecast which will 
appear in the company's annual report 
• Exploratory: e.g., prediction market is used as part of a marketing group's evaluation of 
new product concepts 
The signal strength may be the designer's best guess or perhaps previous prediction 
markets have provided some indication (e.g., many prior prediction markets resulted in 
Stage No FB Pct Freq
1 16.7% 20.9% 13.0%
2 25.0% 23.3% 19.6%
3 22.9% 32.6% 30.4%
4 25.0% 37.2% 28.3%
5 25.0% 32.6% 37.0%
6 35.4% 41.9% 41.3%
7 39.6% 46.5% 45.7%
8 43.8% 48.8% 47.8%
9 43.8% 44.2% 50.0%
10 45.8% 48.8% 47.8%
11 41.7% 48.8% 52.2%
12 41.7% 48.8% 52.2%
13 45.8% 48.8% 56.5%
14 47.9% 48.8% 58.7%
15 52.1% 51.2% 63.0%
16 52.1% 51.2% 67.4%
17 56.3% 55.8% 67.4%
18 60.4% 58.1% 67.4%
19 60.4% 58.1% 67.4%
20 58.3% 58.1% 67.4%
Correctness x Decisiveness
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'Not Significant' results).     Where the signal is expected to be strong and the project is 
critical then the designer may favor no-feedback markets.    When the signal is expected 
to be weak and the results are not mission critical then the designer may favor a feedback 
market. 
 
 Project Characteristics 
Mission Critical Exploratory 
 
 
Signal 
Strength 
Strong Favor Correctness - No-
Feedback 
Need both Correctness 
and Decisiveness, but 
favor Decisiveness - 
Feedback or Hybrid? 
Weak Need both Correctness 
and Decisiveness, but 
favor Correctness - No-
Feedback Hybrid? 
Favor Decisiveness - 
Feedback 
Table 81. Potential selection criteria for market structure. 
 
 
The way the market results are to be used might also influence the structure to be used.   
As discussed in section 2.2.3.2.2, the Ellsberg Paradox showed that humans are averse to 
ambiguity.    If the market results are needed to convince an audience (e.g., senior 
management) then more Decisive and lower entropy feedback markets may be valuable. 
 
5.3.2 Market Size (Number of Participants) 
The number of participants is another parameter which may be under the control of the 
market organizer.   Should the market be kept to a small, select group in the organization 
or made more generally available?     It is expected that this would be heavily dependent 
on the signal strength (availability of private information) and the allocation styles used 
by the participants.   The experimental data can be examined for some guidance.   Figure 
32 shows the decisiveness and correctness results for the no-feedback and feedback 
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markets by market stage.   No-feedback market decisiveness is quite stable after 7 
participants.   However, the correctness continues to rise until it reaches 100% at stage 16.    
By contrast, decisiveness for feedback markets appears to keep rising over most of the 
experiment with a plateau being reached quite late in the experiment.   Feedback market 
correctness appears to reach a maximum after approximately 15 participants.     
 
 
Figure 32. Decisiveness and correctness by stage (random draws experiment) 
 
5.3.3 Guiding Participants to Improve Performance 
Section 5.2.5 suggested that if the participants used more available information and more 
complex algorithms in the allocation of their tickets, the performance of the market 
would improve.     Generally, these changes also improve the participant's financial 
performance as they approach the maximum expected value, and thus represent a win-
win for both the participant and market organizer.   Plott et al. (2003) gave participant's a 
review of Bayesian statistics and showed them a version of Table 22.    A prediction 
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
100.0%
120.0%
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Decisiveness (No FB)
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Correctness (No FB)
Correctness (FB)
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market organizers may use some type of similar information to improve the performance 
of their participants. 
 
5.3.4 Screening 
The random draws experiment included two types of participant screening while the 
mirage prone data experiment had no screening.   It's possible that the participants in the 
mirage prone experiment who would have been screened out if screens were present may 
have had a significant contribution to the poor decisiveness and correctness performance 
seen in those results. 
 
Table 26, shown earlier, showed the results from a no-feedback market in the mirage 
prone.    Participant 4 received a draw of DDE and put all 100 of their tickets on state C.   
These 100 tickets represented nearly 40% of the tickets allocated to state C through the 
first 12 stages and created a market which did not display a significant mode.   So, not 
only was private information excluded from the market, the spurious input adversely 
impacted the result.    In feedback markets the result of a spurious impact can be even 
more detrimental, especially if that input occurs early in the market and creates an 
information mirage. 
 
Two screening methods were tested and described in section 4.1.4 including an attention 
test and a screen on a no-feedback market.   No-feedback markets have an inherent 
advantage as screening need not be done in real time.   Feedback markets would require 
the screening to be complete before the participant were allowed to enter the market. 
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5.3.5 Synchronous or Asynchronous Markets 
Most of the prediction markets being implemented today are synchronous.   An 
asynchronous market has been shown in the present study.   While this implementation 
was used primarily due to the design of the experiment, it provides a potentially useful 
type of market.   For a no-feedback market design there is no reason to have a 
synchronous market.   For a feedback market one might argue that those at the end have 
an advantage over those at the beginning.   However, if the market is repeated on a 
regular basis (e.g., a monthly forecast) then participants could have different positions on 
each cycle.   Additionally, synchronous markets place a greater burden on the 
implementation of the market, especially in terms of the software needed.   And, 
synchronous markets place a burden upon the participants as they must be available at the 
specific time (and perhaps place) of the prediction market.   If the market includes 
participants across various time zones, this can be logistically difficult.   The present 
research suggest practitioners might consider an asynchronous approach. 
 
5.3.6 Evaluating Prediction Market Results 
The present study has defined a method to judge the statistical significance of results in 
terms of correct, incorrect or not statistically significant as discussed in section 3.4.2.       
This can be valuable for the prediction market organizer in the interpretation of their 
results.    Still qualitative analysis of distribution shape of real world prediction market 
results may give clues to participants' insights.   For example,  dual peaks may give clues 
to dissonance being experienced by participants (Hopman, 2008). 
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5.4 Future Research 
Areas of potential future research are now discussed. 
 
5.4.1 Simulation 
Further simulation development, testing and applications are here indicated.   Several 
possible simulation projects were described in section 5.1.  As mentioned, simulation can 
help to understand market conditions that may be difficult or time consuming to test 
empirically.    Simulation work may be used to narrow down a list of ideas for an 
empirical study.   Or, simulation could be used after an empirical study to gain insight 
into a phenomenon observed in the experiment.     
 
Within a given market structure, there are several important characteristics which could 
impact performance.   Some of these may be under the control of the organizer.   Others 
may not be under the organizer’s control, but an understanding of them may influence the 
organizer’s choices. 
 
The performance of the market as a function of the number of participants in the market 
is of great interest to the market designer (section 5.3.2).   Depending on the 
circumstances it is likely under some degree of control to the designer.   In some cases, 
the designer may determine that relatively few participants should participate and in this 
situation the designer would be keenly interested in the expected performance of such 
market. 
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Other factors of interest may be difficult to control but  the designer might have some 
influence on the effect.   For example, the designer may influence diversity by who is 
invited to participate in the market.   Training for participants on cascade tendencies or 
maximizing expected payoffs might influence feedback effects.   The impact of these 
changes could be estimated and simulated to study the impact on market performance. 
 
Other factors may be outside the control of the organizer but the designer may have some 
understanding of these parameters which could help in the analysis of the market results.    
Key factors in this category are signal strength and the presence of noise.   Signal 
strength relates to the amount of information available to market participants in the 
problem space.   Noise relates to how clearly available information is interpreted.   To 
illustrate, consider a forecasting prediction market.    If the participants have a lot of 
information relevant to the forecast (e.g., inventory levels, customer insights, ecosystem 
factors, etc.) they are able to make more knowledgeable assessments.   If the information 
is unclear (e.g., customers giving conflicting signals, channel partners giving ambiguous 
responses, etc.) or noisy then individual assessments are more difficult.   Simulation 
studies could help to increase understanding of how the markets perform under varying 
levels of signal strength and noise. 
 
Table 82 briefly describes some hypotheses on how key factors may impact correctness 
and decisiveness in prediction markets.    These represent a sampling of ideas for a 
simulation research project. 
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Factor Hypothesized 
Impact on 
Correctness 
Hypothesized 
Impact on 
Decisiveness 
Hypothesized Net 
impact 
Number of 
participants  
More participants 
increase correctness  
More participants 
increase 
decisiveness  
More participants 
improves 
performance 
Diversity  Greater diversity 
increases 
correctness  
Greater diversity 
increases 
decisiveness  
Greater diversity 
improves 
performance 
Degree of 
positive 
feedback  
More positive 
feedback decreases 
correctness  
More positive 
feedback increases 
decisiveness 
Positive feedback 
involves a tradeoff 
Degree of 
negative 
feedback  
More negative 
feedback increases 
correctness in a 
system which already 
has positive feedback 
(by reducing 
information mirages) 
More negative 
feedback reduces 
decisiveness 
correctness in a 
system which 
already has positive 
feedback 
Negative feedback 
involves a tradeoff 
Signal Strength  Stronger signal 
increases 
correctness  
Stronger signal 
increases 
decisiveness 
Stronger signal 
improves 
performance 
Noise Levels  More noise reduces 
correctness 
More noise reduces 
decisiveness 
More noise degrades 
performance 
Table 82. Hypothesized impact of key factors 
 
5.4.2 Parimutuel Markets 
Parimutuel markets were briefly mentioned in section 2.1.1.2.   These were explored in 
detail by Plott et al. (2003).   Table 83 summarizes the pros and cons of a parimutuel 
system. 
 
Parimutuel systems have some interesting benefits.  First, compared to a fixed winning 
system, they provide a measure of negative feedback.    Since the market prize is split 
amongst winning tickets, as more tickets are allocated to a particular state the incentive to 
place more tickets on that state decreases.   Another state, which may have a lower 
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probability of being correct, may offer a better expected value.    This negative feedback 
should help in reducing information mirages. 
 
A long shot bias has been observed in gambling (Woodland & B.M., 1994) as well as 
parimutuel market (Hurley & McDonough, 1995).    In this situation, participants tend to 
overvalue long shots and undervalue favorites.    This phenomenon was also observed in 
the experimental parimutuel prediction markets (Plott et al., 2003). 
 
However, there are some clear negative issues with parimutuel markets.   First, since the 
pool will be split amongst all winning tickets, there is incentive for participants to attempt 
to influence other members as they place their bets.    For example, bluffing may occur.   
Second, if there is some indication of the accumulated bets, there is incentive to delay 
making one’s bet until the last possible moment – when all the diverse information of the 
participants has been accumulated in the system.   This is in contrast to a double auction 
process where participants are incentivized to bet early, when market inefficiencies may 
be present (and prices are low). 
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Pros Cons 
Provides a source of negative feedback - 
could provide a counter force to 
information mirages 
Could foster disruptive strategic behavior – 
e.g., bluffing 
May provide additional incentive to 
participants as they perceive large potential 
winnings  
Incentivizes delaying the allocation of 
tickets  (as group information is collected) 
– vs. double-auction which incentivizes 
quick action 
 May cost the market organizer more in 
terms of payments since the entire pool of 
incentive prizes is paid each time - 
independent of the performance of the 
market 
Table 83. Pros/Cons of parimutuel system 
 
 
Comparing the parimutuel and a fixed winning system offers interesting tradeoffs 
between the payout the organizer must make and the perceived possible winnings by 
participants.   In the parimutuel system the entire market prize is awarded each time, 
regardless of market performance (with the exception when no tickets are placed on the 
correct state).   By contrast, the payout in a fixed winning system is unpredictable.   It is 
bounded by the winnings per ticket multiplied by the number of tickets, but would rarely 
if ever reach that level.   To the organizer's benefit, the payout is proportional to the 
performance of the market.    The tradeoff here concerns the incentives perceived by the 
participants.   In a fixed winning system the participant knows their maximum possible 
winning (the amount one winning ticket will fetch times the number of tickets).   By 
contrast, in a parimutuel system there is the chance that one single ticket could win the 
entire market prize (if that one ticket is the only ticket placed on the correct state).   To 
illustrate this imagine a corporate prediction market designer who has a budget of $100.   
They want to run a market with 10 participants and are considering a fixed winning vs. a 
parimutuel system.   How should they set up the prize structure?   For the parimutuel they 
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may simply say the prize is $100 and each of you get 100 tickets to allocate.   Any 
participant has the opportunity (perhaps very small) of winning the entire $100.   That 
may provide a significant amount of incentive and the participants may expend 
considerable energy in making their selections.   The fixed winning system is much more 
difficult to plan.   If the budget is fixed they may indicate that each participant gets 100 
tickets and each correct ticket is worth 10 cents ($100/1000) budget compliance.   
However, in this case, each participant can win a maximum of only $10.   This may result 
in less mental energy being expended during the allocation process.   Another option 
open to the organizer is to make tickets worth more than 10 cents and assume some 
maximum percentage of the tickets will be allocated on the correct state.   That would 
provide more incentive to the participants but the organizer runs the risk of going over 
budget.   In fact, this characteristic makes the design of a research experiment to compare 
fixed winning and parimutuel markets very challenging. 
 
5.4.3 Hybrid Markets 
Roust and Plott (1999) tested a two stage parimutuel market where the first stage had no 
feedback and the second stage included feedback.     Other types of hybrid structures 
would be interesting to explore.   For example, a hybrid market could be constructed 
where some members of the market receive feedback and others do not.    A hypothesis is 
that a  hybrid market's performance would lie somewhere on the curve formed by the 
pure markets of Figure 13. 
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5.4.4 Treatments to Improve Individual's Performance 
As discussed in sections 5.3.3 and Plott et al. (2003)  there may be opportunities to 
improve the way individuals allocate tickets which would improve the overall 
performance of the markets (as well as increase the individual's winnings).    An 
experiment where one group received a certain treatment (such as being shown Table 22, 
the Bayesian probabilities given the different types of draw sets) compared to a control 
group should be able to test this hypothesis. 
 
5.4.5 Correlation of Allocation Styles to Psychological 
Characteristics 
Further analysis and empirical experimentation could help understand the relationship 
between allocation styles and individual's characteristics.   A deeper understanding here 
could help to tailor the treatments as described in section 5.3.3. 
 
 
5.4.6 Impact of Final Digit Bias 
Figure 19 showed a bias by respondents to round allocations to multiples of 5 or 10.    It 
would be valuable to understand if, and how, this phenomenon impacts the performance 
of the markets. 
 
5.5 Summary 
Prediction markets are emerging as an interesting tool for organizational knowledge 
management.    Their ability to assimilate diverse information in the organization and 
bypass some of the human biases present in group processes is seen as a valuable 
instrument to improve business performance.   The primary goal of the present study was 
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to gain insights into the operation and optimization of prediction markets.   Specifically, 
the research sought to understand how these markets assimilate information and how this 
process is influenced by the presence, and type, of feedback.     
 
The research supported the hypothesis that information assimilation in feedback markets 
is composed of two mechanisms - information collection and  aggregation.    These are 
defined as:  
• Collection - The compilation of dispersed information - individuals using their 
own private information make  judgments and act accordingly in the market. 
• Aggregation - The market's judgment on the implications of this gathered 
information - an inductive process. This effect comes from participants 
integrating public information with their private information in their decision 
process. 
 
Information collection was studied in isolation in no feedback markets and the hypothesis 
that markets outperform the average of their participants was supported.    The hypothesis 
that with the addition of feedback, the process of aggregation would be present was also 
supported.    Aggregation was shown to create agreement in markets (as measured by 
entropy) and drive market results closer to correct values (the known probabilities). 
 
Information mirages were hypothesized as a key failure mechanism and their fingerprint 
was detected in the research data.   It was suggested that the very mechanism of market 
information aggregation, the inductive portion of information assimilation, can inherently 
produce bubbles based on randomness in the processes.   This illustrates that market 
bubbles in the form or information mirages can come about as the result of statistical 
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variations in private data coupled with rational judgment and decision processes; bubbles 
need not come from simple irrationality.   
 
A primary hypothesis of the present study was that changing the presence and type of 
feedback supplied to the market can impact market performance because of its impact on 
this inductive process.   The research showed that the presence of feedback increased the 
precision of the market at the expense of accuracy.   The data also suggested that the type 
of feedback may modulate this process which may allow a prediction market organizer to 
tailor the market to the specific requirements of their task. 
 
The way individual participants use information to make allocations was studied.    In 
feedback markets the fit of participant's responses to various decision models 
demonstrated great variety.  The decision models ranged from little use of information 
(e.g., MaxiMin),  use of only private information (e.g., allocation in proportion to 
probabilities), use of only public information (e.g., allocating in proportion to public 
distributions) and  integration of public and private information.    Analysis of all 
feedback market responses using multivariate regression also supported the hypothesis 
that public and private information was being integrated by some participants.   The 
subtle information integration results are in contrast to the distinct differences seen in 
markets with varying levels of feedback.    This illustrates that the differences in market 
performance with feedback are an emergent phenomenon (i.e., one that could not be 
predicted by analyzing the behavior of individuals in different market situations). 
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The characterization of individual participant's use of information can lead to the 
development of models (and simulators) to understand the performance of different 
market structures.   This might be used to predict potentially interesting performance 
characteristics of a prediction market under certain conditions that could later be tested 
empirically; such as a treatment that changes the way individuals use their information to 
allocate tickets and thereby improves the overall performance of the prediction market.   
Alternately, the characterization of individuals responses may be used with  a simulator 
to explain an effect seen in a prediction market that had not previously been understood - 
an application of generative science to explain an emergent effect. 
 
The results of this study have increased our collective knowledge of market operation and 
have revealed methods that organizations can use in the construction and analysis of 
prediction markets.     In some situations markets without feedback  may be a preferred 
option.  The research has studied information aggregation and shown support for the 
hypothesis that it can be simultaneously  responsible for the beneficial information 
processing in feedback markets as well as the harmful information mirage induced 
bubbles.    In fact, a market subject to a mirage prone data resembles a Prisoner's 
Dilemma where individual rationality results in collective irrationality. 
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Appendix - Survey Details 
 
1. IRB approved Consent Form: 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study.   This research is being conducted by 
Richard Jolly, a student in Portland State University’s Systems Science Program and 
School of Business.  The research is part of a PhD dissertation and is being supervised by 
Professor Wayne Wakeland. 
 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to partake in an on-line simulated market.   
You will be given some information about the market which is unique to you and you 
will see how other market participants have acted.   You will then be asked to make an 
allocation of tickets which represents your best guess for the future state of the market.    
You will participate in a number of these market activities over the course of about 15-
20 minutes.   You will receive a payment after participating in the study.   In addition, 
the knowledge which the study produces may help others in the future. 
 
None of your contact information will be kept with the data – so there will be no way to 
link your responses to you. 
 
Your participation is voluntary.   You may also withdraw from this study at any time.  
However, if you do withdraw, you will not be eligible for the payment. 
 
If you have concerns or problems about your participation in this study or your rights as 
a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review Committee, 
Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 600 Unitus Bldg., Portland State University, 
(503) 725-4288 / 1-877-480-4400.   If you have questions about the study itself, contact 
Richard Jolly at amtsurvey2010@yahoo.com. 
 
Clicking the ‘Yes’ button indicates that you have read and understand the above 
information and agree to take part in this study. Please understand that you may 
withdraw your consent at any time, and that, by clicking, you are not waiving any legal 
claims, rights or remedies. Please print a copy of this page for your own records. 
 
Would you like to participate? 
o Yes, I have read the instructions and would like to participate 
o No, I would not like to participate 
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2. Instructions for Incentivized Poll 
 
Instructions: 
Please read the instructions carefully so that you can properly complete the survey. 
 
How you earn your bonus 
You will be participating in an experiment in the economics of market decision making.   
Your bonus will be determined from your allocation of tickets in a set of simulated 
markets.   There are six states in each market: A, B, C, D, E and F.   One of the six will be 
randomly chosen as the correct state for any given market.     You will be given 100 
tickets for each market which you can distribute any way you wish across the six states.    
For example, let's say you distributed your 100 tickets as follows: 
 
A B C D E F 
4 42 9 21 17 7 
 
If the correct state were B, then, for this market,  you would earn a bonus of 42% of the 
maximum bonus for that market.  
 
You will be given information to help you distribute your tickets.     But, first, we will 
explain how the correct state is determined. 
 
The correct state 
The computer will randomly determine the correct state for each market.    The 
computer's process can be most easily understood by considering the analogy of 
drawing balls from a bingo cage. 
 
Six balls labeled A, B, C, D, E and F are placed in a bingo cage as shown in the figure 
below.  One ball is drawn at random.   The ball which was drawn becomes the correct 
state or the solution for the market.   You will not be told the results of this draw  – it is 
what you are attempting to predict in the exercise. 
 
 
Phase 1 draw - the first bingo cage 
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Your Private Information: 
You will also be given information which can help you distribute your tickets.   This 
information is also randomly generated by the computer.    Again, we use the bingo cage 
analogy to describe how this information is generated.    Consider that balls will be 
drawn from a second bingo cage and these draws will be shown to you.    This second 
cage will be biased based on the results of the draw from the first bingo cage.   For 
example, let’s say that the ‘B’ ball was drawn from the first bingo cage.    The second 
bingo cage would then contain 5 ‘B’ balls, 2 ‘A’ balls, 2 ‘C’ balls, 2 ‘D’ balls, 2 ‘E’ Balls and 
2 ‘F’ balls as shown in the figure below.    So, the odds that a B ball would be randomly 
drawn are higher. 
 
 
The second bingo cage 
The private data you will be shown is based on drawing balls from this second bingo 
cage.   The exact method is called ‘drawing with replacement.’   A ball will be drawn 
from the cage, recorded and then replaced into the cage.   The cage will then be spun 
and the process repeated until three draws are completed.    The drawing with 
replacement process means that for each draw the contents of the bingo cage are the 
same.   The results of these three draws will be reported to you on the screen in a 
graphic as below: 
 
 
 
This shows that the first ball drawn was a B ball.   The second and third balls were both F 
balls. 
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The Markets: 
The markets will be conducted online via this survey.   You will be participating with 
others – spaced out in time.    Between 10 and 20 people will participate in each market.    
 
At the beginning of each exercise you will see the following graphic on your screen: 
 
 
 
This indicates you have 100 tickets left to allocate across the six states – A through F. 
 
Let’s say, for example, that you then allocate 10 tickets for each state A through F by 
typing a 10 into the corresponding boxes in the table.   The screen would now update to 
the following: 
 
 
 
This shows that 10 tickets have been allocated for each state and 40 are remaining to be 
distributed.   You should continue allocating tickets until the ‘Tickets Remaining to 
Allocate’ indicates 0. 
 
The screen you will see for each market will combine the private data - the draw of 
three balls from the bingo cage - and the ticket allocation graphic.   The figure below is 
an example of the screen graphic. 
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Do you understand the process and are you ready to begin? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
3. Screen shot of  Incentivized Poll Market 
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4. Instructions for Feedback Markets 
(note, this shows the instructions for frequency markets - the instructions were 
modified accordingly if the respondent was selected into percentage markets). 
 
What others are doing: 
In the final markets you will now have an additional source of information to use to 
make your ticket distributions  - what others have done.    In addition to your private 
draw, your market screen will also show the cumulative result of all those market 
participants who have preceded you. 
 
The selections of those who have preceded you will be shown in a graphic as below: 
 
 
 
This shows that 44 tickets have been allocated to state A, 122 to state B and so on.   If 
you are the first participant in the market then the totals will be 0 for each state. 
 
So, you now have two sources of information as to which ball is more likely to have 
been drawn for the market:  
a) the private information of your three ball draws from the bingo cage 
b) the cumulative allocations made by prior participants.    
 
The screen you will see for each of these types of  market exercises will be as below: 
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Your Bonus in these markets: 
You bonus will be calculated as mentioned before - based on the percentage of tickets 
you correctly allocate.   There is no pooling of winnings - so how others allocate their 
tickets does not affect your bonus. 
 
 
Do you understand the market information and are you ready to begin? 
o Yes 
o No 
5. Screen Shot of Feedback Market 
 
 
 
 
 
